University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1996

The Triangle fire and the limits of progressivism.
Frances B. Jensen
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Jensen, Frances B., "The Triangle fire and the limits of progressivism." (1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896
- February 2014. 1230.
https://doi.org/10.7275/pnsb-nn57 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1230

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE LIMITS OF PROGRESSIVISM

A Dissertation Presented
by
FRANCES

B.

JENSEN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1996
Department of History

Q

Copyright by Frances

B.

Jensen 1996

All Rights Reserved

THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE LIMITS OF PROGRESSIVISM

A Dissertation Presented
By

FRANCES

B.

JENSEN

Approved as to style and content by.

Gerald

W.

McFarland, Chair

Bruce Laurie

,

Member

David Glassberg, Membe:

Dean MJang ^X^^^^Met^be r

Bruce Laurie, Department Head
History

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I

am grateful to many people who have encouraged and

assisted me during the preparation of this dissertation.
My colleagues at Elms College were a source of support to
me during the past several years and frequently boosted my

flagging spirits on dark day.

Members of my dissertation

committee were cooperative, helpful, and encouraging.

I

owe a deep debt of gratitude to the chairman of my

committee, Gerald McFarland.

Without his encouragement,

his patience, and his guidance at each stage of my

doctoral studies,

I

would never have been able to complete

the degree requirements

.

Furthermore

,

his example as a

scholar and a teacher will always be an inspiration to me.
I

also wish to acknowledge the debt that

late parents.

I

owe my

From my mother, Filomena Anna Giordano,

learned firsthand about life in an immigrant family
father,

.

I

My

Charles Harris Brewer, was a working-man who took

great pride in his union affiliation and left his daughter

with an appreciation for the efforts of organized labor.
I

trust that this dissertation reflects in some measure

their legacy to me.
I

owe my greatest debt to my husband, Ted Jensen,

He

has always been there for me, even during the times when

my work most upset our once tranquil family existence.

acknowledge all his help and support with love and

gratitude

iv

I

ABSTRACT
THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE LIMITS OF PROGRESSIVISM

MAY 1996

FRANCES B. JENSEN, B.A., WESTFIELD STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Gerald

W.

McFarland

One hundred and forty- six women, most of them young
immigrants, died in the fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist

Company in New York City's Lower East Side on March 25,
1911.

One of the worst industrial disasters in the

history of the United States, it confirmed the belief of
progressives that unregulated industrialism had gone awry.
This tragedy, however, have rise to a campaign for

protective labor legislation in the Empire State and

provided historians with an example of the reform impulse
in the years prior to World War

I

This dissertation makes the case, both implicitly and

explicitly, that this disaster, if examined in both a

social and a political context, can be used to increase
our understanding of three broad aspects of the history

and historiography of the progressive era.

First,

it can

help us to evaluate the debate among historians over the
true extent and effectiveness of the reform movement.
Secondly,

it will help us examine how coalitions of

united to
diverse and incompatible groups temporarily
V

demand reform legislation, and finally it can allow us to
interweave many histories of the era- -the immigrant
experience, American radicalism, trade unionism, the

suffrage movement, and progressive reform- -that formerly
have been analyzed as separate stories.
The idea of limitations is emphasized in each of the

dissertation's predominate themes.

The reform initiative,

in terms of both its liberalism and the effectiveness of

the legislation it produced were limited.

Furthermore,

the degree of cooperation generated by the reform

coalition that responded to the Triangle Fire was

temporary and produced few enduring associations.
The ongoing historical debate regarding the meaning

and the results of progressivism has produced extensive
but incoherent opinions which call for further scholarly

clarification.

This dissertation not only provides a

framework for further analyzing the events surrounding the

Triangle Fire, it also produces additional information
about progressivism- -its membership,

its goals,

its

achievements, and the political and social environment

which produced the movement
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CHAPTER

I

THE TRIANGLE FIRE AND THE HISTORIANS
The flames that swept through the Triangle Shirtwaist

Company in New York City on March 25, 1911, left 146
workers dead, most of them young immigrant women.

This

event was surely one of the worst industrial disasters in
the history of the United States.

At the time,

it

confirmed progressive Americans' belief that rampant

industrialism had gone awry.

It has since furnished

historians with evidence of the adverse effects that rapid
and unregulated industrialization had on workers.

The

tragedy at the Triangle company has also stimulated

scholarly interest because it gave rise to a noteworthy

campaign for regulatory legislation in New York State.
That state's accomplishments ushered in an era of

protective labor legislation that served as a model for
similar efforts in other states.

It also provides

scholars with an example of the progressive reform impulse
that reached its peak in the first decade of the twentieth

century
The historian, however, has purposes beyond simply

retelling the story of the Triangle Fire and the program
of reform that it inspired.

Indeed,

this dissertation

will make the case, both implicitly and explicitly, that
the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire,

if examined in both a social

and political context, can be used to increase our

understanding of three broad aspects of the history and

historiography of the progressive era.

Through a study of

the Triangle Fire, we can evaluate the debate among

historians over the true extent and effectiveness of the

reform impulse: we can also examine how coalitions of
diverse and incompatible groups

--

feminists, working-

class women, socialists, conservative trade unionists, and

middle-class social reformers

--

temporarily united to

demand reform legislation during the progressive era: and
through a description of circumstances leading to the fire
as well as its consequences, we can interweave many

histories

--

of the immigrant experience,

of American

radicalism, of trade unionism, of the suffrage movement,
of progressive reform -- that is the past have often been

treated as separate stories.
The compelling nature of the Triangle tragedy tended
to arrest interpretation of the event at a point that

modern historians of the progressive era have long
considered to be suspect.

The usual historical treatment

of the fire and its aftermath considered the wretched

circumstances that industrial workers were forced to
endure,

the tragic results those conditions had on the

lives of the immigrant laborers, and the successful

efforts of progressive reformers to eliminate or, at
least,

ameliorate the evils that resulted from

industrialization.^

However, this interpretation of

progressivism as a victory of liberal reformers was
questioned by scholars as early as the 1950'
2

s.

Both

Richard Hofstadter in his Age of Reform (1955) and
Gabriel
Kolko in his Triumph of Conservatism (1963) directed
attention to the conservative aspects of progressivism and
suggested that progressive reforms were neither really
liberal nor really effective in attacking the inequities
that threatened American democracy in the first decades of
the present century.^

The Hofstadter and Kolko books stimulated other

historians to reexamine the progressive era reforms and to
reevaluate the effectiveness of the broad reform crusade
that was a hallmark of that period.

A similar

reconsideration of the Triangle Fire and its results, one
that considers and explains the often timid response of

radicals, union leaders, politicians, and middle-class

reformers, should be attempted and is, in fact, long past
due

.

When Richard Hofstadter challenged the older liberal
school of progressive historiography, he provoked a

spirited debate about the origins and the nature of
progressivism.

The debate has produced extensive and

contradictory views: some historians have suggested that

progressivism was a movement led by middle-class
reformers, while other argued for either the working class

or the upper class as the chief source of reform.^

Scholars have also offered varying opinions about the

goals of the progressives.

Some asserted that the

reformers' primary intent was to Americanize the

immigrants settling into the nation's industrial centers,

thereby eliminating slums and poverty and, at the same
time,

destroying the political machines.

Other historians

suggested that conservative reformers sought, above all
else,

the goal of social control and supported the passage

of regulatory legislation mainly in order to reduce the

likelihood of social and political upheavals erupting
among the urban masses.

Still other scholars maintained

that the reformers had attempted to further the cause of

political democracy, while others believed that the

primary goal of the progressives was to accommodate the
needs of corporate businessmen.''

The number of

historical studies attempting to clarify the nature and
goals of progressivism proliferated, but at the same time,
the portrait of progressivism that emerged seemed

increasingly obscure.^
By the late 1960's, the variety of views about

progressivism was so extensive and the range of ideas
suggested was so broad and incoherent that historian Peter
Filene published "An Obituary for the Progressive

Movement," an article in which he suggested
scholars.''

His proposal was simple.

there had never been

a

a

way out for

He maintained that

united progressive movement, and

that it was therefore impossible to properly delineate

unified sources and goals.

The most that could be

established, he argued, was that a broad reform

impulse

had existed, which had many roots and diverse forms.
4

Each

group involved had specific goals which caused
it to
respond in its own way to the exigencies of the

time.

There were instances when various groups would form

coalitions in order to realize common purposes, but these

combinations were temporary and fragile in nature.
could not, with any validity, be termed
movement.

a

They

general

Filene's insightful thesis provides a

convenient framework for analyzing the events surrounding
the Triangle Fire,

since the alliance of reform groups

that responded to the disaster was in some regards

improbable, although it was also highly successful.
the same time,

At

the coalition was exceedingly fragile.

The publication of Filene's thesis in 1970 failed to

end the debate over progressivism

Indeed,

.

it seemed to

encourage the efforts of historians involved in research
into United States history between 1895 and 1915.
social historians of the late 1970'

s

The new

and early 1980'

continued to investigate the progressive era and give

particular attention to the role of specific groups
immigrants, working-class women,

--

feminists, radicals,

and

social reformers -- that participated in the events

surrounding the Triangle Fire and the campaign for reform
that resulted from that event.''

While these specialized histories were valuable for

establishing the social and political environment during
the progressive era,

the new scholarship itself became a

source of controversy.

Thomas Bender's article entitled

"Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American

History," which was published in June 1986, summarized the

substance of the arguments against the New Social
History.^

He acknowledged the value of the brilliant

monographs written about an extensive range of social

history topics, but he called attention to the failure of
the social historians to bring their work into a

comprehensive synthesis.

He argued that their excessive

specialization had produced a proliferation of "parts"
that needed to be gathered together into an integrated
"whole"

While Bender's criticism of the New Social History
has weaknesses of its own, his argument about the need for

synthesis is certainly relevant to the study of the
Historians of the socialist movement, the

Triangle Fire.

immigrant experience, and the trade unions, as well as

women's historians and political historians, have all

touched on the subject of the fire, but none of the

existing studies gives an overview of how such diverse
interest groups came together during the Triangle
incident.

Attempting the task of synthesis is the primary

concern of this dissertation.

Another matter requires clarification

Triangle Fire.

"

namely, how

"The Limits of

this dissertation's subtitle,

Progressivism,

--

pertains to the historiography of the
Stated simply, the ideas of limitations is

emphasized in each of the dissertation's predominate
6

themes.

First, what were the limits of the reform

initiative,

in terms of both its liberalism and the

effectiveness of the legislation it produced?

Second,

what were the limits of the cooperation generated by the

reform coalition that responded to the Triangle Fire?
Finally, what are the limits of using a single tragic

event as a framework to try to achieve a measure of

synthesis between political and social history?

7
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CHAPTER II
THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
AND
THE WOMEN WHO LABORED IN IT
The New York City garment industry provided

enterprising immigrants with the means to acquire some

measure of materials wealth,

a

realization of the dream

that had originally enticed many of them to abandon their

European homelands and emigrate to the United States.

At

the same time it forced great numbers of workers to eke
out livelihoods for themselves and their families at only
a subsistence level.

The industry also offered young

women,

newly arrived from towns and villages in Russia and

Italy,

opportunities to assist their families financially

as they settled into life in urban America.

The garment industry, so important to these new

arrivals and increasingly significant to the burgeoning

economy of the growing city, developed gradually during
the nineteenth century.

The men's clothing industry began

to expand rapidly as early as the Jacksonian years.

American-born tailors worked in their own homes and in
small shops to produce inexpensive ready-made men's suits

and coats.

During and after the 1840'

of Irish immigrants,

s,

growing numbers

escaping the potato famine, arrived

in New York City and joined, whenever possible,

American workers in the tailor shops.

the

Many of these

workers were later forced out of their positions by German
immigrants who came in increasing numbers after 1850.

These new arrivals brought with them from Germany

tailoring skills and a tradition of home industry.

Their

ability to produce clothing at a lower cost forced
the
small shops owned by non-Germans to close.

Nevertheless, the garment industry continued to
expand.

In 1860 there were 4,014 shops in which 114,800

workers produced clothing. ^

Most of these workers were

foreign-born: fifty-five percent had immigrated from

Germany and thirty- four percent from Ireland.^

A growing

number of these German tailors were Jews who, because of
their skills, worked primarily in the manufacture of

custom-made clothing.'*

After 1850 women began to replace

men in the ready-made clothing industry, although they
were outnumbered by men as late as 1860.^
The workers who produced ready-made clothing were

employed in three types of industry patterns.^

Some

worked in "inside shops", factories or workshops run by
individual manufacturers with the help of their employees

Other workers- -men, women, and children- -labored in their
own homes, usually located in tenement buildings in the
area of Mott, Mulberry, and Baxter Streets.

Families

engaged in such work often employed a few workers to
assist them and usually worked in the same few crowded

rooms in which they lived.

A third group worked in

"outside shops" where a contractor was given specific

tasks to complete by a large manufacturer.

He in turn,

either distributed assigned jobs to home workers or to
11

employees who worked in his shop.

Contractors who ran

these sweatshops often employed relatives and

acquaintances from their own ethnic groups or even from
common villages in the old country.

The sweatshops

themselves were unsanitary pestholes where the immigrants

worked long hours for low wages
There were few initial complaints from the foreign-

born workers who enthusiastically competed for positions
in the sweatshops.

They were willing to work for lower

wages than American-born workers would accept.

These

immigrants agreed that, difficult though their lives were
in the new land,

their weekly pay envelopes enabled them

to live far better than they had in the old country.

They

were anxious to work extended hours in order to amass the
funds they needed to bring members of their families from

Europe to join them in the United States.
by the turn of the century, many of the German- Jewish

immigrants had taken advantage of opportunities available
to them and had risen from the ranks of machine operators
to become manufacturers in their own right.

One

contemporary who, with some distress, witnessed the

ascendancy of this group of enterprising businessmen,

noted that they were concentrated of Fifth Avenue between
Fourteenth and Twenty- third Streets, where they had

demolished the once elegant homes of the city's old elite
and had built buildings to house their thriving business
concerns

.

12

As these old immigrants prospered, they
no longer

wished to be identified as German-Jews but
took pride in
their Americanization, which had enabled them
to

join the

ranks of respectability.

While they still practiced the

old religion, they formed synagogues that were labeled
"progressive" and disassociated themselves from the

Russian Jews who were arriving in New York City at an

unprecedented rate.

They lived "uptown,

away from the

crowded Jewish quarter in the Lower East Side where the
newcomers congregated, and they scorned the newcomers' use
of Yiddish,

their old-country immigrant dress, their

"barbarous" Jewish theater, and their Jewish newspapers,

which disseminated "dangerous" socialist ideas. ^°

They

did not, however, turn completely away from the Russian
Jews; they spent great sums of money,

funnelled through

Jewish charity organizations to assist the Eastern
European refugees and transform them into "Americanized
Jews

"^^
.

As owners of shops and factories, they were anxious
to hire the newly-arrived Jewish immigrants from the

shtetls,

the small Jewish communities in Eastern Europe.

These East European newcomers had abandoned their homes to
escape the pograms that had disrupted the already

restricted life in the Pale during the last year of
tzarist rule.

By the turn of the century, one-third of

the Jews in Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe had left

their homelands, and ninety percent of these immigrants
13

had journeyed to the United States.

^=

A large majority

of them remained in New York City where they had

disembarked after their trip to America.

Many went to

work for their coreligionists in the garment industry and
were comfortable working in their establishments because

their poor knowledge of English would not be an impediment
and they would be allowed to observe their Saturday

Sabbath rituals without the obstructions that they might
experience in a gentile establishment.
After 1900, the garment industry, affected by the

increasing importance of fashion, began to cater to the
needs of women who no longer wished to wear hand-made

clothing or were unable to patronize expensive custom-made
dress shops where dressmakers sewed for their wealthy
clientele.

Ready-made women's clothing manufacturing

concerns began a phenomenal expansion, and soon ladies'
wear,

lingerie,

shirtwaists, dresses, coats, and suits,

all in a multitude of styles, were fashioned for the

growing new market.

By 1910 the combined clothing

manufacturing trades employed forty-six percent of New
York City's labor

f orce

.

While many of these Eastern European Jews employed in
the needle trades initially accepted their low wages

without complaint since their pay appeared to be

considerably more generous than what they had earned in
the old country, they soon came to resent the fact that

their wages were so meager that they were unable to
14

provide even

subsistence living for their families.

a

Life was far more expensive in American urban
areas than
it had been in the shtetls of tzarist Russia.

In order to

survive, Jewish women and children had to enter the
labor
force.

Married women often worked at home doing

specialized sewing operations or finishing work until
legislation during the 1890'
employment.^''

s

discouraged this type of

Young Jewish girls often sought employment

in the huge shops and factories that mushroomed up in the

Lower East Side, for many decades the center of Jewish
life in New York City, and an area that eventually

expanded northward into Lower Manhattan.
In the world of the Russian shtetl,

the Jewish women

had traditionally played a less than consistent role in

both the family and in the community.

As dictated by the

tenets of their culture, they held a subordinate position
in society.

They had neither civic nor religious

importance and were never consulted on matters of concern
in the community.

Men headed families, sat in the places

of importance in the synagogues,

and directed neighborhood

affairs through positions on their community councils.
family rejoiced if it was blessed with sons,^^ while an

abundance of daughters only increased the sense of

frustration which dogged the existence of Jews in the
tzarist empire.

"In Russia a woman was nothing,"" and

an old Jewish proverb warned men to render prayerful

thanks to God that they were not born women
15

A

At the same time,

lives.

Jewish women led far from sheltered

They were obligated to assist, as needed, with
the

support of their families, and, if they were "fortunate"

enough to marry scholars, they were obligated to assume
the role of family breadwinners in order to

permit their

learned husbands time and energy to pursue rabbinical
studies or to seek enlightenment in the traditional study
of Jewish

law.^'-^

While many women assisted their

husbands in the position of unrecognized business
partners, other women often ran their own shops, bakeries,

and businesses.

Such business women were a necessary and

acknowledged part of the local economy.
Unmarried girls were also expected to assist their
families with domestic help, child care assistance, and

with efforts to support their parents, younger sisters,
and scholarly brothers.

Some entered domestic service,

others worked in family businesses, and

worked in handicrafts and manufacturing

a large
.

number

The primary

occupation for Jewish women, however, was work in the
needle trades.

Sewing was considered

young women in Jewish families.

a

good trade for

Many owned their own

sewing machines and served apprenticeships, learning to do
fancy dressmaking for wealthy clientele, while others

worked in their own homes or in small tailoring
establishments doing contract work for middlemen.

Few

worked in large-scale factories that manufactured ready-

16

made clothing.

The garment industry in Europe
had not
developed to that extent.

During the last years of the nineteenth
century,
working-class girls in the Pale of Settlement
became
active in movements that promoted Jewish
self-defense in
the face of increasing anti-Semitic
violence.

They

also supported the Zionist movement, which
insisted that
the only way to escape the injustices heaped
on Jews in

eastern Europe was to emigrate en masse to Palestine,
where efforts would be made to set up an independent

Jewish state."

Young Jewish workers, male and female,

also gave enthusiastic support to the socialist movement,

which promised to end the violence and discrimination
against Jews and to restructure political and economic

power on an equitable basis throughout the Russian Empire

Referred to as the Bund, the socialist organization took
part in revolutionary activities, sponsored huge strikes,
and provided a means to harness the discontent and fear
that was prevalent in the Jewish community.

who made up one -third of the Bund membership

Young women,
,

were

active in the movement and were often radicalized by thei
efforts.

At the same time, men accepted the women as

partners in the movement, granting them responsibilities
and authority that often resulted in an ambiguous kind of

gender equality.

This new status, however, was of

small importance to these working girls.

They were far

more concerned with achieving working-class equality.
17

The new-found independence and sense
of personal

importance which they derived from their
affiliation with
radical movements in Russia served these
Jewish workers
well after they left their homelands.

Many of them

emigrated alone, found work in the garment industry,
lived
frugally, and sent a large portion of their earnings
back
to support their families in the old country.

Others

emigrated with their families and, as children, went off
to work in the factories long before they were legally old

enough to do so.

In many cases,

these young daughters

became the primary breadwinners in their large families.
In 1902 the journalist Hutchins Hapgood,

a resident

of Greenwich Village and an observer of Jewish life in the

Lower East Side of New York City, wrote that the modern
type of Jewish immigrant women possessed many virtues that

might be considered "masculine in character

"^'^
.

They

were "serious in nature "^^ and did not "bank in any way
on the fact that they were women.

"^^

Hapgood recounted other unusual details about the
interests and activities of Jewish immigrant women in New

York City.

Many were socialists, he claimed, while others

were nihilists.

A great many of them worked in

sweatshops, and all were interested in radical ideas such
as the social equality of women.

until they married.

^°

At the time,

They usually worked
if their husbands were

unable to support them, they devoted themselves to
increasing family income by applying themselves to
18

economic activities within the domestic
sphere.
in boarders or worked on specialized
sewing

They took

tasks for

local contractors.^^

When the young Jewish girls located employment
in the
factories, they found themselves working next
to Italian
women who had emigrated from their homeland in an
effort

to escape the grinding poverty in which they had
lived in

Italy.

The pre-emigration life-style of the Italian women

differed considerably from that of their Jewish coworkers.

Although there were regional differences in the status of
Italian women,

most of the Italian immigrants from

Italy to the United States in the peak years of

immigration came from the south, the Mezzoaiorno

where

.

peasant families usually owned undersized plots of land
that they cultivated in family groups, producing only an

inadequate living.

Money was always had to come by.

Women, mothers and daughters, worked alongside male

members of their families in agricultural pursuits."
Often family earnings had to be supplemented by day
labor in the fields of nearby large landowners.

Young

girls assisted their families in this way, but only when

they could work under the protective eyes of their

brothers or some other male family member.

Mothers

worked closer to home, often doing spinning, weaving, or
dressmaking, and their work would be sold to increase the

family income

19

Italian men frequently emigrated alone,
working in
the United States either temporarily
or permanently.
Some
sent a portion of their earnings home or
saved to bring
their families to join them. Other men simply
abandoned
their original families and, forming new attachments,

began lives over again in America.

This migration of

their men placed great responsibilities on the Italian

women left at home.

They became the sole support of their

families and were forced to work longer and harder than
they had previously.

In 1900 more Italian women worked as

wage-earners than did women in the United States.
is not surprising,

It

however, to note that they were paid

approximately half of what men made in wages, even when
there was little difference in the work done."

These

women were never organized, but there is evidence that
they often took part in demonstrations and strikes

demanding lower taxes and cheaper

food.-^^

In spite of their contributions to the family income,

Italian women had always been held in low esteem by the

society in which they lived.

Usually illiterate, they

nevertheless handled the family finances.

They could also

independently own and inherit property, but they could not
make decisions regarding either their possessions or their
lives without their husbands' consent.

Italian women did

not even gain control over their own earnings until

1919."

They were,

in effect,

legally viewed as minors

living under their husbands' watchful guardianship.
20

Their

subordinate role was not questioned either by
them or by
the rest of Italian society.
The life-style of many Italian families changed
a

great deal after they emigrated to the United States.

Those who remained in New York City usually settled
in

distinct sections of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx.
The largest number located in Manhattan, where about

a

third of the Italian immigrants resided in the area below

Fourteenth Street in the Lower East Side.""
of households,

Male heads

formerly agrarian workers, lacked the job

skills that might have enabled them to earn comfortable
wages,

paying,

and they were forced to do menial work in low-

seasonal occupations.^^

For these reasons,

Italian immigrants had a below average income and a

standard of living that ranked lowest of all the foreign-

born in New York

City.''^

Because these circumstances forced their families
into frightening poverty,

Italian women, married and

single, were required to enter the labor force.

Some

worked at home while others worked in nearby factories.
They found employment in industries such as candy-making,
artificial flowers, and tobacco.

Many of them were hired

in the garment -making industries where, as early as 1911,

approximately 36% of the women employed were southern
Italians."^

Few skills were required in these

industries, and the tasks performed by the women were

little more than extensions of the domestic chores in

which they were traditionally involved.

In fact,

many of

the younger Italian girls were anxious to find
work in the

garment trades.

Initially unaware that the degree of

specialization used in the industry would mean that a

worker could never learn to make an entire garment, they

believed that employment in the needle trades would train
them in dressmaking and enable them to make their own

clothing and that of their families.

Such a skill would

make them more attractive to potential husbands.
more,

What is

even though those women who came from Italy trained

in the skills of fine dressmaking and embroidery were

often able to better adjust to the system in the factories
of New York City and earn higher wages, they soon found

their skills disintegrating due to the emphasis on speed
and specialization in the American system."*^

While their employment was low-paying, seasonal, and
irregular,

these new members of New York City's labor

force seldom had problems locating work and were often the

primary breadwinners in their families.

Employers

recognized the desirability of hiring Italian women, often
indicating that they were hard-working and quick to learn.

They advertised extensively in Italian newspapers for such
workers

.

Willing to work for the lowest wages, these women
were easily absorbed into the city's garment industry.

They were usually docile, hard-working, and easy to
exploit.

Because they were seldom able to read and speak

English, were unacquainted with the manufacturing
system
in their new places of employment and new
participants in
the American economic system,

their own exploitation/^

they were often unaware of

They were ignored by the

fledgling trade unions because they lacked skills and
because they were women.
organize.

In fact,

Nor were they anxious to

they often served as strikebreakers,

albeit unknowingly/"^

Forced by their husbands and fathers to shun

socializing during and after work, the Italian women led
isolated lives, able to find companionship only within
their families.

Other foreign-born workers despised them

many Irish even refused to work with these "guineas" or
"dagoes,

"'^^

The Jewish girls in the city's garment

industry, however, worked side-by-side with the Italian

women.

Still,

often they were unable to communicate in

more than a rudimentary way, and the two groups seldom

enjoyed a close or friendly relationship.

The Jewish

girls found the passivity of the Italians difficulty to

comprehend
As the garment industry expanded and became more

prosperous after the turn of the century, it became more
competitive and increasingly centered in factories

.

The

factory owners, in turn, enlarged their labor force in

order to meet the demands placed on them.

These employer

were often deficient in their record keeping, and they
made little attempt to regularize production.

Employment

in the industry was seasonal,

and most workers suffered

through layoffs on a regular basis.

They could usually

find work during busy seasons, three or
four months in the
spring and two or three months in the late
summer and
early fall. But during the remainder of the
year, garment
workers were often laid off for four to eight weeks
at a

time/5

Because the labor supply was so plentiful, there

was no motivation for owners to rationalize their

employment practices.

The problems faced by the workers

as a result of these policies were not a matter of

consideration for their employers.
Given the seasonal fluctuations within the industry,
labor turnover was high.

This was not viewed as a problem

by employers who saw merit in hiring young, inexperienced
girls as "learners."

These new workers were paid at a

lower rate than were the skilled, experienced employees.
As late as 1914,

25% of the women in New York City's dress

and shirtwaist industries were classified as "learners"
and earned substandard wages."

Even the "old hands"

were usually employed to do either hand-work or finishing

work and were subject to periodic layoffs.

A marked

sexual division of labor gave men in the clothing trades

more job security; the few men^^ in the industry were

hired to do the technologically advanced and skilled
chores and they therefore made the highest wages and were
less likely to be laid off, even during the slack seasons.
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When men and women worked in identical positions,
men's
wages were usually higher than those of women."
Nevertheless, wages were uniformly low throughout
the
garment industry.
In January 1910, Dr. Woods Hutchinson

chaired a small committee that inquired into conditions
in
the shirtwaist -making industry for Survey

,

concerned with social problems of the day.
Kleeck,

periodical

a

Mary Van

later an investigator for the Russell Sage

Foundation, was a member of the Hutchinson Committee",

and made public data that had been collected.

The average

wage for women, with an allowance made for time lost

during the slack season, was five dollars a week.^^

If

the wages of "learners" were eliminated" from the data

considered,

it

would appear that the experienced women

made between seven and eight dollars a week.^^

maximum weekly wage for

a female worker,

The

and this was

truly exceptional, was twenty dollars in the busiest
season.^''

Men averaged between sixteen to eighteen

dollars a week, although the higher earnings of
subcontractors were included in Van Kleeck'

skewed the results."

At that time,

s

data and

it was necessary for

a working family with five members to make $1000 a year in

order to survive at even a subsistence level.
Out of their meager wages, women employees were

forced to pay fines for mistakes made in their assigned

work or for infractions of company rules.

For instance,

tardy workers, even those only five minutes late, would
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not be allowed to report to work until
after lunch, thus

forfeiting half a day's wages. ^°

Some shops charged a

fine for late arrival, often a cent for
each minute after
the opening deadline.
Workers were usually required to

purchase their needles, thread, and other necessities
used
in the course of their work.
These petty expenses were
much resented by the women in the needle trades.
The hours of work demanded of employees in the

garment industry varied according to the shops surveyed.
In an ordinary work week,

between 56-60 hours.

employees were required to work

During the busy season, the hours

were usually extended, and workers were compelled to stay
in the evening and to report for work seven days a

week."

Some employers refused to compensate their

employees for the extra hours of labor.

The excessive

work hours continued even after the Supreme Court, in the
case of Muller v. Oregon in 1908, declared that the Oregon

statute limiting hours of work for laundresses in Oregon
to ten hours each day was not in conflict with the

Constitution.

The court was influenced in making its

decision by the Brandeis Brief, in which Louis Brandeis
and his sister-in-law Josephine Goldmark, working for the

National Consumers League, presented evidence that long
hours of were detrimental to the health of women and would
in time interfere with their child-bearing and maternal

roles."

While the court failed to specify the number of

hours women could work, the decision did invite the states

to proceed with regulation."

Nineteen states, from 1909

to 1917, passed laws concerned with the
regulation of

hours employers could expect women to work.

Most of the

laws were concerned with the number of hours
worked and
the prohibition of night work for women."

New York was something of

a

pioneer in terms of

statues limiting the working hours of women.

In 1899 a

law was enacted stipulating that neither women nor minors

could be employed more than ten hours a day or sixty hours
a week."

This law was amended in 1907 to institute a

six-day week for all women working in factories."

Muller

V.

Oregon

.

After

New York State revised its earlier

mandates, and in 1912 legislation was passed restricting
the hours that women and males under eighteen years of age

could work to nine hours a day and fifty- four hours
week.^^

a

The prohibition of night work for women employed

in factories was enacted in 1899 by the New York State

legislature,^^ but this restriction was annulled in 1907

by the state

court.''"

In 1915,

however, the state court

reversed its earlier decision and declared the 1899

prohibition in regard to women employees to be valid.
In spite of the new concern of the courts and of the

state legislature, employers often ignored or evaded
.

restriction

'^^

Women factory workers seldom complained

about these attempts to circumvent the laws.

Too often

their primary concern was the need to compete with men for

better paying positions and to increase their wages, by
27

any means possible.

if longer hours spent over the
sewin

machines in their employers factories meant
a few more
dollars in their pay envelopes each week,
they were

willing to pay the price.

Protective legislation resulte

in limitations on their ability to accomplish
their goals

Physical conditions in the factories and shops of
th

garment industry were unsanitary and exceedingly
dangerous.

During Fire Prevention Week in January 1911,

the Women's Trade Union League solicited complaints from

workers regarding conditions in the factories that

employed them.

They were invited to forward anonymous

charges to the offices of the League, which then verified
them by sending inspectors to the shops and factories in
questions.

On January 11,

1911,

the Women's Trade Union

League filed an extensive list of the reported problems
that they were able to confirm to Rudolph

York City Superintendent of Buildings

P.

Miller, New

.

'^^

The problems reported to Miller were formidable in

terms of their number and the dangers they presented to

those employed in the reported factories.

Many of the

buildings, some as high as ten stories, lacked fire
escapes.

Others had either no elevators or an inadequate

number considering the hundreds of people employed on the

upper floors.
dark,

A common complaint concerned the narrow,

and obstructed stairways which the workers had to

descend in single file at the end of their long days.
Some apprehensive employees reported problems with
28

unsatisfactory ventilation due to an inadequate
number of
windows or locked windows
Many employees were concerned
that doors especially those opening to the
upper
.

floors,

were locked or opened inward.
The machinery used in the shops was often
dangerous,

and employers failed to enclose it as a protection
for
workers.

Many employees reported that alcohol and

excelsior, combustible in combination, were often used

near each other or near machinery, and workers were
fearful of the possibility of fire given the piles of

flammable scrap material which littered the shops.

Some

factories had inadequate water supplies, while others had
too few toilets or toilets that had failed to work for

several months.

Often those reporting on conditions in

their places of employment complained that the buildings
were dangerous, filthy, and vile-smelling.^^

In sum,

lot of the immigrant workers in New York City'

s

the

garment

industry who had come to the United States seeking the

legendary American dream was

a

mockery of the vision that

had originally inspired them to leave their homelands.
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CHAPTER III
THE SHIRTWAIST INDUSTRY:
THE EMPLOYERS
The manufacture of shirtwaists was a relatively
late

addition Lo Lhe

garitUMiL

indusLry.

Tntroducec^ about 1890,

these businesses grew rapidly once the Gibuon Girl, the

creation of popular artist Charles Dana Gibson, becanu«
symbol of modern American femininity.

The Gibson Girl was

always dressed in a shirtwaist combined with
skirt.

Usually made of

a crisp,

or linen referred to as lawn,

light,

lAu-

a

tailored

translucent cotton

shirtwaist enliaiu^ed the

delicate and womanly look in vogue at the time.
dc:;i<jn oL

a

the blouse-like garment,

however,

in

Llie

there was

clearly a masculine element exemplified by the cut of the
collar,

the efficient lines, and the fitted waist.

The

Gibson Girl shirtwaists symbol ized to a new generation of
high-spirited young women the prospect of
independence heretofore unknown.

a

freedom and

They were worn not only

by the wealthy, who had the opportunity to enjoy the new

way of life open to some women of the time, but also by
the middle-class and working-class women who usually

imitated the clothing styles of the upper classes.
There is little available data about workers employed
in the manufacture of the fashionable garment during

shirtwaist industry's first decade.

Llio

Even the Census of

Manufacturers taken by the federal government during that

period grouped shirtwaist makers with others

uiKJer the

heading "Women's Clothing-Factory Product."^

New York

State Department of Labor statistics included
them under
the heading of "White Goods" with makers
of lingerie.

Nevertheless, the industry had emerged as a trade

distinct from others in the garment industry by 1910.

in

that year there were 450 shirtwaist factories in New
York
City.^

There were no uniform procedures used in these

business concerns.
of shirtwaist,

Each shop worked on a distinct style

some tailored, others more elaborate and

feminine in design.

Each establishment therefore

developed a unique manufacturing process to produce its

particular style.*
Many of the owners of these shirtwaist firms moved
their manufacturing establishments into imposing buildings

situated in an area beginning around Fifth Avenue and

Washington Square and eventually expanded into the area
from Canal Street to Fortieth Street.^

The factories

housed in this area bore little resemblance to

manufacturing centers located in either New York City
tenement buildings or those in other industrial cities in
the nation.

Each building had several stories, some as

many as twenty:

they had frames constructed of iron, and

they were built of granite, stone, brick, and even marble.

Constructed after the turn of the century, these buildings
were never intended to be used as factories.

They were

built to warehouse, display, and sell manufactured goods.
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Buyers would visit the warehouse,
inspect the merchandise,
and place their orders/
Since the purpose of these buildings was
primarily to
warehouse goods, and because the buildings
were
"skyscrapers" with elevators providing access
to the upper
floors, there was little concern for stairways.
Often,

therefore, stairways were narrow, without adequate
light,

and with sharp and winding turns.

Workers descending

these stairs had to negotiate them single-file.

Large

factory buildings with floor areas over 2,500 square feet
on each floor were required by law to have more than a

single stairway.^

Inspectors from the New York City

Building Department were required to indicate that the
stairways, as well as the rest of the buildings, met the
legal requirements when construction was completed.

These

inspectors, however, were examining what were officially

warehouse buildings, not factories where hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of workers were employed.^

These large buildings consisted of a single open room
on each floor or loft.

Depending on the available area,

as many as five hundred workers could be employed on each

floor.

^

Sewing machines, cutting tables, and workers

were packed as closely as possible.

Often machine

operators were seated so close together that it was
impossible for one row of women to rise and push their
chairs back without disturbing another row of workers.

New York factory laws of the time specified that every
38

factory worker had to have 250 cubic feet
of air available
to her.^" Since the loft buildings had
ceilings ten
or

eleven feet high, while an average tenement
building's
ceiling was eight feet high, the number of machine

operators who could be packed into an area could be
increased by

a

quarter or more/^ even though the average

square- foot floor space occupied by workers was less than
in a tenement factory.
In addition to the large number of workers who could

be jammed into a loft building,

there were many other

advantages for garment industry firms moving into these
"towers."

There was rising concern during the Progressive

Era about the unhealthy consequences of purchasing

clothing made by immigrant workers in their cramped,

overcrowded tenements, where the lack of hygiene was often
noted by carping social reformers.
that public opinion,

Businessmen realized

if not legal mandates,

would in the

near future, require them to house their workshops in

factories that would be open to official inspectors.
Since few factories that met existing regulations were
available,
needs.

these loft buildings were suitable for their

In addition,

factory owners could use electricity

to run their machinery instead of the costly gasoline that

fueled the engines used in factories located in older
tenement structures.

The savings were considerable.

Perhaps most important to the money-conscious

entrepreneurs, the loft buildings were supposedly
39

fireproof.

Constructed of stone and metal and with

stairways enclosed in masonry-covered walls,
the structure
itself contained little that was flammable,
and insurance
rates were lower than those set for other types
of factory
buildings.
Such insurance was still costly, but prudent

businessmen could not do without it since fires in the
garment district and elsewhere in New York City were
commonplace.

In 1910 the City suffered fire losses in the

amount of $8,591,831, an amount five times that

experienced in London and nine times that in Paris."
In the 19th century, New York City factories had been

insured by "factory mutuals" that charged low premiums for
firms that agreed to lower their risks through preventive

measures such as the installation of sprinkler systems.
Unfortunately, mutual insurance companies were driven out
of the city by an insurance monopoly,

Insurance Exchange

.

the New York Fire

The cost of insurance then increased

regardless of safety devices installed in factories.

In

1898 several factory owners began to add sprinkler systems

on their own initiative, hoping to lower their insurance
costs, but insurance companies refused to reduce their

rates

.

The concerned owners then proceeded to form

insurance associations of their own, making them, in
effect,

self -insured.

In reaction to this, many of the

old stock insurance companies began to lower rates on

buildings with sprinkler systems, thus reducing the income
of the city's brokers and agents.
40

The Exchange,

controlled by these same brokers and agents,
withdrew
brokers licenses from local companies that had
been
reducing rates.

Without these licenses, the companies

could not legally operate.

The associations collapsed.

After thus driving the insurance associations out of
business, the Exchange then permitted its companies to
sell insurance to factory owners in far greater amounts

than their companies were worth.

In case of a fire,

therefore, a businessman who was over-insured could

realize a profit instead of a loss.'^

Such

a

situation

did not encourage attention to fire prevention measures,
nor did it motivate concern about fire hazards in the
shirtwaist factories
Despite their high rates,

insurance companies found

themselves losing money as a result of the increasing

number of expensive fires in the industry

.

Early in 1911,

the Exchange decided to increase rates by thirty- five

percent in order to protect profits.

They gave no

consideration to encouraging fire prevention through rate
incentives and inspections
The shirtwaist firms,

if they could pay the

escalating premiums, had few problems obtaining fire
insurance, no matter what the condition of their

factories.
coverage,

Many of the larger businesses purchased
through insurance brokers, from several

insurance companies willing to jointly share the risks
involved.

In case of fire,

each concerned insurance
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company would pay

a small

purchased by the insured.
minimal

portion of the total coverage
Losses,

therefore, would be

^'^
.

The shirtwaist industry, along with other
industries
in the needle trades, experienced periods
of financial

distress during the first decade of the 20th
century.
There was a brief but uncomfortable recession
in 1903 and
a severe panic in 1907,
Labor unrest, which often

manifested itself in inconclusive strikes, some of them
lengthy and financially draining, was endemic in the
industry.''

The shirtwaist firms suffered further losses

when the one-piece dress and other styling innovations
were introduced and caught the fancy of the buying
public.

Economic uncertainty in the industry resulted

in an epidemic of factory fires that produced heavy losses

for the companies that insured the firms involved.

Ignoring their own responsibility for the existing
situation, the insurers complained that "factory fires

were fairly saturated with moral hazard.
In spite of the instability in the industry,

new

shirtwaist enterprises were continually launched during
the decade

,

generating intense competition

.

Rival firms

struggled to realize increased profits and to keep their
heads above water in the contest for survival

.

The least

arduous way to accomplish this was to decrease the cost of

production by obtaining the maximum amount of work from a

minimum number of employees working for the least possible

amount of money.

One of the most effective means of

gaining these ends was the subcontracting
system.
employer would hire an "old hand," an experienced
operator with contacts in the industry.

He,

An

machine

in turn,

would hire several machine operators to work under
his
direction.

Often these young women were relatives or

immigrants from the same Russian shtetl as the contractor.
He would teach them the discrete skills involved in
the

manufacture of the waists, each worker learning to

accomplish her assigned task.
The factory owner would agree to pay the contractor a
set rate for all the waists produced by the contractor and

his team, the rate varying according to the style of the

garment.

The contractor would then settle with each of

his workers, paying them on an individual basis according
to the work each one accomplished and in line with

previously arranged rates.

As a result of this system,

the company had no dealings with its employees.

The

workers were unaware of the rate agreed on by the

contractor and the employer.

They earned only what the

contractor wanted to pay them, and this amount was usually
small since the contractor wished to retain as much as

possible for himself.

If the employees became

dissatisfied with their lot, it was usually the contractor
who felt the brunt of their anger and not the firm's

owner
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The fierce competition in the
shirtwaist industry

resulted in low wages and sporadic work
for employees.
During busy seasons, workers were forced
to labor over
their machines for twelve and fourteen or
more hours
a

day,

often working seven days a week.

During slack

seasons, they might be laid off for weeks and
even months
at a time.

Rivalry in the industry also decreased the

concern that the owners displayed for the wretched and
dangerous environments in which their employees were
forced to work, since such attention usually necessitated

unwanted expenditures.
In spite of the precarious conditions in the

industry,

shrewd businessmen found ways of amassing

substantial fortunes in the manufacture of shirtwaists.

Max Blanck and Isaac Harris were two such entrepreneurs.
Known in the industry as the "Shirtwaist Kings,

"^^

Blanck

and Harris were the proprietors of the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company, one of the largest firms in New York City.

They

were crude and ruthless men, devoted to enriching

themselves without giving thought to either ethical or
legal niceties.

Unlike most other shirtwaist manufacturers of the
era,

Blanck and Harris were born, not in Germany, but in

Russia and immigrated to the United States with their

young wives in the last years of the nineteenth
century.

Blanck began his career in the garment

industry by doing tailoring work out of his home on East
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street in the Lower East Side.-

m

1901 he joined Isaac

Harris in setting up a shirtwaist
manufacturing firm at
155-158 Wooster Street, in the center of
the garment
district." Their association was profitable
and

apparently amiable since it endured, through
good times
and troubled times, for almost twenty years.
During
that period, the partnership expanded its
interests,

purchasing either sole ownership or control of several
other businesses, always in the shirtwaist industry,

in

Newark, New York City or Philadelphia."

however,

Until 1918,

the Triangle Company remained the cornerstone of

their "Empire.

"^^

Sometime during the year ending on July

1,

1903

Blanck and Harris moved their establishment into a newly

constructed building at Washington Place and Greene

Street."

Built by Joseph Asch of Saugatuck,

Connecticut, the ten-floor loft building was 135 feet high

and was fireproof, although it had wooden trim, window
frames,

and floors.

The building, which cost Asch about

$400,000 to construct, had been completed in mid- January
1901
The Asch building had an internal floor area of

10,000 square feet on each floor and, as such, was

required by law to have at least three staircases
was,

.

It

however, equipped with only two very narrow, winding

staircases.
Miller,

The Building Department inspector, Rudolph

notified the architect of this violation in May
45

.

of 1900, before the building was
finished.

The architect,

Julius Franke, asked that the Department
grant an
exception to this regulation since the
building had a
single exterior fire escape that he felt
could be counted
as a third staircase."
Inspector Miller argued that
the

fire escape, located in the rear of the
building, should
lead down to the yard and not end, as had been
planned, at
the second floor.

The architect promised to honor the

inspector's request,
finished,

although when the building was

the narrow and flimsy fire escape descended only

to the second floor and had one window opening to the
fire

escape on each floor.

Miller admitted at

a

later date

that he was not sure that he had ever granted approval of
the Asch Building, even after the construction and before
it was occupied.

Nor was there further concern

expressed over the inadequacy of the fire escape since, at
that time, the law did not mandate fire escapes on any
type of building.

Opening inward into each loft in the Asch Building
were wooden doors, again in violation of the State Labor

Law that stated that factory doors had to be constructed
to open outwardly,

if practical.

The Triangle

architect felt it was impractical since the last step on

each landing was just a single stair's width from the
door
The building also had four elevators, two of them

freight elevators and two passenger elevators.

As was

the case in most factories of that
time, only one stairway
was used by the employees." The other
was used for

management,

staff,

and visitors.

Most of the workers were

unaware that there were doors on the Washington
Place side
of the building since they were accustomed to
using only
the Greene Street elevators and the Greene Street

stairway.

2«

At this stairway, partitions were set up to

form a narrow passageway with a twenty- inch doorway

through which employees had to pass in single- file before

descending the stairs."

A staff member was always

stationed there at the end of the day to inspect the
girls' handbags as they left the shop, a measure

instituted to prevent pilferage.

Considerable evidence

also indicates that doors were kept locked during working
hours,

a practice expressly forbidden by New York State

factory laws.
In spite of its deficiencies,

the building was

impressive to observers and considered safer than most

buildings used as factories in New York City at that
time.''°

Even seventy-five years later, former employees

mentioned the elaborate foyer that greeted visitors
entering the building.*^

Max Blanck must have been

especially satisfied with the edifice since he was the
firm's "outside man" whose responsibility it was to

entertain buyers from other stores that bought the
Triangle Company's Waists.'*^
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Blanck himself was described as
unemotional man.^^

a

"sporty" but

He lived comfortably, moving his

growing family into wealthier neighborhood
almost on a
yearly basis.
He dressed stylishly
owned
a large

automobile, and was driven on his errands by
a
chauffeur.

Isaac Harris, on the other hand, spent his

days in the working areas of the Washington Place
factory.
He directed the daily work and checked to see that
it was

adequately completed.

He was familiar with the workings

of the machinery in the plant and was well acquainted
with

all phases of garment production."^
frail,

He was a small,

and serious man"^ who maintained his family at the

same address on West 101 Street even after the company's

profits began to substantially increase.*^

When the partners first moved their new business into
the Asch Building,

they occupied only the ninth floor. ^°

By 1906, however, they found it necessary to take over the

eighth floor, and, in 1908, their increased volume of

production led them to appropriate the tenth floor
also.^^

By 1911, the company employed approximately 600

women and about 100 men.^^

Sixty employees worked on the

tenth floor^^ where the offices, the packing room, and
the showroom were located.^"

Approximately 225 were

employed in the main cutting room, which was located on
the eighth floor.

A large stock of material, light-

weight and flammable, was also stored there.
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The

.

remaining operators worked at sewing
machines in close
proximity to one another on the ninth floor.
In 1908 Blanck and Harris'

business profits surpassed

one million dollars," in spite of the fact
that the

nation was just emerging from the Panic of 1907.

They

were acknowledged as the leading shirtwaist business
in
the city, perhaps in the nation.

Their employees did not,

however, benefit from the success of the Triangle

partners
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company was a perfect example
of everything that was exploitive, negligent, and heedless
in the shirtwaist industry.

Ida Deutchman, who had been

employed in many shirtwaist factories, claimed that the
Triangle Company was the worst shop she had ever worked
in,

Blanck and Harris were task masters who displayed

a

complete lack of concern for the welfare of their
employees.

Even though both men had relatives working

in various positions in their factory,

they were oblivious

to the dangerous conditions in the shop and the poor

morale of those who worked for them.

Most of the women

working for Blanck and Harris would have echoed the
sentiments of Yetta Altman who worked for another
shirtwaist company on Greene Street in the Lower East Side

during the first years of the century.

Many year later,

Yetta vehemently declared that she had hated her boss, a

monster who forced his workers into slavery.
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She stated

with great passion that she would have
killed him if she
had had the opportunity.^^
Pauline Newman, an East European immigrant,
obtained
a position at the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company shortly
after it moved into the Asch Building. Although
she had
not yet reached the age when she could be
legally
employed,

she got up at 5:30 each morning,

to Greene Street,

took a horsecar

and walked to her place of employment,

where she began work at 7:30 am.

During the busy season

she worked until 9:00 in the evening.

Because she was an

unskilled child, her job was simple, repetitive, and
boring: she cut off thread ends on the finished

shirtwaists.

Her starting pay was $1.50 a week.

Experienced girls usually made $6.00, and the exceptional

worker made $12.00 a week.

While most workers were paid

for overtime work, the rate was that which they ordinarily

received.

Pauline, as a child, made no more than $1.50 no

matter how many hours she worked.

^°

Blanck and Harris were secretly alerted to the times

when inspectors were to pay periodic visits to their
shop.^^

During these inspections, the illegally-employed

children climbed into the huge boxes in which finished
shirtwaists were stored and waists were piled on top of
them. "

Inspectors were also known to take bribes from

factory owners, ignoring not only evidence of illegal
child labor but also other obvious violations of the

law."
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While hiding from inspectors must
have been an
adventure for the children, their days
in the Triangle
Factory were usually long and dreary.
The workshop was
cold in winter and stifling in the summer
months.
in many
shops, the young women, as they worked at
their
machines,

sang folk songs that had been sung by workers
in East
Europe." The Triangle owners not only forbade
singing
but refused to allow their employees even to
talk with one
another while they were at work." The women could
not

eat their lunches on the fire escape as was common
in

other factories."

Bathroom breaks were monitored by

foreladies," and fines were imposed for such things as
making an error that ruined a piece of material.

Even

more annoying than these petty rules and restrictions were
the costs of needles,

threads, and other needed supplies

that workers had to purchase.

Considering their niggardly

wages, workers found these expenses an indisputable

hardship
Nevertheless, the physical conditions at the Triangle

factory were a greater cause for concern than the low
wages and the pettifogging regulations.
in continual fear, and with good reason.

Many women worked
Oil was

needed to lubricate the many machines in the factory; two
barrels of oil were stored on both the eighth and the

ninth floors, and the floors under the machines were
soaked with oil.^^

Under the cutters' tables were huge

bins where remnants, scraps, and oil -soaked rags were
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tossed.

Boxes loaded with rolls of tissue
paper and

supplies of the flimsy material used
in making the waists
were everywhere.
Paper patterns were hung on overhead
wires over the cutters' tables.

Many scraps were

carelessly tossed on the floor.

Eventually

a ragman,

employed for that purpose, would come in
and sweep up
these discarded clippings and haul them away.
He refused
to come,

however, unless he could pick up at least
a bale

at a time,

so the refuse cluttered the floor for
anywhere

from eight days to several weeks.

''^

In 1909 a fire on

the eighth floor was caused by a flame emitted by
one of
the motors that,

cuttings.

in turn,

set fire to some discarded

Although it was extinguished quickly and no

harm was done, the employees reacted with panic.

Even

if the owners felt secure because of the supposedly

fireproof construction of the building, the workers

realized that the flammable nature of the building's
contents was dangerous.
The danger from the fire was compounded by the fact

that many male employees smoked.

Although smoking in a

factory setting was illegal, they smoked in the washrooms
and in the workshop itself, where they hid their

cigarettes in the palms of their hands and blew the smoke

under their coats.

Many men would wait until the bell

rang signaling the end of the work day and then

immediately "light up,

cluttered floor.

'^^

"

tossing the match onto the

.

Joseph Asch had installed a few
precautionary
measures to safeguard his tenants against
fire.
On each
floor of the building he had coiled length
of standpipe
hose installed that could be filled with water
from

a 5000

gallon tank located on the roof."

John Casey, an Asch

Building engineer, was made responsible for checking
the
condition of the standpipe. Later he admitted that he
never did more than glance at it and never realized
that
the pipe had rotted and disintegrated in the folds."^^

The factory also had an alarm system.''^
in 1909,

After the fire

Blanck and Harris hired night watchmen to keep an

eye on their premises during the evening hours and be on
the lookout for sparks from the motors that might ignite a
fire.''^

These safeguards, however, did not calm the

fears of the employees who recognized the dangerous

conditions in which they worked and the inadequate means
of escape in case of

fire.'^'^

To complain would have been

unavailing and worse, since it was well-known that workers
who complained were blacklisted by the Triangle

Company
Blanck and Harris must have been aware of the

possibility of fire in their factory because, although
they did little to protect the lives of their employees,

they were increasingly careful about the extent of their
insurance coverage.

They purchased their insurance from

the large New York City brokerage firm of Samuels,

Cornwall, and Stevens,''^ who,

in turn, distributed the
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risks among thirty-seven different
insurance companies.In the first decade of the century,
Joseph Asch, the owner
of the building, and all his tenants
purchased a maximum
of over a million and a half dollars'
worth of insurance
on the building, paying more than a total
sum of $15,000 a
year on the policies. More than $1600 of
this amount

compensated the brokers for their efforts in
obtaining
this insurance.

An increasing percentage of this

«^

amount was paid by Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, even

though the Triangle Shirtwaist Company was known in the
insurance trade as a "rotten risk."
a "repeater,

"

a

it was designated as

company that collected on fires in its

places of business on

a

fairly regular basis, as indicated

by the following report of blazes
April

1902
5:18 a.m.
5,

9th Floor, Asch Building
Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected- -$19 142
,

November

1,

1902

6:00 a.m.

9th Floor, Asch Building
Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected- -$12 905
,

April 7, 1905
11:00 p.m.

Factory owned by Triangle Waist
Cause Unknown
Insurance Collected- -Unknown

December 28, 1906

Diamond Waist Company
Harris & Blanck, Proprietors
119 Mercer Street, New York
Insurance Collected- -Unknown

7:30 p.m.

April 12, 1904

Diamond Waist Company
Harris & Blanck, Proprietors
165-7 Mercer Street
Insurance Collected- -Unknown
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1908 & 1909
no exact dates

On premises of Triangle Company
Two small fires probably caused
by smoking.
Insurance Collected- -Unknown

The insurance companies covering the
Triangle Company
seemed oblivious to the implications made clear
by the

firm's loss record; most of the fires in their
places of
business occurred during evening hours, and most
of them

took place in April, a slack month in the shirtwaist

industry and one during which factory owners often

experienced some degree of financial distress."
Furthermore, it was known that Blanck and Harris had

suffered diminished profits as a result of the lengthy
Shirtwaist Strike in 1909, since their employees were
among those who initially walked off their jobs and were
also among the last to return to their positions when the

strike ended.

In spite of this,

in January 1910,

the

Triangle proprietors increased their insurance coverage by
almost $10,000.^^

During 1910, probably still suffering from the

aftermath of the strike, Blanck and Harris allowed a great
deal of their insurance to lapse.

They renewed a portion

of it in the amount of $75,750 in November of 1910 and

increased it further by $25,000 in December of that year.
There is no evidence that any of the insurance companies

involved in granting either of the reinstated amounts

questioned the transactions in any way.

They requested

neither evidence of an enlarged inventory nor any
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confirmation of the firm's fiscal stability
or enhanced
worth.
To have challenged the Triangle Company's

request

for increased coverage might have jeopardized
their

relationship with the important brokerage firm
of Samuels,
Cornwall, and Stevens and with the City's
powerful
insurance monopoly.
In July 1910 Blanck and Harris lost their credit

rating because they refused to disclose their financial

condition to a commercial agency.

It was returned to them

when they presented a statement of their resources based
almost entirely on the amount of insurance they carried at
that time, which was, as noted, about $100,000.^^

In

January of 1911, despite the fact that they were in some
financial distress,^'' they renewed another $75,000 of

their expired insurance, bringing the total to
$199,750.^^

Again,

their insurers.

there were no questions asked by

It was

estimated that at this time the

Triangle Shirtwaist Company was overinsured by about
$80 000

.^^

,

On October 15,

1910,

a

fireman from Engine Company 72

inspected the Asch Building, as the department was

required to do semi-annually under Section 99 of the
department rules.

^°

His report mentioned no

irregularities; as far as he was concerned, Joseph Asch

and the Triangle firm conformed to the standards in place
at the time.

Actually, the Fire Department was aware of

the inadequacies of the current standards.

Although new

.

.

buildings were being constructed all over
lower Manhatt an
in the first decade of the twentieth
century, the City
failed to legislate either new building or
factory
laws

despite the fact that the new buildings were
higher and
were planned to house increasing numbers of
workers
In 1910 Fire Chief Edward Croker warned the
complacent

city of the danger implicit in their inadequate laws.^^
On February 11,

1911,

an inspector from the New York

Board of Fire Underwriters visited the Asch Building.

He

represented not only the insurance companies that issued
coverage to the Triangle Company but also the ones that

insured Joseph Asch and the other tenants in the

buildings."

The rag collector had not visited the

Triangle firm since January 15th, and, from all reports,

a

considerable collection of rags, clippings, and lint had

accumulated in all parts of the three floors occupied by
the Triangle Company.

The inspector made no mention of

the accumulated debris in his report

On February 28,

1911,

a factory inspector also

examined the building for the New York State Labor
His report mentioned that is was impractical

Department.

to order doors to open outward in the factory.

He also

stated that the doors were unlocked on the day of his
visit^^ and noted that the premises were not

overcrowded

^"^
.

His only concern related to the

inadequate lighting in the hallways, and on March 3rd, the

owners of the firm were ordered to correct this
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deficiency,- a request they complied
with immediately.Interestingly enough, the inspector
did report violation
by businesses on the second, third,
fourth,
and fifth

floors of the Asch Building, among them
locked doors
during business hours
.

In the first weeks of 1911,

after a tragic fire in an

antiquated factory building in Newark, New
Jersey claimed
the lives of twenty-five employees
the New York City
Fire Department made an investigation of hundreds
of
,

factory buildings in the City, noting existing
violations
and making appropriate recommendations to eliminate
these

problems.

The Department turned the list over to the

Department of Buildings, calling attention to the lack of
fire escapes and sprinkler systems and the inadequate
exits.

They also criticized the fact that fire drills

were not mandated in most factories.

The Triangle factory

was only one of thousands of buildings listed in this
survey.

Few of the violations were acted on by the

Department of Buildings

.

Max Blanck and Isaac Harris

were among those who were never formally notified of

infractions found in their establishment.^"

Another agency that took note of violations of the
law and life- threatening conditions in New York City

factories was the Joint Board of Sanitary Control.
group,

This

set up under the Protocol of 1910 that followed the

Cloakmakers' Strike, was charged with eliminating sources
of dispute between labor and management before disruptive
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strikes occurred.

Composed of two representatives from

the manufacturing community,

two representatives from

labor,

and three citizens at large, the Board
had
investigated the conditions in twelve hundred
New York
City factories during the first weeks of 1911
and issued a
statement complaining that seventy- three shops
were

flagrantly violating fire protection laws.

They sent

notification of their findings to the mayor, the
Superintendent of Buildings, the Fire Commissioner, the
Police Commissioner, the Cloakmakers' Union, and to

employers on the list telling them of violations in their
places of business.

The Asch Building was not on the

list
As early as 1909 it was suggested to the Triangle

partners that periodic fire drills would improve their

weak factory safety program.

The proposal was made to

them by P.J. McKeon, a lecturer on fire prevention at

Columbia University who had inspected the Triangle
quarters when the company contemplated increasing its
insurance coverage.

McKeon,

in turn,

recommended to

Blanck and Harris that they hire H.F.J. Porter,

a

New York

City industrial engineer, to organize fire drills for
their factory.

Porter, who lived in the area and was

acquainted with the Asch Building, wrote the partners
offering to help set up the suggested fire drills at their
convenience.
answered.

His letter was neither acknowledged nor

The partners later cited the prevalence of non59

English speaking workers in the factory
as the primary
reason for failing to instruct their
workers about fire
safety."^ The Triangle Company was
not
alone in

ignoring the advisability of instituting
fire drills.
Only one or two manufacturing establishments
in New York
City had begun introducing them to their
workers.
One

factory owner told Porter,

"Let 'em burn up.

They're a

lot of cattle anyway.
In spite of the prevalence of this arrogant
attitude

in the ranks of the city's factory owners, the New
York

State Assembly's Labor and Industrial Committee, with an

obvious lack of enthusiasm, had been considering since

February 12, 1911 a proposed amendment to an existing law
that might have improved the situation.

This amendment

called for an alarm system in all factories of two or more
stories and mandated weekly fire drills for employees who

worked at levels above the ground floors.

The state labor

commissioner would be empowered to enforce the act with
appropriate fines for violations.^"
The Manufacturers' Association, a group of garment

company owners, were firm in their opposition to
protective measures on either the state or municipal
level

.

Complaining that the suggested measures were both

costly and unnecessary, they held meetings in a Wall
Street location to plan their campaign against the forces
of reform.
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While Blanck and Harris, active members
of the
Manufacturers' Association, were always
reluctant to

undertake safety measures that might prove
costly to them,
Joseph Asch, owner of the Asch Building, was
apparently
unaware of the problems in his building. He never
visited
the premises since his rents were mailed to
him, and
he

was never notified by any agency or organization
about the

deficiencies in his building.

stated that if he

had been alerted, he would have rectified the problems
immediately.

But the Triangle Company and almost all

other shirtwaist factories in New York City were not so
ethical.

Their owners felt confident that they would

never be called to task about violations of existing
regulations.

This was due to their recognition that the

division of authority among state and city departments in
regard to factory conditions led to confusion regarding
jurisdiction over inspections and the enforcement of
regulations
The State Bureau of Labor had always supervised

factory conditions in New York State, sending out
personnel on a regular basis to investigate firms involved
in manufacturing

Sailors' Snug

.

In 1903,

however, the Trustees of

Harbor Corporation were ordered by the New

York City Department of Buildings to add fire escapes to

number of their buildings in New York City.

a

They appealed

the requirement, arguing that the City had no jurisdiction
in such matters as fire escapes and that such concerns
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were the responsibility of the Factory
Inspection Bureau
of the State Labor Department.
The Appellate Division of
the State Supreme Court decided
against the
Trustees.

They held that the state had no right
to dictate to
property owners in a city such as New York,

where control

over buildings was vested in several municipal
bureaus,
and that the New York City Department of
Buildings had
exclusive jurisdiction over fire escapes within

the five

boroughs of the City.^^^
however,

The state labor department,

retained authority over the rest of the state in

all factory matters, as it did in New York City except
in

the area of fire escapes.^"
The New York City Building Code was somewhat

ambiguous in its statements regarding fire escapes.

It

stated that the Department of Buildings would decide what
was necessary in cases of fire escapes.

Since that

Department was inadequately funded and employed only

eighteen largely untrained inspectors, they were not
expected to make periodic visits to sites.

They made

inspections at the time of construction and returned for

subsequent visits only when alterations in structure were
made.

They were unaware of changes made in the functions

of individual buildings- -if

,

for instance, buildings

designed as warehouses were converted to factories- -and,
even if they had been alerted to such changes, they lacked
the personnel to conduct necessary invest igat ions
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The Building Department relied on
the Fire Department
to keep them informed of potential
problems since that
department did make periodic inspections
of factory
buildings, issued written reports of
violations, and kept
records of fire prevention measures undertaken
in

manufacturing establishments

.

There is ample

evidence, however, that officials within the
Fire

Department were increasingly disconcerted about
their role
in trying to persuade factory and firm owners
to
accept

even minimum standards for conditions in their
establishments.

They were well aware that the City's

building codes and municipal and state laws were
inadequate.

And even where they recognized violations of

the law and dangerous conditions,

they lacked enforcement

powers and could only report such situations to the

Department of Buildings.

Too often, however, that

department, because of inadequacies within its own ranks,

failed to investigate further the complaints it received.
As the first decade of the new century drew to a
close,

it was apparent that several elements were in place

that could result in a major industrial tragedy.

The lack

of concern on the part of employers about the welfare of

their employees, the deficient laws, the overlapping and

confused jurisdictions of city and state agencies
responsible for the enforcement of safety regulations, and
the unethical practices of the insurance companies all
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combined to endanger the welfare of
New York City's
factory workers.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WORKERS AND THEIR ALLIES

All employees in the garment factories of
New York

City had to contend with dangerous and degrading
working
conditions.

However, most of the employees in the

shirtwaist industry were women, and this fact alone

weakened their position even further and made it
difficult,

workers.

if not impossible,

to improve their lot as

Their traditional view of themselves within

their family structure and within society, the ethnic

differences among the women workers, the elasticity of the
supply of workers as a result of immigration trends, and
the community's overt bias against female employment

outside the home contributed to their lack of empowerment.
There had been some attempts by the New York State

legislature to safeguard women factory workers.
Protective factory laws had been enacted on behalf of
female workers as early as 1886 when the state prohibited
the employment of women under twenty-one years of age and

minors for more than sixty hours a week.^

In 1899,

work

between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. for "girls"
and minors was prohibited.^

Later in that same year,

this law was extended to cover all women factory workers

except under certain approved conditions.^

The law

further stipullated that employers were required to allow
their employees a sixty minute break for their noon

meal.^

This law was appealed to the New York
State

Supreme Court

^
,

but the Court ruled that it was

constitutional, the main justification of
the jurists'
decision being the "delicate constitutions"
of the female
workers.^ In 1907, attorney and journalist
Crystal
Eastman, after investigating labor conditions
and

accidents in the workplace insofar as they involved
women,
helped to write New York State's first women's

compensation law, a piece of legislation that became a
model for later efforts in other states.
In spite of these well-intentioned efforts on the

part of state legislators, laws pertaining to women

workers were inadequately enforced.

A study done in 1905-

1906 by the Russell Sage Foundation, a research

organization that sent out investigators to collect
statistics in order to document the need for remedial
laws,

indicated that enforcement of these labor laws by

the state labor department left much to be desired.

Between 1901-1906, there were just four prosecutions for
violations in the entire state.
was even required to pay a

Only one of the offenders

fine.''

In 1906-1907,

fifty-two cases of violations were brought before the
courts, but their disposition was extremely lenient.

Many

of the cases were suspended while other violations were

punished with trifling fines.

^

Women in New York City

were still working night shifts in the garment industry
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and were working far longer than sixty
hours a week during
busy seasons.
In fact, in 1906 Mary Van Kleeck, then
a
fellow of the College Settlement Association,
did a study
of the enforcement of women's labor laws,
focusing

especially on the hours worked by factory women.

She

discovered that in spite of the sixty-hour law many
female
employees worked as many as seventy-eight hours each
week
in garment factories.

There were, Van Kleeck explained,

so many loopholes in the legislation under scrutiny
that
it was almost impossible to prove a violation; therefore,

she believed that the laws were unenf orcable

.

^

This

study received considerable publicity and resulted in
further legislation stating that enforcement of the

sixty-hour law would henceforth be the responsibility of
local boards of health instead of the state labor
department.^"

As early as 1908, however, another statute

returned the law's enforcement to the Labor Department
The transfer of jurisdiction resulted in no improvement in
the execution of the law.

A survey conducted among Italian workers by Florence
Odencranz under the auspices of the Russell Sage

Foundation supported Van Kleeck'

s

findings.

Odencranz

discovered that most employers were either ignorant of the
law or disregarded any limitations placed on them by
legislation.^^

They not only required their female

employees to work overly long shifts but also insisted
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.

that they take work home with them during
their evening
hours." They also disregarded a 19li New
York state 1 aw

requiring mandatory school attendance until
age fourteen,
and minors, eluding the clutches of truant

officers, went

off to work in the garment factories with
their older

siblings and, in some cases, with their parents,
many of
whom saw no need to educate their children,
especially if
they were girls.

In 1907,

it was estimated that there

were at least 60,000 children at work in the factories
of
New York City."

Odencranz's study also emphasized the dangerous

physical conditions that continued to prevail in garment
factories despite state and municipal regulations.

Poor

ventilation, inadequate lighting, and extraordinary filth

were typical

.

Fire hazards were commonplace and evoked

little attention.
all day and,

backs.

Women workers were required to stand

if seated,

were supplied with chairs without

Odencranz also mentioned that the noise level in

factories, due to the use of power machinery, was so loud

and intense that it must have produced ill effects on

workers

.

What is more, no effort was made to eliminate the

seasonal character of work in the shirtwaist industry,

with its peak periods of high employment and slumps during

which a high percentage of workers were laid off
Principally because of the large numbers of women employed
in the industry, businessmen saw little need to regularize
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the manufacturing process; after all,
women were

expendable.

Employers often, however, attempted to hold

onto their trained workers during slow periods.

They

maintained employees on their work rosters and
required
them to report to their shops each day and sit with
nothing to do for several hours until they were informed
that there was no work available.

At that point they

would be permitted to go home, with no pay to show for
their hours spent waiting.

Exploited by their employers, denied help from the
state departments and agencies whose job it was to protect
them,

and powerless to defend their own interests, women

factory workers recognized that if they were to realize
changes in their work environment, they would have to have

assistance from other segments of the community.

The

existence of a notable reform spirit in the first two
decades of the twentieth century gave some hope that the

assistance they needed might, in fact, be forthcoming.
Two broad groups, liberals and radicals, were challenging
the status quo and seeking to ameliorate the consequences
of unrestrained industrialism.

Liberals, an elitist group of progressive reformers,

believed that the federal government should act to curtail
or eliminate existing injustices and abuses through

regulation and social reform.

They argued that it was

imperative that such reform occur in order to check the

anger of an aroused working class embittered by the harsh
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living and working conditions.

Forming cross-class

alliances of upper and middle-class reformers from
various
unconnected circles such as labor and women's
organizations,

the liberals hoped to expand democracy as
a

means of solving the problems bedeviling American society
and to eliminate the corrupting ties linking government

and business.

They hoped to accomplish their goals within

the framework of capitalism and the American tradition.

Radicals, however, were not satisfied with liberal

solutions and intended instead to restructure and transom

American political, economic, and social life to suit
their idealistic vision.

They resolved to institute

revolutionary reforms that would result in a system more
responsive to the needs of the working class.

While few

of them advocated programs that were truly revolutionary
in nature in nature,

radicals from both the middle and the

working classes were willing to seek solutions to the
nation's problems that were not in keeping with American
tradition.
The lines between these two groups were fluid; often

their motives and methods overlapped and merged or they
formed coalitions, while at other times elements within
the discrete groups fragmented and hostile factions did

battle with one another.

Although they were all located

to the left of center on the political continuum,

they

particularly disagreed about the place of women in society
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and their function within the workplace.

The reformers'

divisions in this regard often made them
unreliable allies
for the powerless factory workers who hoped
to benefit
from an alliance with them.
*

*

*

Many young Jewish girls, the most militant group
in
the ranks of female workers, had ties to the
socialist
movement and they forged ties with that movement.

Modern

socialism had been introduced into the United States by

German immigrants prior to the Civil War.

These

immigrants brought with them Marxist ideas about the

desirability of promoting class consciousness in the

working class, the inevitability of class conflict, and
the need to work through trade unions to accomplish their
ends.

They also brought with them the ideological

differences that had originated among socialists in
Germany.

One of the primary disputes centered on the

relationship between trade unionism and politics as seen
by Marx and the one envisioned by Ferdinand Lassalle and

Eduard Bernstein, late nineteenth century German political
and social thinkers who proposed revisionist theories

countering the ideas of

Marx.^'^

Marxian socialists believed that trade unionism was a
result of the contest between labor and capital and that

such activity would eventually disappear, the reasons for
its existence having been eliminated after the final

revolution and the birth of the new socialist state.
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The

followers of Lassalle, however, maintained
that trade
unionism would appear at the opposite end of
the spectrum
They believed that the conditions of working
people would
be improved by the actions of existing
governments after
those governments had been "purified" through
universal
suffrage.

The government could then assist the working

class by underwriting cooperative production that
would,
in turn,

make effective trade unions possible.

Bernstein and other contemporary European Marxist
revisionists,

influenced by Lassalle, believed that the

determinist outcome preached by Marx might not be
inevitable and that class conflict could be avoided if

capitalism could be modified and reformed through the use
of democratic methods to protect workers'

interests and

allow them some measure of economic security.

These

socialist saw the middle class (as distinct from both the

capitalist class and the working class) as a potential

ally that could align itself with the proletariat and

perform some "useful" work for mankind, an outlook many
other Marxists, who saw society in terms of
division, would have regarded as puzzling.^**

a

two-fold
Most of

these socialists also recognized that trade unionism,

if

successful in realizing its goals, would undermine the

Marxian view of a future world order.

By improving the

conditions and the status of the working class, trade
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unionism would inevitably eliminate the
need for the final
revolution that would produce a classless
society and
result in the eventual extinction of the
state itself.

Debate as they might theoretical questions
regarding
labor and politics, German socialist immigrants
found
little to disagree about regarding the place of
women in
the family,

in the workplace,

or in society.

German

socialist held a highly romanticized view of women and
their pivotal role in the idealized household.

While

they gave credit to women for their contributions in all
areas,

they believed that it was the responsibility of the

husband to work to support his family and to protect his
wife against impending dangers including capitalism and

any attempts to further the emancipation of "the weaker
sex."^°

While women, organized into auxiliaries, filled

several roles in the party, their activities were

peripheral to the German socialist agenda.

They provided

social services to the socialist community; they ran

charity organizations, recreational programs, day
nurseries, and even choral groups.

They were never,

however, given a position next to their men in either the

party organization or in any early unions.
Once they were settled in the United States, the

views of these German socialists began to change.

There

were a few, mostly intellectuals and radicals, who became

outspoken advocates of women's rights soon after the end
of the Civil War.

Many of this new breed of socialists
82

were women.

Outstanding among them were prominent writers
and speakers such as Mathilde Anneke and
Augusta

Lilienthal, who,
women,

in efforts to advance the emancipation
of

supported American suffragists, even such

freethinkers as Victoria Woodhull.^^

They were supported

by a few well-known intellectuals in socialist circles,
such as Adolf Douai, whose essays in German -American
daily

newspapers advanced the idea of women's suffrage."

But

these radical ideas were not accepted by most of the early

socialists who settled in the United States.
However, as they adapted to life in an industrial

society that placed little value on the work of individual
laborers, German socialists recognized the economic

necessity for women to engage in wage labor and decided to
lift their traditional prohibition against women working

outside the home.

Nevertheless, they maintained their

customary attitudes toward their wives and daughters and

attempted to shield them through support for the passage
of protective legislation in 1875 which was so restrictive
that,

if enacted,

it would have banned mothers of children

under fourteen from working.

They also continued to

denounce women who agitated for suffrage rights as "bad
wives" working for something "not in their own best

interests

"^*
.

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the

views of these German -American socialists began to change
in other ways.

Their doctrinaire fervor was tempered by
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association with American social, economic,
and political
realities.
Most of them spent little time speculating
on
the nature of the future as envisioned by
traditional
Marxists.

They avoided such visionary reflections
because

they had become pragmatists and were more concerned
about
the current problems facing society than about
a vague

Utopian future.
Many of them also rejected the Marxian belief in the
demise of the state in an ideal socialist future.

As

voters, many German-Americans identified with their

government and saw it as a mechanism to be used to enhance
their own status and that of their social class.

easier for them to identify with the state as

It was

a symbol of

their national pride than with an ambiguous international

working class composed of those with whom they had little
in common.
It was not long before the

American socialists saw

their movement splinter in much the same way that European

socialism had.

The hard-line faction within the movement,

led by the autocratic Daniel DeLeon, a former Columbia

University professor, and the Socialist Labor Party worked
together after 1890 to establish a trade union movement in
the United States subject to the control of the Socialist

Labor Party.

While DeLeon subscribed to the fundamental

tenets of Marxist theory, he was an inflexible and

narrow-minded tyrant who was determined to destroy what he
could not control and did battle with the non-socialist
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labor movement as well as with those
socialists who
disputed his attempts to centralize control
of

the party

and to direct and politicize the unions.

He was not

impressed with either the ideas of popular
government or
the potential of the masses to participate in
determining
their own destiny.

He put all his faith in the party as

an instrument to direct the future of the movement,

educate the proletariat about its eventual role, and

eventually control the state and the economy.

His faction

argued that class struggle was inevitable and revolution

necessary to achieve the long-awaited dictatorship of the
proletariat
The right wing of the socialist movement was

represented by Morris Hillquit, a New York lawyer, and

Victor Berger, a Milwaukee political figure, an elected
mayor of that city who in 1910 was sent to represent his
constituents in Congress.

These two men shared with

conservative elements of society a deep aversion to rapid
and radical change and looked to socialism, as they

perceived

it,

to protect society from the excesses of

capitalism and the specter of violent revolution.

Berger

advocated a gradual approach through social reforms and
state ownership of utilities as socialism marched to its

inevitable victory.

Hillquit, more to the center of the

movement than Berger, regarded the state, transformed from
its initial role as the preserver of the status quo for
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the benefit of the affluent classes,

as a medium to effect

social change for the benefit of the working
class.
With
the coming of the long-awaited socialist
nirvana, the
state would not disappear but would assume an

administrative role, since the need for its former
functions had been eliminated.

Unlike DeLeon and his

faction, both Berger and Hillquit believed it possible
and

even commendable for the socialists to seek accommodation

with non-socialist trade unions even though they deplored
their elitism.
The radical wing of the socialist movement was

represented by Eugene Debs' Social Democracy and, even
farther to the left, by the International Workers of the
World.

Debs, never doctrinaire in his socialist

convictions, was enthusiastically supported by many

Americans, partly because of his commitment to the

democratic traditions they held dear.

Always devoted to

the interests of working people. Debs expended much effort
in attempts to win converts to the ideas of industrial

unionism.

He was,

therefore,

seldom willing to cooperate

with non-socialist trade unions and tried to win their
members over to his idea of one great union working for
the realization of political and economic equality for
all.^^

The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was located
on the far left fringe of the socialist spectrum.
a

It was

national syndicalist union that intended to transform
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society by means of industrial unions.

The leaders of the

IWW were revolutionaries who scorned both
the state and
trade unions.
They hoped to banish capitalism and the

wage system after an inevitable class war.

They were

feared and denounced by most Americans and found
little

sympathy in the ranks of less radical socialists.
With the exception of the IWW, which advocated both
women's emancipation and a full political, social, and
economic equality, and Debs, who denounced women's

oppression and encouraged their full equality, most other
socialists retained the German mythos regarding women.
While professing indignation at the treatment of female

workers in shops and factories, they basically believed
that women belonged in the home tending to their domestic

duties.

Socialists accepted the fact that women might

have to engage in work outside the home, but this was not
to be desired,

labor."

since women were "not suited to wage

When Adolf Douai was called on to give testimony

to a congressional committee in 1881 regarding women wage

earners, he suggested that the exploitation of women

workers resulted not only in the breakdown of their health
but could also endanger the lives and health of their

unborn children.

Nor did socialists, except for Debs

and the IWW radicals, approve of granting women full

political rights so they could effectively protect
themselves

^"^
.
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There were, nevertheless, after 1900, modest
changes
in the socialist perception of women and their
role

in the

family,

in the workplace,

and in the party.

When the

Socialist Party of America was formed in 1901 in an
effort
to unite the various factions in the movement, eight
of

the 13 8 delegates were women.

None, however,

spoke out

about the status of women in the party, nor did any of

their male counterparts

Nevertheless, women activists

.

such as Kate Richards O'Hare and Josephine Conger began to

speak out for women's rights and argued that the

traditional auxiliaries should be avoided and that women

should demand equal status within the party.

This

trend was further encouraged by the influx of young Jewish

women into the country.
in the European movement,

However,

These immigrants, often activists

demanded a voice in the party.

it was not until after they became a force in

established unions that their concerns were noted and they
were given significant standing in the party. ^°
*

*

*

Women workers received little in the way of sympathy
or assistance from the socialist movement, and their

experience with organized labor offered little hope
either.

Nevertheless, in the last decades of the

nineteenth century, as the dissatisfaction and anger of

women workers intensified, many spontaneous walkouts and
strikes took place.

They were usually led by the Jewish

workers, recent immigrants from Eastern Europe who had
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participated in radical movements in the old
country and
were associated with flourishing movements
working to
achieve social justice in their neighborhoods on
the Lower
East Side.^^ The disputes that produced the
walkouts

centered on the workers' dissatisfaction with their
low
wages,

employers' attempts to enforce petty discipline in

the factories,

and instances of sexual harassment.

As early as the 1880'

s,

women in the garment industry

realized they would have to organize as their male
counterparts were doing in order to obtain benefits for
themselves.
co-workers,

In 1883 they,

along with their male

formed the Dress and Cloak Makers' Union, a

local assembly of the Knights of Labor.

Although the

women unionists were required to meet separately from the
men,^^ in the single strike in which the infant

organization was involved, half of the strikers were

women."

The union won this strike which had been called

to obtain better pay, more reasonable working hours,

polite treatment from the employers.

and

Nevertheless, the

Dress and Cloak Makers' Union died an early death shortly

after the termination of the strike.

This became a usual

pattern in union activity that involved women.

A

successful and enthusiastic organization would be formed

by women workers; it would become involved in
demonstrations or strikes to achieve specific demands; but
once their goals were realized, the women would rapidly
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lose interest in the organization they had
created,

abandoning unionism until a future crisis roused
them to
organize once again.
The Dress and Cloakmakers' Union was soon

reestablished in New York City, once again as

assembly of the Knights of Labor.

a local

The Union led the

entire cloak trade of the City out in a general strike
in

mid-August of 1885.

The women unionists, again meeting

apart from their male co-workers, decided to support the
strike, which lasted for two weeks.

The strike settlement

not only resulted in wage concessions on the part of the

manufacturers, but in also set up an arbitration committee
to prevent further strikes in the industry.

This was

apparently the first arbitration committee established in
the garment industry.

The late 1880 's witnessed a national wave of workers'

protests against the evils generated by rampant
industrialization.

The garment workers in New York City

took part in a series of strikes during that period, the

walkouts being so numerous that the New York State Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported in 1889 that the garment

trade was "notorious for strikes.

"^^

Many of these

strikes failed to win their objectives.

The employers

were learning to deal with their recalcitrant workers, who

lacked the funds to withstand unyielding management
responses.

The employers attempted to divide the workers

against each other or shipped work from city to city to
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break the strikes; when all else failed,
they imported
ready-made clothing from Europe in an effort

to force the

workers to abandon their demands
These upheavals produced a new interest in

unionization, and several new unions were organized
in the
New York City garment industry, although during
the

general strike of 1885 at least one of these unions
allied
itself with the employers against it fellow unions."
These new organizations were notoriously short-lived,^^

partly due to the fact that there was a good deal of
disorder and discord among the workers attempting to
organize.

Many of the individuals who won leadership

positions in the new unions were Jewish socialists and
anarchists who used the unions to further their own

competing radical ideologies
Few of the men who organized these new unions were

concerned about the need to organize women workers in the
garment industry, even though all of the new unions

included a women's branch.

Moreover, few of the female

workers were convinced that union membership would prove
to be beneficial to them,

at least in the chaotic

conditions that prevailed in most of the unions at that
time.

As a result,

their association with unions seems to

have been, at best, sporadic.^"
In the spring of 1891, garment workers from many

cities met in New York City and founded the United Garment

Workers of America (UGW)

,

a

union for workers in the men's
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clothing industries.

.

It was a

conservative organization

that repudiated the ideas of making
radical changes in

either American society or the American
economy.
it
sought to improve the condition of workers
through
economic pressure on employers in the shops and
factories
One of the primary means the union adopted to
achieve its

objectives was the use of the union label, issued only
to
those firms that agree to meet acceptable standards
for

their employees and to accept the UGW as the bargaining
agent for their workers.

Since the UGW insisted that

all employees in a shop belong to the union before it

would permit a firm to use the union label, the UGW was
forced to recruit the women working in factories.
so,

Even

the union usually demanded from employers only

concessions that would benefit male workers and ignored
the conditions its women members were forced to endure.''^

Nor were women given leadership positions in their unions
In several instances,

women, usually young and

enthusiastic Jewish women, established their own locals

within the UGW but were seldom given either encouragement
or assistance by male members of the parent

organization
As a result of its moderate agenda, the UGW was able
to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor

(AFL)

Originally established in 1881 as the Federation of
Organized Trader and Labor Unions, the Federation was
reorganized and renamed in 1886.

Within a short time the

.

new organization became the nation's
foremost spokesman
for labor, replacing the Knights of Labor,
which had
faltered and died in the wake of the Haymarket
debacle.

The AFL, a union of national trade unions
operating

autonomously within the parent organization, appealed
to
skilled workers who were willing to work within the
capitalist system as a distinct wage-earning class.
Samuel Gompers,

founder of the Federation and president

until 1924, convinced members of his organization that
it

would be more effective for them to pursue moderate goals
and adopt a policy of "pure and simple unionism" than to
seek more radical objectives and involve themselves in

partisan politics.

Gompers and his union were even

reluctant to work for the passage of protective
legislation,

insisting that it was wiser to depend on

economic pressure in the workshops to produce better

conditions for workers.

By avoiding extreme political and

social programs and methods and by divorcing itself from
the masses of unskilled workers,

the AFL was able to

maintain itself while earlier organizations fell into
oblivion
Even before Gompers and his close associates had

reorganized the Federation, they had encouraged women to
join their respective trade unions and called for better

pay for women and an end to the deplorable conditions with
which female workers had to contend.

These AFL leaders,

however, had underlying motives when they displayed
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concern for women workers.

Although convinced that

women's place was in the home filling their
traditional
roles as wives, mothers, and homemakers
they
,

recognized that economic factors had forced women
into the
workplace in ever increasing numbers.
In their new
capacity,

they usually displaced male workers who were the

rightful bread-winners in their families and reduced the

wages in the industries in which they worked.

Gompers and

his cohorts believed that encouraging women to unionize

and demanding equal pay for their efforts would eliminate

both problems.

If faced with hiring either male or female

workers at equal wages, employers would certainly choose
the males,

thus forcing the women to return to their

domestic roles while men would work at higher wages and
support their families adequately.

What is more, the

individual trade unions belonging to the AFL were free to

restrict female membership as they saw fit, regardless of
the policies of the parent organization.

In these first

years of the Federation's existence, therefore, only two
national unions, the Cigarmakers and the Typographical
Union, recruited women, while other AFL unions actually

prohibited their membership.''^
The AFL,

in other words,

spoke with a forked tongue.

Gompers made magnanimous public statements calling on his
elite membership to encourage female enrollment in their

unions and went so far as to appoint Mary Kenny as a full
time AFL organizer in 1892 and to invite prominent women.

knowledgeable about the problems of women in the
workplace, to address the Federation's annual

convention/^

Beyond this, however, neither the parent

organization nor its member unions displayed even
minimal
concern about women's problems.
^'^

When the UGW affiliated with the AFL, the union
brought with it

a

sizeable contingent of women members.

Highly enthusiastic, they proved themselves to be loyal
and fearless strikers during the 1890'
of 1894,

however,

s.

The depression

caused the demise of most of the garment

makers' unions, although the UGW, with a reduced

membership, continued to maintain itself.

The severe

economic problems generated by this depression caused

women union members, as well their male co-workers, to
forego militancy.

They were willing to endure almost

anything to retain their jobs.

After the return of prosperity in 1897, unionism
enjoyed a healthy resurgence.

The AFL not only survived

the depression but saw its membership increase to 548,000

by 1900; by 1914 it had 1,676,000 members in its 113
affiliated unions.''^

The garment industry also enjoyed a

great upsurge during this period, and increasing numbers
of women, mostly young Jewish immigrants,

the factories of New York City.

found work in

They joined a hodgepodge

of male-dominated unions in the industry and took part in

several small strikes with varying degrees of success.
The manufacturers were growing more determined to break
95

.

the new unions and end the fledgling
opposition of their

recalcitrant workers.

Internal problems existed as well

and prevented much in the way of permanent
achievements;
the disputes over dual union membership and
the

ideological competition that existed between unions
were

disruptive and caused distrust and hostility, when
increasing unity should have been their goal.
As early as 1898 there was a growing demand for a

national union to work for the united interests of the

workers in the garment industry.

This enthusiasm resulted

in the establishment of the International Ladies Garment

Workers' Union (ILGWU)

in the spring of 1900.

Less than a

month after the formation of the new union, the AFL

granted a charter to the new national organization, and
local unions in various branches of the garment industry

requested membership.
The ILGWU differed from most other AFL affiliates in
that much of its leadership was socialist and its guiding

philosophy always conflicted with that of the parent
union, which advocated working within the existing system.
ILGWU,

however, while never losing sight of the pragmatic

trade union approach, combined it with an aggressive and

militant idealism that was

origins
•

•

a

legacy from its leftist

4 9

The early leaders and supporters of the union were

Jewish immigrants

,

scholars

,

intellectuals

,

and socialist

activists who probably would have remained in those
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circles if they had remained in Eastern Europe.

After

their arrival in the United States, they drifted
into the
needle trades out of economic necessity. The workers
in

the industry, mainly unlettered and often conservative
in

their outlook, nevertheless turned to these intellectuals
for help and leadership in contending with the harsh

reality of sweatshop conditions.

Benjamin Schlesinger,

who came from a Lithuanian rabbinical family, became an

early president of the ILGWU.^°

Abe Baroff, another

early and influential official in the ILGWU, had been a
sensitive and poetic journalist in Russia before
emigrating.

Schlesinger had socialist connections while

Baroff had been a nihilist before leaving his early
home.^^

Other individuals whose aid and support were of

utmost importance to the new union were immigrants from
the professional classes.

Lawyers Meyer London and Morris

Hillquit represented the ILGWU in many of its efforts and

influenced the union to "speed the progress of this

country to the grand and noble idea of Social
Democracy.

"^^

The ILGWU had a very inauspicious beginning.

With

initial assets of only thirty dollars, the union provided
its officers with no salaries during the first year of its

existence.

Unable even to rent an office for the infant

organization, the leaders had nothing but desk space in
the New York Cloakmakers' Union's office.
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Not until the

union was into its third year did it move
into its own
office on Third Avenue." The new union,
however, grew
rapidly and by 1903 was able to boast of
10,000 members in
fifty-one locals, half of them located outside
of New York
City.^^

The ILGWU managed to persist through its earliest

years despite a multitude of problems.

caused worry.

Financial distress

The Federation had to assist the ILGWU by

financing the cost of sending officials into the field to
organize.

The AFL also donated funds to assist with

administrative costs, and, on at least one occasion, lent

money to the ILGWU."

The ILGWU'

s

tenuous financial

plight encouraged it to recruit women working in the
industry, but in the early years the number of female

recruits who answered the call was less than promising."
In 1900,

the New York City shirtwaist makers

organized the Ladies Waist Makers Union, ILGWU 12."
This involved the ILGWU in a bitter jurisdictional dispute

with the United Shirt and Waist Makers Union that was
settled in favor of the ILGWU through the mediation of the

AFL."

By 1905, however. Local 12 had disbanded due to

lack of interest.

In that same year a new

organization. Local 25, was established, but it appeared

likely to go the way of its predecessor.^"

In 1909 Local

25 had only one hundred members and a sum total of four

dollars in its treasury.
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Until 1904, many employers in the needle
trades were
earning large profits from their business ventures,

especially those outside of New York City, and
seemed,
therefore, willing to deal with the unions in a

cooperative manner.

Several unions gained recognition,

contracts were amicably agreed upon, and few serious

disagreements arose between labor and management in the
garment trades."

In turn,

the unions tried to

discourage strikes within the industry and attempted to
improve their relationship with employers."

Boycotts

were used, and the union label modeled after the one

adopted by the UGW, was advocated.

To their regret,

however, there was little initial enthusiasm for the
label; after five years of arguing its advantages, only

one company was actually using it."

This prosperous spell in the history of the garment

industry came to a sudden halt with the advent of hard
economic times in 1903-1904.
began,

An industrial depression

signaling an end to the steady growth of the ILGWU

Employers took advantage of the economic decline and did
what they could to weaken unions.

blacklisting were commonplace.

Lockouts and

Employees retaliated and

stikes proliferated, often without union sanction.

The

national organization lacked central authority and was

unable to cope with the resulting deterioration of the
local's influence and the demoralization of the

membership."

The ILGWU was further weakened in this
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time of trouble by the intrusion of the IWW
into the

garment industry.

its presence caused internal tension

and some splintering both within the unions and the

socialist movement.^''

Shortly after its establishment, the leaders of Local
25 came to realize that it was time to organize women

workers in earnest, but their efforts produced little

enthusiasm among factory women.

As a result,

Sam

Shindler, the Local's secretary at this time, publicly

deplored the fact that his women members were "irregular
and unenthusiastic

.

"^^

Despite the lack of interest in

collective action, growing unrest was evident among

workers in the New York shirtwaist trade and in the entire
garment industry, especially those workers employed in
firms located in the area of Washington Square.

There

were continual confrontations between employers and their
workers.

In the early autumn of 1909,

aware of this

growing discontent, Shindler and Abraham Baroff, who was
then an organizer for Local 25, suggested to the officials
of the ILGWU that the problems in the shirtwaist industry

called for a general strike, a "walkout of all the crafts
in one branch of the industry."'^"

The leadership of the ILGWU had recently fallen into
the hands of moderates.

Especially important was John

Dyche, the Secretary-Treasurer of the ILGWU.

Dyche, who

had been involved in socialist activities prior to his
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emigration from Europe, came under the influence
of Samuel
Gompers after his arrival in the United States.
He

was so

close to Gompers that he was referred to as
"the Jewish

Gompers."

He left the socialist movement and it was

rumored that the president of the Federation had helped
him obtain his position with the ILGWU in 1904.^^

Dyche

dominated the union and its president, Abraham Rosenberg.
Using his position of authority within the organization,
he helped introduce a centralized structure to the ILGWU,

making the locals more responsible to the parent union.
He also did what he could to discourage strikes and

confrontations with employers.

Moreover, at no time was

he responsive to the problems of his women union
members.''^
a

When asked to approve Local 25

's

request for

general strike, Dyche and Rosenberg objected that the

idea of a general strike was "reckless" and advised

Shindler and Baroff to seek other options.
While the socialists were too divided in terms of
their ideology and too fragmented in their organization to
mount a concerted effort on behalf of women factory
workers, organized labor also lacked either the unity or
the motivation to seek solutions to their problems.

Those

working women who were aware of the absence of concern for
their situation realized that they would have to structure
a

course of action that would enable them to protect
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themselves.

They looked to the social reformers to
supply

them with the assistance they needed to effect
changes in
their work environment.
*

*

*

The impotent workers in the garment industry in New

York City, Philadelphia, Boston, and other major

industrial cities did find support from

a

unlikely, coalition of progressive allies.

significant,

if

They were

befriended by an organization of upper- and middle-class
women known as the Women's Trade Union League of America
(WTUL)

.

This organization was originally the brainchild

of William English Walling,

a

well-to-do former factory

inspector who had been associated with the settlement
house movement in New York City.

On a trip to^^^Englsjid he

became acquainted with the British Women's Trade Union
League, which maintained that women workers could improve

their wages and working conditions by joining existing

men's unions.

This British organization, established in

1874 by trade unions working with social reformers,

had

achieved some successes.
Walling was convinced that an American league,

modeled after the British organization, could improve the
conditions in which women in the United States were forced
to work.

He and Mary Kenney 0' Sullivan,

and AFL

organizer, drew up a constitution and brought their plans

before a group of social reformers and AFL officials

attending the Federation's 1903 convention in Boston.
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Although working women were part of the
organization from
the start,

the driving force behind the WTUL was a
group

of dedicated,

non-union, upper-class women who were

willing to contribute not only their efforts but their
financial support to the movement.

It was,

however,

anticipated that these "allies" would, in time, give way
to trade union members,

women wage workers, who would

supply leadership and give direction to the WTUL.
The WTUL's primary goals, as formulated by the

founding members, were to "affiliate ourselves as closely
as possible with the AFL"" and organize women workers

into trade unions under the aegis of the AFL.

It was

anticipated that once this was accomplished, collective
efforts would be launched to secure better wages and

working conditions for women.
Within

a

few months local branches of the WTUL were

formed in New York City, Boston, and Chicago, with the

national organization established in Chicago.

The New

York League held its meetings at the University Settlement
House, where shirtwaist makers had been meeting since
1889.

The shirtwaist makers became the first group to

unofficially ally themselves with the League.'"

Although

amazed that League meetings included such unlikely
activities as tea parties and dancing the Virginia Reel,
few working women began to join the new organization.

Rose Schneiderman and Leonora O'Reilly were two such
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activists, and their long association with the
League

proved to be mutually beneficial.

Professional women,

suffragists, and even a few socialists also sought
early

membership in the WTUL.
This cross-class alliance of trade union women and

philanthropic reformers made its appearance at
auspicious time.

a

less than

Business establishments in the garment

industry were closing at an alarmingly high rate due to

recession-induced financial distress.

There was

increasing rancor toward working women competing with men
for the limited jobs still available in the industry.

Employers,

in their determination to reverse the trend

toward worker organization, were forming manufacturers'
associations, insisting on open shops, and refusing to

recognize unions as bargaining agents for their employees.
Lockouts

,

blacklists

,

and injunctions were also used in an

effort to quash the unions.

Confrontation between

employers and their workers often ended in ignominious
defeats for the unions

,

and their leaders could do little

more than protest weakly as they saw hard-earned
concessions, won earlier from employers, abrogated during
the hard times.

At the turn of the century, only three

percent of all working women were unionized.

After the

recession their numbers dwindled still further, despite
the efforts of the WTUL.'^
The most difficult obstacle League members had to

face was the continued indifference of the AFL to their
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efforts.

In spite of the fact that the WTUL
worked

diligently to gain recognition and support from
the AFL,
the Federation avoided making a real commitment
to
the

work of the League.

In his autobiography,

Gompers

recalled his wholehearted endorsement of the WTUL and
the

cooperation he always extended to the League women."
The AFL president's memory did not serve him correctly.
His detached and passive attitude toward the WTUL and its

members afforded them little more than token support.
Undoubtedly, any real collaboration between the two

organizations was prevented by Gompers' aversion to women
in the labor force and his suspicions about the motives

and intent of the League's upper-class allies.

He could

not understand their interest in the problems of working

women and feared that once the novelty wore off, they
might withdraw and "leave the working girls to the mercies
of their employers

"'^^
.

Unfortunately, the AFL affiliates

and their locals followed his example,

frustrationg the

attempts of the League to involve working women in union

activities
Despite the fact that many socialist women such as
Rose Schneiderman,

Pauline Newman, Leonora O'Reilly,

Theresa Malkiel, and bertha Mailly were staunch members of
the WTUL, rank-and-file members of the socialist movement

generally lacked sympathy for the aims of the League.
fact,

some socialists were unfailingly hostile to the

"rich ladies."

They could not comprehend their
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association with the working women.

Nor could they

forgive the League's determination to affiliate
with

Gompers and the Federation.

The socialists, however,

muted their suspicions of the WTUL, acknowledging
its
successes in the campaign to aid working women.

The

association of socialists with the League, however, fueled
Gompers'

suspicions of its efforts and hampered the WTUL's

ability to work with the AFL.^°
The League was also afflicted with internal problems

from the time of its inception.

place as early as 1904 over

adequately solved.

a

A confrontation took

problem that was never

The progressive social reformers among

the WTUL members were anxious to have the League involve

itself in investigative work, amassing facts and figures
that could be used to good advantage in their struggle.

The trade union members objected and insisted that the

League remain true to its initial goal, enrolling workers
in trade unions.

The AFL threw its influence behind the

tade union contingent, and they emerged, at least
temporarily, as the victors.

Other questions about the goals of the League

continually emerged and were never resolved, remaining to

vex members and foster discord in the organization.

While

the members from the start constantly stressed their

commitment to the concept of sisterhood, they were never
able to decide if their primary obligation was to women as
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an oppressed minority among workers or
whether their

dedication to the labor movement as
supersede other priorities.

a

whole should

Their attempts to integrate

their feminist objectives with unionism were
ongoing and
disruptive.

Early members of the WTUL such as Harriot

Stanton Blatch and journalist Rheta Childe DOrr, both
involved with the suffrage movement, left the League
because they found it impossible to reconcile the two
concerns.

^2

Other League members such as Helen Marot,

and upper-class whose entire career was devoted to League
activities, argued that the organization should view women

workers as part of the working class,

in need of the same

protections and benefits as male workers.

The League,

in

other words, should concern itself with "labor questions,"
not "gender questions.""

Working-class members such as Rose Schneiderman, a

Jewish immigrant from Poland whose early career as a cap
maker led her into union organizing and

socialism*'''

and

Leonora O'Reilly, first employed in a shirtwaist factory
before engaging in trade union activities

,

were seldom

primarily concerned about suffrage and equal rights, but
they understood all too well that their problems were

unique to their gender, and it was difficult, if not
impossible,

for most of them to bury their concerns under

a blanket of class-conscious rhetoric.
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League members constantly boasted, with some
validity, about their attempts to achieve "sisterhood."
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Nevertheless, the diverse composition of the WTUL
membership, each group with its own concerns,
its own
agenda, and its own apprehensions, resulted in
further

internal discord.

The working women were wary of the

"fine ladies'* who were their upper-class allies.

They

were conscious of and uncomfortable with the progressives'
inherent,

if often subconscious,

desire to transform the

immigrant-class women, divested of their old-world and
lower-class eccentricities, into acceptable Americanized
citizens
Ethnic differences were always a problem.

Although

the League made great efforts to accommodate workers of

various nationalities, problems caused by cultural

differences and language problems were never completely
solved.

The Jewish and Italian girls did not understand

or care for each other, and the American girls saw little
to admire in either group.

The WTUL understood the genesis of the problems and
the difficulties that restricted its successes during the

first years of its existence and truly attempted to

control

,

if not eliminate them

.

What is more

,

it never

lost sight of its commitment to the women enduring the

wretched conditions in the garment factories of New York
City.

Although the nature of its charge, the

intransigence of its detractors, and the lack of accord

within the organization limited its early accomplishments.
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it was the most loyal ally the factory women
had as they

began their assault on those who were their exploit
ers
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CHAPTER V

CONFRONTATION AND TRAGEDY
As the first decade of the twentieth century drew
to

an end,

the rage of New York City's garment workers

escalated.

At the same time,

the intransigence of their

employers, determined to arrest the encroachment of the

unions into their factories and workshops, seemed to
intensify.

The assortment of weapons they used to

accomplish their objectives- -the blacklist, the lockout,
and the injunction- -were accepted by most members of the

community as legitimate means of self -protection against
those who would restrict their supposed constitutional
right to expand their property and enlarge their fortunes.

Law-enforcement agencies, the courts, and the government
at all levels encouraged and protected the position of

these businessmen.

They were, however,

indifferent to the

discontent of the workers.
Late in July of 1909, two hundred workers in the

Rosen Brothers Shirtwaist Shop in the Washington Square
garment district walked off their jobs in a protest
against their meager wages.

They picketed the shop wliile

their employers hired local ruffians to heckle them, and
the police arrested those pickets rash enough to shout
"scab" at workers who refused to join the walkout.

The

strikers appealed for assistance from Local 25,^ which,
in turn,

requested help from the United Hebrew Trades, an

organization formed by socialists in 1888 for the purpose

of encouraging union organization among Jewish
workers.

The United Hebrew Trades eventually became an
influential

federation of Jewish unions on the Lower East Side.

The

ILGWU had fallen into the bad graces of the United Hebrew

Trades primarily because its conservative SecretaryTreasurer, John Dyche, was exceedingly reluctant to lend
the union's support to strikes.

At the same time,

the

ILGWU charged that the United Hebrew Trades was calling

strikes of ILGWU unions and encouraging rebellions of the
locals against their parent union.

^

This is, no doubt,

why Local 25 asked for the assistance of the United Hebrew
Trades instead of going to the ILGWU.

The aid of the

strikers during the five-week- long strike resulted in

a

surprising victory for the workers; the Rosen Brothers
agreed to a twenty-percent wage increase and full union
recognition.

The triumph encouraged more garment workers

to join the unions.

They were, however, advised by an AFL

official who had little faith in either the women's

motivation or their ability to improve their own situation
to "attend all meetings and help those in the union to

carry out their plans for the betterment of your
condition
Encouraged by the results of the Rosen Brothers
strike,

in early September of 1909 one hundred and fifty

women walked off their jobs at the Leiserson factory on
West 17th Street, protesting their inadequate pay and the

brutal behavior of

a

foreman employed to keep the workers
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in line.

The result was an inordinate amount of
violence

on the picket lines outside the Leiserson shop.

One young

striker, Clara Lemlich, was beaten so badly by a group
of

thugs that she was hospitalized for several days.

The

police assigned to the site arrested the strikers, who
were then fined for needling scabs.

When the hired

ruffians were arrested, they were discharged without

punishment by the magistrates at the Jefferson Market
Court

.

Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, owners of the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company, were determined to prevent Local 25
and the ILGWU, weak as they were,

their company.

from gaining access to

Nor were they willing to chance the

possibility that their employees might be affected by the
restlessness in the local industry and walk off their
jobs.

While the Triangle owners were never reluctant to

employ the means commonly used by other company owners to
achieve their purposes, they attempted the use of still

another method to forestall employee interest in the
union.

In

1908,

they formed a company union, the

Employees Benevolent Association.^

Only employees

considered loyal to the company were granted membership in
the organization.

The Benevolent Association was,

therefore, limited in size and influence among the

employees since only one out of six workers was a member,
and its officers were all relatives of either Blanck or
Harris.

This type of activity on the part of the
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company was commonplace in the shirtwaist industry
at this
time,

but at the Triangle Company it proved to be a
less

than effective means of controlling employees.

Because of

the restricted membership it caused divisions within
the

ranks of the workers, and eventually, internal bickering

over the dispersal of funds ended any hope for the company

union's usefulness.^

oblivion

It

persisted then faded into

.

During the summer of 190 9, women from the WTUL made
contact with the workers at the Triangle Company and other
firms, pleading with them to organize and prepare to

Among them, recalled Pauline Newman, then

strike.

employed by Harris and Blanck, was the inspiring Leonora
O'Reilly, originally a garment worker, whose efforts

impressed Pauline and had an impact on the other
workers. ^°

Rose Schneiderman, who, as a young cap maker,

organized a local of the Cloth Hat and Cap Makers' Union,
had become a union organizer for the WTUL and convinced

many workers in the East Side factories that union
membership in Local 25 would benefit them.

Sadly,

however, even after joining the union the workers were

unable to improve their situation, since all the officers
and members of the Executive Board were men who displayed
little concern about the women's complaints

A confrontation between management and two
subcontractors at the Triangle Company increased the
employees' anger, eventually motivating them to march out
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on strike at the same time the Leiserson workers
were

walking the picket line.

The two subcontractors, Jake

Kline and Morris Elzufin, pressured by the employees

working in their groups who wanted an increase in their
wages,

decided to appeal to the company for more money.

They made their request through Samuel Bernstein, Blanck
and Harris' production manager, who fired them on the
spot

.

The group leaders protested and were physically

assaulted and turned out of the shop.

Most of the machine

operators, angered at the attack on Kline and Elzufin,
left their machines in protest.

Several went to Local 25

headquarters and asked for assistance.

The union, with

few members and empty coffers, advised conciliation, and
the women returned to work.^^

The final rupture at the Triangle Company occurred in
late September of 1909, when over a hundred disgruntled

workers met in secret with officials of Local 25 and the

United Hebrew Trades.

The company received word of the

meeting and laid off a hundred and fifty employees, ninety
women and sixty men, who had either been in attendance at
the meeting or who were suspected of union sympathies

^-^
.

They were told that there was no work available for them.
Since the industry was in the midst of a slack period, the

discharged workers accepted their dismissal without undue
anger or suspicion.

The following day, however,

newspapers carried advertisements for shirtwaist makers

needed at once at the Triangle Company.
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The leaders of

Local 25, recognizing that they had no alternative
if they
wished to retain any influence in the shirtwaist
factories, declared that Blanck and Harris had locked
out

their workers and immediately declared a strike against
the company.

Although the workers began their efforts with great
resolve,
them.

they had few financial resources available to

Local 25 and the ILGWU were attempting to assist

the strikers at both Leisersons and the Triangle Company,
but they had little to offer.

The amount received from

the United Hebrew Trades was also limited and

inadequate
Both companies were unfailing in their determination
to defeat their employees and, hopefully, deal a death

blow to the union at the same time.

Leiserson continued

to hire hoodlums to heckle the pickets while Blanck and

Harris, perhaps more alert to the need for a positive

public image, recognized that a physical confrontation

between a young female striker and a professional thug
would win little sympathy for their company.
to the strikers

,

Triangle

'

s

According

owners employed prostitutes

"bad girls", to harass the workers on picket duty.

They

hoped that a confrontation between females would not be

viewed so negatively by the public.

Police patrolled the

sites of the strikes, but had no sympathy for the strikers

and usually abused them verbally or physically.

They

often arrested the demonstrating workers, charging them

with prostitution, claiming they could not tell the
difference between the two groups of women in the streets
outside the striking shops.

Joseph Fletcher, an assistant

cashier at the Triangle Company, later claimed that

management was able to procure the assistance of the
police "by giving them a box of cigars with

a

hundred

dollar bill in it.""
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris decided to seek allies in
their battle against the two hundred strikers who

initially participated in the walkout

.

With the goal

of forming an employers' association, they wrote a letter
to other area manufacturers asking them to join in the

fight against the "irresponsible" union.

They requested

that the letter be kept in strict confidence, but it

somehow fell into the hands of Local 25.

Secretary

Shindler decided to fight fire with fire and penned an

angry letter to all the same manufacturers, making a case
for the strikers

.

He claimed that the union was both

legitimate and conservative and had been forced to aid the
strikers because Harris and Blanck, the "Kings of the
Waists,

"

had fired about two hundred workers after they

had joined his union.

He then advised the manufacturers

that Harris and Blanck had become the "largest waist

house" in the industry by "underselling every legitimate

manufacturer in the waist market and by using the cheapest
labor.

""'
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Blanck and Harris next attempted to stir up
the
latent dislike and distrust that existed between
the

Jewish and the Italian workers.
foremen, an Italian,

They sent one of their

to the office of an Italian language

newspaper II Giornale Italiano with a statement from the
Triangle owners that Local 25 was a union controlled by
Jews and that the strike began only because Jewish workers

refused to work any longer with the Italian girls.

When

the officials at the union were informed of this

unscrupulous maneuver on the part of Blanck and Harris,
they sent Salvatore Ninfo, one of their organizers, to the

newspaper to refute the lie.^°
In their running battle with the union and its

supporters, the Triangle owners filed a $150,000 lawsuit

against the Jewish Daily Forward

,

a socialist newspaper.

They claimed that the Forward had slandered them by

accusing them of murder.

Apparently Blanck and Harris had

crudely translated a Yiddish term in an article on the
strike as murder while the accepted translation of the

phrase was "cruelties

.

"^^

There is no evidence that the

case was ever brought to court
In spite of these few victories,

the long-term

success of the strike was uncertain due to the strikers'
lack of available funds and their loose organization.
However, before the strikers were forced to abandon their
efforts,
sources.

they received welcome assistance from several
The United Hebrew Trades organized a
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fund-raising drive to aid the workers.

Shirtwaist makers

all over the area pledged ten cents each for
the

strikers."
funds.

Other AFL-af filiated unions also donated

The Typographical Union sent one hundred
dollars,

and the Electrical Workers pledged fifty dollars.

Even

the Central Labor Union in Brooklyn gave the strikers

permission to solicit funds from the unions under its
j

urisdict ion

^"^
.

Officials from Local 25 requested help from the WTUL,
whose members had unofficially been giving some assistance
from the beginnings of the Leiserson and Triangle strikes.
The response of the upper-class allies was immediate and

generous."

From this point on, the WTUL and Local 25

worked together in an uneasy alliance to help the
shirtwaist makers.

In an official history of the ILGWU,

written thirty-five years after the strike, the author
remembered that "when the WTUL ladies took their stand at
the side of the shirtwaist makers,

strong and glamorous allies.

"^^

the girls felt they had

This account pointed out

that the striking women even felt brave enough to ignore
the advice given them by ILGWU Secretary Dyche, who had

misgivings about the strike and was "very snooty about the
alliance between highbrow butters -in and irresponsible
little girls.

"^^

By this time the "highbrow ladies" were well aware of
Dyche'

s

negative opinion of them and their organization.

Nevertheless, they sent out organizers to urge workers
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throughout the industry to organize and join the
strike. 2«

Rose Schneiderman went to Massachusetts,
and

Pauline Newman traveled to upstate New York to
solicit
funds for the strikers from unions and sympathetic,

wealthy individuals in those areas."
In addition to providing monetary and organizational

assistance, the WTUL members set up a contingent of

forty-eight members who volunteered to join the picket
line,

marching side-by-side with the workers in the hope

that their presence would provide some measure of

protection for the young strikers.^"

Several WTUL women

were arrested along with the strikers, among them, Mary
Dreier,

however,

President of the New York City League.

She was,

rapidly discharged from court when it was

discovered that she was one of the "rich ladies".

The

League members protested in vain that picketing, when

carried on peacefully, had long been upheld as legal by

New York courts.

Strikers continued to be arrested in

significant numbers, brought before magistrates, and fined
ten dollars each, often without even a hearing.

Members of the WTUL also gave their own money to aid
the strikers.

"The Mink Brigade," consisting of Alva

Belmont, mother of the Duchess of Marlborough, Anne
Morgan,

the daughter of J.

P.

Morgan, and others, made

substantial contributions that were used for bail money,
demonstrations, and strike benefits.
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Probably the most helpful assistance made by
the WTUL
women was their successful effort to organize and

disseminate information about the causes of the strikes
and the treatment of the pickets by the police and
the

bullies hired to harass them.

Not only those newspapers

sympathetic to the position of the strikers, The Forward
snd The East Side So cialist

,

but also more conservative,

mainline papers such as the New York Times began including
articles about the plight of the shirtwaist workers: their

pitiful wages and the long hours of work and the

deplorable conditions in the factories.

The Forward even

printed a list of names and criminal records of the
bullies hired to assault the girls doing picket duty.
Next to the list, they printed pictures of a few of the
strikers, complete with the disfiguring injuries inflicted

on them by these thugs.

Public opinion began to

indicated an increasing sympathy in the community for the
strikers
In view of the altered circumstances,

the leaders of

Local 25 once again considered the feasibility of calling
a general strike.

They approached the officials of the

ILGWU and requested their approval of the idea.

Secretary

Dyche still opposed an industry-wide strike and suggested
a continuation of efforts to investigate problems in the

shirtwaist industry.

appointed
strike.

a

Ignoring his advice, the local

special committee to consider a general

The committee of five,
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two of whom were women,

recommended such action.

It was decided to hold a meeting

on November 22nd to discuss with area shirtwaist
makers
the ramifications of such a strike and ascertain
whether

they could be counted on if such a strike was called.

The

meeting was well -publicized and scheduled to be held
at
Cooper Union, but the thousands who arrived could not
all
be accommodated there; other halls were expeditiously

rented, and workers were directed to simultaneous meetings
at those sites.

Most speeches given that evening were considered and
cautious.

Samuel Gompers had agreed to address the crowd

at Cooper Union,

and he warned them not to act in haste

but to give employers a chance to meet their demands.

however,

they refused to consider the workers' legitimate

grievances, he exclaimed,

it.""

If,

"strike and let them know

ILGWU officials urged the women to exercise

"realistic restraint

."

Socialist leaders Meyer London

and Jacob Panken, as well as Mary Dreier, president of the
WTUL, gave enthusiastic endorsements of the proposed

strike.

But it was nineteen-year-old Clara Lemlich,

just

released from the hospital after being badly beaten
outside the Leiserson factory, who, in

a

ringing speech

delivered in Yiddish, urged support for the general strike
and convinced the crowd to shout their approval.

Together

they took an old Jewish oath not to "turn traitor to the
cause

.
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When the strike began, there were
approximately
thirty- five thousand workers empolyed in
about
four

hundred firms in New York City's shirtwaist trade.

During the next few days, almost 30,000 shirtwaist
makers
went out on strike in two hundred and fifty shops,

beginning the first major women's strike in American
history.

Strike headquarters were set up at the WTUL

meeting hall on East 22nd Street, and the workers' demands
were issued to the employers.

These demands included

union recognition and a closed shop, the end of the
subcontracting system, a fifty- two-hour work week, holiday

pay for salaried employees, and the elimination of all
fines and charges for needles, thread, and other

necessities.

Wages were to be determined in individual

shops on a fair and equitable basis."
The degree of worker cooperation with the strike

differed from shop to shop.

In some cases,

of a firm chose to remain at their jobs.

all employees

In other shops,

only a portion decided to continue work, and in several,
the entire work force joined the strike.
The strikers and their allies were optimistic about
the outcome of the strike after ten of the smaller

manufacturing firms came to terms before the strike was
one day old, and several small firms, financially unable
to withstand the financial distress entailed in a lengthy

strike, began,

on a daily basis, to negotiate and agree on

their employees' demands.

Strike settlements reached

through the efforts of the WTUL had often been
weak and
ambiguous, and this remained true during the
shirtwaist
strike of 1909. ^« Each business firm reached a
separate
settlement with its workers, and these agreements
differed
widely from shop to shop. Nevertheless, each employer
who
came to an understanding with his workers had to post
a

three-hundred-dollar bond as a guarantee that he would
live up to the agreement and observe union rules in his

shop."

Unfortunately, the three-hundred-dollar bond

provided little assurance that changes would be made in
the shirtwaist factories of New York City.

One hundred and sixty of the larger employers joined

Blanck and Harris' Manufacturers' Association and met

regularly at the Hoffman House, an elegant Manhattan
hotel.

They agreed that they were willing to either meet

the demands of the strikers or negotiate differences with
them, but they were adamant in their refusal to recognize

the union or to accept the closed shop.

They also

denounced those firms that had already settled with Local
25 and suggested that those owners would be accepted into

the Manufacturers' Association if they would break their

agreements with the union,

""^

Calling the strikers

"irresponsible blackguards," they invited the press to
send a delegation to investigate the shirtwaist factories
so that they could report to the public about the

exemplary conditions they would find there.
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''^

In the meantime they fired strikebreakers
to replace

their absent workers and did their best to retain

employees who had decided not to join the walkout.

This

was a difficult task, since these employees had
to face
the contempt of the girls on the picket line.

The owners

of the Bijou Waist Company even installed one hundred
cots
in their factory so that their workers could sleep over
to

avoid confrontations with the strikers.

Some employers

took responsibility for transporting their workers to and
from the factories/^ while the police on duty did what

they could to prevent verbal or physical communication

between the strikers and the scabs.
There was, however, continued violence which dismayed

officials of Local 25 and members of the WTUL.

While the

strikers' behavior was sometimes suspecf", most of the

violence was directed at the picketing women.

Not only

were thugs and strikebreakers guilty of physically

assaulting them, but the police continued their abusive
behavior.

The girls were often arrested and taken to

police headquarters where the mistreatment continued.
court the judges often verbally berated them.

In

Prejudiced

magistrates sentenced many young girls to Blackwell's
Island, where they were housed with violent criminals and

prostitutes and suffered a great many indignities.
Some of the worst incidents occurred outside of the

Triangle Company, where Blanck and Harris were stubbornly

refusing to meet their workers' demands.

Members of the

WTUL,

doing picket duty, observed both hired thugs
and

police clubbing the striking girls

But within the

Triangle factory, the owners, in an attempt to retain
the
loyalty of their workers, played music on a phonograph
as

the girls worked and encouraged them to dance during
their

lunch break.

They even awarded prizes to the most

skillful dancers!"*^
In the streets below,

the WTUL members not only

walked picket lines with the strikers but also hired a
bevy of lawyers to provide the women with legal assistance
and to furnish them with bail.

The indignant allies even

organized a public march of five thousand strikers and
sympathizers, who walked in a silent body to city hall to

inform the mayor about the violent behavior of the city's
finest.

Sadly,

their efforts failed to end the violence

and abuse even though the mayor appeared to be

sympathetic
During the last week of 1909, the New York State

Board of Arbitration offered to mediate the shirtwaist
strike.''''

The Manufacturers' Association agreed to

accept arbitration and again offered to come to terms with
the strikers.

''^

They refused, however, to consider

either the closed shop or union recognition.''^

The

manufacturers claimed that they were ready to eliminate
the abuses in their shops, either unfair treatment of

their employees or dangerous conditions in the
factories.^"

However,

to permit union involvement in

their efforts would only lead to interference
in their
businesses, and this they would not tolerate.

Apparently the striking workers, at this point,
would
have compromised on the issue of the closed shop
if they
could have been assured of union recognition.

They

insisted that only the recognition of the union would
ensure the maintenance of the concessions wrenched from
the employers.

this issue,

Since no settlement could be reached on

the negotiations were discontinued after

December 27th.
From this point on, the shirtwaist strike, the
"Rising of the "Twenty-Thousand,

sympathizers.

"

lost supporters and

Several AFL leaders endorsed the

manufacturers' proposals" and began to withdraw their

already lukewarm help.

Many wealthy women, Anne Morgan

among them, ended the aid they had given the girls and

denounced the WTUL members as

"

socialists

.

"^^

Several

settlement house workers, many of whom had championed the
cause of the workers, suggested that the strikers might be

wise to give their employers a chance "to clean their own
houses" since they had indicated a sincere willingness to
do so.

The strikers should be satisfied, they suggested,

with a moral victory, and, if the employers reneged on
their guarantees, legislative or administrative

alternatives could be attempted.^*

Even some of the

newspapers, previously sympathetic to the strike, grew

more and more critical of the union and its demands.
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The

World suggested that the strike had been a
failure from
the vantage point of union labor.
It claimed that

the

strikers were, for the most part, Russian Jews
who were
strongly influenced by socialists and anarchists,"
and
pointedly noted that "American" and Irish girls
had always
refused to involve themselves in the strike."
The young women who were the backbone of the strike

were reluctant to abandon the cause to which they were
so

committed.

They had attended daily meetings, often late

into the night, done picket duty,

suffered physical

assaults and arrests, sold newspapers that supported their
strike, given speeches before groups of wealthy club
women,

and helped the WTUL allies to supply aid and

sustenance to the strikers and their families.
Nevertheless, as the strike dragged on into February of
1910 and many of the most important shops had not settled,

they faced the inevitable.
harsh,

The winter was especially

and picket duty was difficulty without warm

clothing.

Many of them were ill, and the violence had

never abated.

Without significant support from their

parent organization,

lack of money was a problem, not only

for the union but for individual strikers.
15th,

On February

Local 25 announced that the strike was over.

Although two hundred and seventy-nine manufacturers
had already settled with about sixteen thousand
strikers,

accepting union demands wholly or in part, at

the end of strike some six thousand workers^^ were forced
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to return to work in factories that had held
out,
to make any concessions to the strikers.

refusing

Including those

workers who had not gone out on strike, there were
about

thirteen thousand shirtwaist workers still employed in
open shops at the end of the strike/"

Nevertheless, the positive results of the strike,

limited as they were, gave encouragement to those who

sacrificed so much.
abolished,

The subcontracting system was

and the fifty-two hour week was accepted in

most shops.

Limitations were placed on the amount of

overtime required, and an agreement made that workers had
to be compensated for overtime.

Wages were increased, but

since the new pay scales were set in individual shops, it
is impossible to state the exact amount of the increases.
It was also agreed that employees would be furnished with

needles, thread, and other necessities free of charge.
The shirtwaist strike also had long-range

implications.

It made obvious the potential power of

unions in the garment trade.

Moreover,

it indicated that

those existing unions that had been reluctant to organize

women had made a grave error.

Organizations of women

could obviously contribute needed strength and relentless

persistence to the labor movement
The strike of 1909 also made clear to the shirtwaist

makers which allies could be trusted to give them support
and aid.

The women of the WTUL had proved themselves

capable of standing firm in the most desperate situations.
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They had come a long way toward achieving the
true ideal
of sisterhood.
The strike had indicated that an alliance
of women, wealthy and poor, American-born and
immigrant,

educated and unlettered, could accomplish great things
in
the name of justice.
It should be noted,

however, that while individual

suffragists, women such as Alva Belmont and Anna Howard
Shaw, president of the American Women Suffrage

Association, gave passionate support to the strikers, the

National American Women Suffrage Association neither

endorsed the New York strike nor aided the workers
involved.

They maintained strict neutrally toward labor

organizations and behaved accordingly.

The Association

was especially careful to stipulate that Dr. Shaw, when

aligning herself with the strikers, did so as an
individual and not as a spokeswoman for the

Association
Even though they had cooperated during the strike,

socialist leaders of Local 25 and the socialist community
in general distrusted and disparaged the WTUL members,

still unwilling to trust the motives of the well-to-do
women.

For its part, the WTUL leadership never fully

trusted the socialists, suspecting that they only wished
to use the young women strikers as a front in their

crusade on behalf of their ideology.

The end of the

strike signaled a finish to this precarious alliance.
However, it also revealed a change in the socialists'
136

attitude toward women workers and their status in
the
labor movement.
During the strike, the socialists had

abandoned the last vestiges of their outmoded traditional

view of the superiority of women's domestic role.

The

socialist men, as well as the women in the movement, had

contributed all assistance and aid possible.

They would

remain staunch allies of the workers, even though they
were always uncompromising in their determination to place
the future of socialism in the United States before the

needs of women workers and unions and the cause of women's

suffrage
The behavior of the male leadership of Local 25 had

also revealed its lack of trust of the WTUL.

While the

leaders had given support to the strikers to the best of
their ability, they had attempted to manipulate and take

advantage of the League.

During the strike, the WTUL

women had successfully attempted to overlook this in the
best interest of the cause they were serving, but by

January 31st, even before the conclusion of the strike,
the League's Executive Board formally decided that in the
future,

any union that requested the League's help during

a strike

would have to agree to several requirements: it

would have to explain and justify its grievances to the
League's Executive Board and permit two League

representatives to attend the union's executive committee
meetings.

Moreover, the union's executive committee would

have to pass a formal resolution requesting League
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cooperation.

The WTUL's leaders stipulated that the

League would have to have some input in setting
policy if
it was going to provide help during a strike,"
even if
this meant that it might be accused of interferring
with

internal union affairs.'^

The League also worked in the

following months to unseat those Local 25 officials who
were hostile to the WTUL and indifferent to the concerns
of women wage earners.

But the officers of Local 25

resented the League's interference in their affairs, and
the allies'

efforts accomplished little more than

increasing the existing animosity of the Local toward the

WTUL

.

Secretary Dyche and President Rosenberg of the ILGWU
must have been impressed with the perseverance of the

young women strikers who continued their determined
efforts long after the men strikers, reluctant to suffer

continued abuse, had left the scene.

They also must have

been amazed and gratified at the change in the fortunes of
their union as a result of the strike.

Membership in

Local 25 had soared to over twenty thousand.^''
Nevertheless, they remained lukewarm toward their women

members and uncommitted to the task of eliminating the

problems that beset them in the workplace.

They usually

treated women members with disdain or gave only lip
service in support of their endeavors.
Nor did the Federation reverse its view of the "women

problem."

It

continued to view the WTUL, suffragists,
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female workers, and women unionists with suspicion
and
even contempt.
It would seldom negotiate on behalf
of

women unless doing so would in some way benefit male
laborers.

League members attending the AFL's 1911

national convention in Boston were obviously distressed
by
the patronizing manner with which they were treated by
AFL

officials and by the lack of recognition given their

organization by the Federation

.

''^

They were also

dismayed at Gompers' reluctance to endorse minimum wage
laws and work hour limitations for men and women, both

issues the League strongly advocated,

Mary Dreier and her

associates decided that their most promising course of

action was to exert constant pressure on Gompers and his
associates in the hope that eventually they would be
forced to recognize the problems of women workers.
Unfortunately, the strike did little to change the

attitudes of employers in the shirtwaist industry, where
the short-term gains realized by the 1909 confrontation

proved ephemeral.

Since the strike settlements in

1909-1910 had been made on an individual shop basis, no

common procedures were available ot make grievances known
or to apply sanctions when agreements were violated.

The

only recourse the workers had was to go out on strike
again.

Although there was a general reluctance to resort

to that alternative, many small walkouts took place over

the following months.

Even more of a problem for the

workers was the fact that many of the manufacturers with
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whom agreements had been made either moved or
went out of
business, leaving a large number of workers who
had

believed they had union protection in the same position
they were in prior to the strike.'^ Due to these
discouraging developments, ILGWU membership, which had
increased to almost 20,000 during the strike, fell to
7,000 during the following

year.'^^

Unfortunately, the music also ended at the Triangle
Company.

Employees there realized few of the benefits

granted to workers in other factories as a result of the
strike.

Max Blanck and Isaac Harris held out until the

end of the strike and were adamant in their refusal to

consider acceptanc of a union at their factory."

Considering the union an organization to be avoided at all
costs,

they were more careful about their hiring practices

than they had been previously, interrogating each

prospective employee about any possible union affiliation.
Even after a woman was hired, she might be questioned from
time to time about her union sympathies and discharged if

her answers did not meet with the approval of the
company.^''

The union, nevertheless,

efforts to organize this company.

continued its

'^^

Although the shirtwaist makers were exhausted and

disillusioned after their great effort, workers in several
other garment industries considered the strike a more

viable option in the light of the shirtwaist strike
settlement.

During the summer of 1910, the cloakmakers'
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union,

largely an organization of men, went out
on strike.
They were well organized and financed and were
assured of
the support and cooperation of both the ILGWU and
the AFL

The Manufacturers' Association, however, obtained
an

injunction from Judge John W. Goff of the Supreme Court,

New York County, forbidding picketing or any other
"acts
of intimidation" or force that might be construed as

interfering with the property or with the right of the

manufacturers to do business.''^

This reactionary

injunction could have been interpreted in a way that would
have effectively ended the strike.

It was a grievous

reversal for the union and successfully negated much of
the painfully won progress labor organizations had

achieved during recent years.

The cloakmakers defied the

injunction, but considerable violence and many arrest

resulted
The strike was finally settled by the union and the

Manufacturers' Association with a "Protocol of Peace" that

awarded the strikers many of their demands and established
a

procedure to avoid the escalation of labor-management

problems to the point where a strike became inevitable.
Largely the work of Louis Brandeis,

a

brillian Boston

lawyer and a trusted mediator, the Protocol contained

provisions for acceptable hours, wages, and, in place of
the disputed closed shoop, a "preferential shop,

"

giving

preferment to union members in cases where both skilled

union and non-union workers applied for positions.
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The

protocol also established the Joint Board
of Sanitary
Control to oversee working conditions and a
Board of

Grievances and a Board of Arbitration to deal
with
disputes and prevent strikes. Until March
1913,

however,

the Protocol was concerned only with the
cloak and suit

industries

'^'^
.

In spite of this promising agreement,

during the

winter of 1911 several events in the shirtwaist industry
alerted concerned individuals in the labor movement to the
fact that there were still serious battles to be fought.

A rash of strikes occurred in several shops where
employers locked their employees out during a lull in the

business season rather than sign contracts with them.

The

union met with WTUL representatives to confer about

possible joint action to deal with the new

crisis.''^

Unfortunately, the WTUL membership was attempting to

resolve several internal problems, the most important

being the growing antagonism between the well-to-do
reformers and the trade union members of the League.''^

A

new agreement between the old allies was never

satisfactorily reached.
Even more ominous was a fire that occurred in a
Newark, New Jersey factory on Saturday, November 26th,
1910,

in which twenty-five workers were killed.

Six women

burned to death, and nineteen died after jumping from
fourth floor windows to escape the flames.

The dead

workers were employees of the Wolf Muslin Undergarment
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Company which had its headquarters in New York
City.

The

building was not fireproof and had been classified
as
"extra-hazard" by an insurance company because there had

been ten fires there during the past ten years

.

^°

No one either accepted blame or was able to place

responsibility on others.

The Wolf Company supposedly ran

an acceptable shop, and the building's owner had obeyed
the necessary laws mandated by the State Labor Department.

The Newark City Building Department had made a few

inspections but had never enforced regulatins.
Nevertheless, it was held blameless.
The Newark fire alarmed New York City officials.

Fire Chief Edward

F.

Croker publicly stated that dangerous

conditions existed in many New York garment factories and
that those buildings could suffer the same fate as the

Newark building unless appropriate steps were taken
without delay.

The WTUL, despite its internal disputes,

began a campaign to investigate and make public the names
of factories in New York City that the League deemed to be

unsafe.

The files of the WTUL contain details about the

failure of New York City manufacturing concerns to

eliminate dangerous conditins in their factories.

These

investigations revealed buildings with locked doors, no
fire escapes, and barred windows.

The New York Times

published an article claiming that ninety-nine percent of
New York City's factories contained major fire hazards."
City authorities took no action to eliminate the problems.

The worst fears of Fire Chief Croker were
realized
late in the afternoon of March 25th,

I9ii.

Martha Bensley

Bruere, as an active member of the WTUL, who
had walked
the picket line in front of the Triangle Company
during
the shirtwaist strike, was strolling down Fifth
Avenue

shortly after 4:45.

As she passed the beautiful homes in

which wealthy members of the New York City community
resided,

she observed great clouds of smoke billowing

upward to the east.^'

Within a short time most of the

city knew that there was a dreadful fire at the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company on Washington Square.

Elevators had

stopped running when their cables burned through, and the

only available door, opening on to Greene Street, had soon
been cut off by flames.

The Washington Place exit was

locked and could not be opened by the desperate

individuals trapped on the ninth floor.

Young employees,

trapped and insane with terror, jumped to their deaths in
the street below.

Others perished at their sewing

machines, unable to even maneuver themselves out of the

congested work area, while still others died when the
single inadequate fire escape buckled and collapsed under
the weight of the escaping employees,

throwing the

frenzied figures on it to the ground or impaling them on
the iron fence below.

Firemen were at the scene within minutes but were

unable to save one hundred and forty-six employees of the
Triangle Company, most of whom died within twenty minutes

after the fire began.

Police officers arrived from

their nearby neighborhood headquarters immediately
after
the first alarm was given.

They were the same group of

officers who had abused and insulted the strikers during
the 1909-1910 walkout.

Now they carried the smoldering

bodies of the Triangle employees to ambulances that

transportd them to the morgue.
The horror of the Triangle Fire shocked the city and
the state.
were,

Only fifteen of the victims were men; the rest

for the most part, teenage girls, unmarried Jewish

immigrants.

A few were Italian women.

The city

newspapers were filled with articles analyzing the

particular details of the tradegy.

Accompanying these

stories were gruesome pictures that helped to arouse the

outrage of almost all segments of the community.
The immediate reaction was a sweeping but haphazard

effort to place blame for the fire.

Among those held

responsible was the owner of the Washington Place
building, Joseph Asch.

He,

however,

shared the sense of

horror that gripped the people of New York City and easily

convinced his accusers that he had complied with existing
laws and regulation in every instance.

The Fire

Department officials denied any culpability and heatedly

pointed to Chief Croker's admonitions after the Newark
fire.

They also deplored the confusion that existed over

the question of responsibility for enforcement of safety

regulations.

Governor Dix was appalled at the tragedy,

but he placed the blame for the shocking
deaths on the

victims themselves; they had neglected to familiarize

themselves with the building and were unaware of the
exits
available to them. The State Labor Department blamed
the

City Department of Buildings for its failure to enforce
the law, while the Department of Buildings censured
the

State Labor Department for neglect of its

responsibilities
Not surprisingly, almost everyone accused Max Blanck

and Isaac Harris of reprehensible negligence and even

criminal behavior.

They were so hated by their employees

that many of the surviving women accused the Triangle

owners of starting the fire in order to collect insurance
money.

Pauline Newman was in Philadelphia organizing for

the union at the time of the fire but returned to New York

after being informed of the tragic event.

She had known

many of the dead workers, having worked with them at the
Triangle Company prior to the 1909 strike.

Even years

later she claimed that Blanck and Harris were guilty of

deliberate murder and arson.

Another woman, employed

at the Triangle Company at the time of the fire, wrote an

anonymous letter to a New York City paper, refusing to
sign her name because she "feared for her life."

She too

claimed that the fire was planned by the owners for
financial gain.^^

Although the record of the Triangle owners in regard
to fire insurance claims is clouded at best,

it is

unlikely that they started the fire.

Earlier insurance

fires in their factories had all occurred during

non-working hours, while this conflagration took place
when hundreds of workers were still in the shop.
Furthermore, not only Blanck and Harris but two of

Blanck's young children were in the building when the fire
began.

They barely escaped with their lives, making their

way to the roof from the tenth-floor offices.

A few hours after the fire, these gentlemen were
interviewed at Harris' nearby home by reporters from the
New York Times

.

Blanck, usually unemotional and polished,

could barely hold himself together as he answered
questions.

The more taciturn Harris, his bandaged right

hand covering an injury received that afternoon, did most
of the talking.

He was something

of a hero.

Keeping his

head while others panicked, he had helped save the lives
of several of his employees,

leading them through the

terrible heat and smoke to the roof where they were

assisted to the roof of an adjoining building by New York

University students.

While being interviewed, Blanck and

Harris expressed concern about relatives working in the

factory who had been hospitalized or were either dead or

among the missing.
Both partners were anxious to explain the precautions
they had taken to avoid fire and to stress the fact that
the Department of Buildings had recently given their

approval to their factory, asking only for an additional
147

window in the women's dressing room and protective
shields
for some of the machinery.

Both men denied over and over

that the factory doors were locked on the afternoon
of

March 25th.

Blanck said that he made it his personal duty

each morning to check and ascertain that all doors were
unlocked.

®^

In spite of their protestations of innocence,

on

April 11th Max Blanck and Isaac Harris were indicted on

seven counts by a grand jury.

The charge was manslaughter

in the second degree under Section 80 of the Labor Law,

mandating that factory doors should not be locked, bolted,
or fastened during working hours.

The New York State

Penal Code defined manslaughter in the second degree at

taking human life through an act of culpable

negligence

^°
.

No one seemed unduly concerned that the

day before the indictment was handed down in the Court of
General Sessions, two of Blanck and Harris' top assistants
at the Triangle Company,

Samuel Bernstein and Louis Brown,

were escorted from the court building after it was

reported that they had been attempting to influence

witnesses
The trial of the partners began on December 4th and

lasted until the 27th of that month.

They were charged

with causing the death of Margaret Schwartz, one of the
girls who had died trying to get out of the Washington
Place door.

The state called one hundred and three

witness, mostly either Triangle Company employees or
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experts hired by the District Attorney's
office to examine
the premises after the fire.
Most of the witnesses

testified that the Washington Place door was always
locked
and had been locked at the time of the tragic
fire.
The

defense also called several witnesses who testified
that
the door was usually open and was open on the
afternoon of
the fire.

Many of them had made earlier statements that

contradicted their testimony on the stand.
Before the case went to the jury, the judge gave the
jurors a lengthy charge, in the course of which he warned

them that to find the defendants guilty, they had to agree
that Margaret Schwartz's death was caused by the locked

door and that the defendants, Blanck and Harris, knew the
door was locked.

Legal experts believed that this charge

probably determined the verdict.

The jurors deliberated

about two hours and returned a not guilty verdict.

They

later stated that they had agreed that Margaret Schwartz's

death had been caused by the locked door, but were not
sure that Harris and Blanck were that the door was
closed.

The other indictments against the Triangle

owners went untried.

The District Attorney's office

feared that the other six charges would meet the same fate
as had the Margaret Schwartz case,

and,

furthermore, a

question arose as to whether another trial would leave the
state open to a charge of double jeopardy.
As the partners left the courthouse, they were

surrounded by a protective ring of policemen as a
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threatening group of the fire victims' relatives,
holding
pictures of their dead, followed them down four

flights of

stairs shouting "Murderers.""

Public opinion agreed

with the distressed kin that justice had not been
served.
No one was held directly responsible for the fire,
which
had taken one hundred and forty-six lives.
Since many of the fire victims were the sole support
of their families,

a

vigorous community-wide effort was to

raise funds to aid those who had lost loved ones in the

conflagration.

Each family eventually received about

seventy-five dollars.'"

Blanck and Harris even offered

to pay to the families of the dead workers a sum of equal
to the weekly wages earned by their deceased relatives."

At the same time Blanck and Harris employed the New

York firm of Goldstein and Company to act as their public

adjusters in negotiating their insurance settlement.
their services, Goldstein and Company received
$8,500.

a

For

total of

They did an admirable job for their clients.

The

Triangle partners carried insurance in the amount of
$174,750 on their stock and $25,000 on furniture and
fixtures.

There was, however, no proof that the value of

the stock and furnishings in the shop at the time of the

fire amounted to more than $134,000.

Since the company's

inventory books had been destroyed in the fire, the
insurance carriers had to accept Blanck and Harris' word
that they were overstocked with goods and were constantly

buying more goods
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Nevertheless, thirty-six of the thirty-seven

insurance compaines paid off their share of the
claim

without complaint.

However,

the Royal Insurance Company,

which seldom contested its losses, refused to settle
until
an investigation occurred and,

therefore never settled.

Even so, by May of 1913, the Triangle owners had collected
$190,000 in insurance claims.

It was,

at the time,

the

largest insurance profit in the history of New York.^^
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CHAPTER VI
THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRIANGLE FIRE:
LOCAL CALLS FOR REFORM

Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, with the help of

a

skilled attorney and a judge willing to overlook
contradictions in the evidence presented and the

possibility that the Triangle owners had bribed witnesses,
emerged from the Triangle Fire absolved of guilt and with
an inordinate insurance settlement enhancing their bank

accounts.^

The public, however, was not satisfied that

justice had been served.

Unwilling to forgive Blanck and

Harris their transgressions, the press, reformers, and the
general public also demanded that an even wider net be
cast in an effort to fix blame.

State and municipal

agencies, officials, and inspectors fell under scrutiny in
an attempt to find those responsible for the tragedy.
turn,

In

recalling widespread indifference to badly needed

improvements in New York City's garment factories at the
time of the shirtwaist strike in 1909, some analysts

suggested that the public should also hold itself

accountable for the terrible fire.
Since Blanck and Harris were acquitted and confusion

over departmental responsibility to inspect and enforce

existing regulations and laws made it almost impossible to
fix the burden of guilt for the fire,
rolled.

Raymond

B.

few official heads

Fosdick, a former settlement house

worker who had become Commissioner of Accounts in New York
City,

did investigate the inadequate enforcement of a few

inspectors.

Everyone, however, dismissed this as a feeble

action that would do little to remedy the existing
problems.

Fosdick himself admitted that the bribery of

inspectors was so common and so deeply rooted in New
York
City that he felt inadequate to cope with it.^

Failing to effectively fix the blame, the press,
reformers, union officials, businessmen, politicians, and

other members of the community called for measures to
improve factory conditions and thus prevent another

disaster in the future.

This reform impetus continued

with decreasing fervor for the next three years.

It

exposed the political power of the city's entrepreneurs
and the inadequacies of municipal and state regulation and

enforcement.

At the same time,

it brought together

several groups within the community, all with differing
agendas, many of them conflicting, to work for legislative

action on both the city and the state level.

Too often,

however, the organizations that called for reform were

weakened and distracted by internal disagreements.

Nor

were they able to put aside their individual concerns and

cooperate with one another to make concrete demands for
the elimination of the dangerous conditions that existed
in garment district factories.

They also failed to speak

with a single convincing voice on behalf of the women who

worked under the threat of a future holocaust.
The WTUL had grown increasingly disenchanted with

union organizations at all levels and was itself fraught
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with internal discord.

The League's socialists and other

members who wished to retain their original goal of

unionizing women workers and those within the organization
who were attempting to push the membership to support
the

efforts of militant suffragists were involved in continual

disputes about the future of the WTUL

.

Nevertheless,

League members were united in their concern for the women

with whom they had walked the picket lines during the 1909
strike.

They took the initiative in calling for immediate

reform measures.
On the morning after the fire, eighteen members of
the League made direct contact with the families of the

victims to determine the extent and the immediacy of their
financial distress.

Meanwhile, Leonora O'Reilly, then a

member of the WTUL Executive Board, served luncheon to
several of the shaken survivors of the fire.

O'Reilly

interrogated the women about working conditions at the
Triangle company in the weeks preceding the fire.^
in the same day,

Later

she addressed a large luncheon-meeting at

League headquarters where several religious, political,
and reform leaders, shocked and angry about the fire, met

with WTUL members.

She shared with them the information

she had obtained earlier from the Triangle employees,

emphasizing their agreement that locked doors at the
factory were

a

common occurrence.

The president of the League, Mary Dreier, also

addressed the assembly.

She denounced the Triangle owners
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as the worst of the employers her organization
had to deal

with during the strike in 1909.

She recalled a time

during the strike when Max Blanck had come to her,

appealing for her intervention with the strikers on
his
behalf and promising to improve conditions in his factory
in return for her help.

The League had trusted him and

encouraged the Triangle employees to return to work,
Dreier recounted, but Blanck had reneged on his part of
the agreement and had failed to make the promised

improvements.

Furthermore,

several of the Jewish girls

who had returned to work had subsequently been fired, and

newly arrived Italian immigrants, easier to exploit, had
been hired to replace them.

It was therefore

understandable, Dreier complained, that while unionized
shops were paying sixty cents a dozen for completed

shirtwaists, the Triangle Company paid only thirty-five

cents a dozen. ^

Before the meeting adjourned, those

assembled agreed to seek further information from workers
in other factories about their working conditions.

They

also began to plan for a mass meeting to be held at the

earliest possible date to continue their crusade against

dangerous and exploitive factory conditions.^
On the following day, the New York EveninQ Journal

published a WTUL questionnaire asking factory workers to
reply anonymously to the questions asked:
Name of your factory.
Number and street of your factory.
What is your trade?
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^

How many floors in your building?
How many people in your room?
Are windows bared or nailed down?
Are doors locked during working hours?
Do doors open in or out?
How many fire escapes are there?
Are staircases wood, iron, or stone?
Is the way to the fire escapes clear or obstructed-?
Are halls dark or lighted?^
By Wednesday the 29th, over 1000 replies had been returned

by frightened workers.

They indicated that several

factories were in far worse shape than the Asch Building

had been.^

The League then sent out inspectors to verify

the conditions that had been reported, and, after

collating the results, they sent notifications of the
violations of regulation to Police, Fire, and Building
Departments and to the State Department of Labor.
Meanwhile, other organizations held meetings to voice

their horror and indignation about the Triangle Fire.

On

the evening of March 29th, the socialist leaders of Local
25 conducted a memorial meeting for the fire's victims.

Held at the Grand Central Palace, it was attended by about
2000 people, mostly women, many of whom were either

survivors of the fire or relatives of the dead workers.
The assembly was addressed by Abraham Cahan, editor of the

Jewish Daily Forward

,

the Jewish community.

an individual with much influence in

An impassioned speaker, Cahan

stirred his audience to a point where sobbing and fainting

women had to be carried out by the police who were in
attendance.

After Cahan related a suggestion that had

been made to him that a "few bombs in the camp of the

.

capitalists" would improve the workers' conditions,
the

meeting was briefly disrupted by emotional outbursts
from
the audience.

Once order was finally restored, several

socialist speakers rose to promote their radical cause as
the remedy for the capitalistic evils.

Among these

speakers was A. M. Simons, the former editor of an

influential publication, the International Socialist
Review.

Simons suggested that only by joining unions

promoted by militant socialists could workers protect
themselves against those capitalists who "begrudged the

Triangle workers the price of another fire escape."
Before leaving, the exhausted audience was invited

to.

attend a socialist debate to bee held at the Rand School
in a few days so that they might better understand the

benefits of socialism.^

Another meeting was held on March 31st by the
Suffrage League at Cooper Union where indignant speakers
also passionately argued that they had a remedy for the

problems that had permitted the Triangle Fire to occur.
They demanded the vote so that women could protect
themselves against horrors such as the recent holocaust

Socialist leaders attended this meeting, among them Meyer

London and Morris Hillquit, who again used the fire as a
pretext to call for support for their ideology.
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Dr. Anna

.

Howard Shaw, the president of the Suffrage League
angrily
told them not to
lay the responsibility on someone else... you men,
forget not that you are responsible; that as voters
It was your business ... the most cowardly thing
that
men ever did was when they tied women's hands and
left them to be food for the flames.^"

Only a handful of the dead Triangle Company workers
had been union members.

Nevertheless, Local 25 officials

were shocked and enraged as the events surrounding the
fire were made public.

With the WTUL, they arranged for

the funerals of the victims,

took part in public meetings

demanding reform, and discussed with the press Blanck and
Harris' criminal lack of concern for the safety of their

employees
The leaders of the ILGWU also called for action on
the part of government officials at all levels as they

publicly mourned the dead workers.

John Dyche advised

workers in the ILGWU to refuse to work if they knew that

dangerous conditions existed at their places of
employment

.

-^-^

He failed, however,

to indicate the means

factory women should utilize to support themselves and
their families if they followed his advice.
Samuel Gompers expressed the outrage of the American

Federation of Labor by penning an angry and accusatory
article for the American Federat ionist

.

He complained of

the lax enforcement of existing factory laws and laid the

blame for this regrettable circumstance on clothing

manufacturers who either bribed crooked officeholders or
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took advantage of the incompetence of inspectors.

He

ignored, however, both the lack of concern his union
had

displayed toward women workers in the past and his own
efforts to block the passage of protective legislation
that might have safeguarded the Triangle employees and

other women working in factories.
Even manufacturers expressed a desire for more

stringent enforcement of existing regulations and, if
necessary, the passage of new legislation.

L.

J.

Horowitz, President of Thompson-Starret Company, publicly

called for mandatory sprinkler systems and fire drills in
garment factories.

Members of the Merchants'

Association wrote a letter to Mayor Gaynor complaining of
the diffusion of authority in regard to the enforcement of

fire prevention regulations.

They insisted that problems

in local factories could be traced to the existing

confusion and maintained that they, as an organization,
had always encouraged the formation of a Fire Prevention
Nevertheless, on the same day, the Protective

Bureau.

League of Property Owners in New York City complained that

sprinkler systems were cumbersome and costly.

It

expressed the hope that the Triangle Fire would not be

used as a weapon to force businessmen to install such
apparatus.

Both points seemed to confirm the claim of

one socialist that the organization's main purpose was

"smoothing over city ordinances detrimental of factory
owners'

interests

."
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.

On the evening of March 31st, the Business Men's

Group of the Society for Ethical Culture met.

The topic

of their discussion was "The Safety of Life in Factories."

Among the evening's speakers was

H.

J.

Porter,

the

industrial engineer and fire expert who again, as he had

many times in the past, spoke in favor of regular fire
drills in New York City's factories, advice that had

previously been regularly disregarded by members of his
audience.

Another speaker, progressive reformer of Dr.

Felix Adler, called for stronger enforcement of existing
laws

.

Forgetfulness is our weakness. We must strike while
the iron is hot.
Don't just pass new laws and
ordinances.
We do that every year but then fail to
enforce them. We must press for a steadfast
enforcement of the laws.^'^
The point was perhaps well taken, except that it ignored
the way members of his audience had, over the years,

bribed factory inspectors so that they could ignore
factory safety laws.
The New York Civic Federation, reacting to the furor

over the Triangle Fire, publicized the fact that it had
been working for several months on formulating a new model

safety act that placed great emphasis on prevention
At the same time, the National Civic Federation met to

discuss implications of the fire and frankly admitted that
for several leading American manufacturers, the welfare of

their employees was secondary to their profits and
investments.^^

It also asked the public to consider that
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New York State, which contained more factories than
any
other state, had seventy- five inspectors employed by

the

Department of Game to protect its animal resources but

only fifty inspectors in the State Department of Labor
to
oversee working conditions for those toiling in the
state's factories. ^°
The manufacturers were sensitive to mounting public

censure of them, and they were increasingly aware that

labor unrest and the lack of rationalized procedures in
this industry placed them at a clear disadvantage in their

efforts to deal with competition from the small,

fly-by-night businesses setting up garment -making shops in

New York City.^^

They realized that they would have to

make some concessions to their employees.

Furthermore,

they understood that if they failed to cooperate with
those formulating reform measures, they would lose their

opportunity to restrict the scope of the new laws and
regulations and would likely have even more stringent

ordinances forced on them.

With this in mind,

manufacturers made little effort to justify their behavior
and together mustered up a joint, if subdued, mea culpa
Perhaps, however,

.

their genuine reaction to the Triangle

Fire and the circumstances that had caused it can be

discerned by noting that on the day that Blanck and Harris
were acquitted, several members of the Manufacturers'

Association waited in the lobby of the Municipal Building
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to congratulate the Triangle owners on the
decision of the
j

ury

^^
.

The commitment of the business community to the
cause
of reform can be questioned on other grounds as well.

While the trial of the Triangle owners was in progress,

newspaper reports indicated that two of the City's
clothing manufacturers were arrested, tried, and found

guilty of locking their factory doors during working
hours.

Isaac Feldmen, whose business establishment was

located at 60 University Place, not far from the site of
the Washington Place fire, was fined fifty dollars.

Morris Sautlifer, from Cherry Street, was fined
twenty- five dollars.

Judge Mclnerny sternly lectured the

two businessmen standing before him in Special Sessions

Court on December 13th.
stated,

"Violations of this law," he

"must stop or the lives of employees are not safe.

A second offense will mean imprisonment for you."^^
Progressive reformers also raised their voices to

denounce past ineffective attempts to safeguard workers
and to encourage more effective efforts in the future.
The City Federation of Women's Clubs reminded New Yorkers

that they had encouraged the establishment of mandatory

fire drills in the City's factories a year ago.

They had

tried in vain to force the City's aldermen to pass an
ordinance to that effect and were rebuffed.

member and

a field

Ida Rauh,

worker for the WTUL, told of her

frustration while trying to force the mayor and the
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a

Building Department to take action against known
firetraps
in New York City after the Newark fire.^^ Meeting
with
indifference from these officials, they had turned in

another direction.

They had only recently succeeded in

having a bill introduced in the state legislature making
fire drills compulsory in factories.

Religious leaders, addressing their congregations
from the pulpits of New York City churches and synagogues,
also voiced concern, but in many cases their previous
deeds did not seem as strong as their present words.

Although several Jewish rabbis, chief among them Stephen
Wise, had for several years called upon the community to

heed the wretched circumstances in which the

recently-arrived immigrants lived and worked, the emphasis
in Judaism was placed on individual acts of charity rather

than on cooperative attempts to eliminate the causes of
the poverty afflicting the immigrant poor.^^
fire,

After the

however. Rabbi Wise led his congregation in mourning

the dead and called on the city to demand reforms.
The disaster was not the deed of God but the greed of
This was no inevitable disaster which could not
man.
We have laws
Some of us foresaw it.
be foreseen.
that in a crisis we find are no laws, and we have
enforcement that when the hour of trial comes we find
Let us lift up the industrial
is no enforcement.
standards until they will bear inspection.^''

Other religious leaders joined Rabbi Wise in calling
for a comprehensive program of labor legislation, even

though their concern in the past for such problems was

hardly noteworthy.

Before the Progressive Era there had
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been a noticeable silence on the part
of many Protestant
clergy in regard to working-class issues.
Many Protestant
men of the cloth, ministering to their
congregations, had
long been unsympathetic to the plight of
the

poverty-stricken immigrants, judging them to be
unwelcome
members of other religious groups. After
1908,
however,

the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America

pledged its efforts to promote its efforts to promote
a
new Social Gospel. A primary component of its program
of
social justice was a pledge to enhance the security and

well-being of industrial workers.

In the days

immediately after the fire, Protestant Bishop David

H.

Greer added his voice to those denouncing the system that
had permitted the Triangle Fire to happen.

Mindful of his

church's commitment to the mandates of the Social Gospel
and aware of his coreligionists' previous neglect of the

plight of the immigrants masses, the bishop stated:
This calamity causes racial differences to be
forgotten for at least a little while and the whole
community rises to one common brotherhood. One thing
is sure.
Hereafter the laws as to fire protection
must be enforced not for a few weeks or a few months
but for all time, faithfully, continuously and
effectively.
If this is not done the
responsibility- -the sin--is on the public, on us.^^
Catholics, until the last decade of the nineteenth
century, had followed their church's ancient belief that

there would be little to gain in trying to affect change
in men's social condition since earthly existence was

meant to be a time of travail.
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Catholic clergy had

usually ignored social problems, enjoining
their
congregations to "offer up" their daily tribulations
in
atonement for their sins. Their reward would be
a

heavenly eternity.

To this long-accepted tenet of

Catholicism was added the Church's determination to
deflect some measure of the uncomfortable resentment

leveled at it from its Protestant neighbors, who

controlled the communities in which it was attempting to

establish itself.

If this meant ignoring abuses in

American society and giving government at all levels their
unqualified support, so be

it.^°

In 1891 Pope Leo XIII promulgated his encyclical

Re rum N o varum

,

denouncing the "very rich men who have been

able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little

better than slavery itself."

He reminded businessmen that

"they were their brothers' keepers" and suggested that

workingmen form labor unions and even political parties
under the auspices of the Church in order to protect
themselves from the abuses of greedy capitalists.

The

Pope had been inspired to promulgate this landmark epistle

by the appeals of James Gibbons, an American cardinal.
Gibbons was concerned that the number of Catholics for

whom he was responsible had increased from six million to
ten million in the last twenty years.

These newcomers,

mostly working-class immigrants, had moved into the
tenements of the country's major cities and were working
for pitiful wages in dangerous industrial concerns.
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Mindful of the Pope's directives,
individual members
of the Catholic clergy began to emerge
as progressive
reformers and critics of the existing social
order.

Outstanding among them was Father John

Monsignor Ryan, who became

a

A.

Ryan,

later

spokesman for reform.

In

1906 he wrote A Living Wage and later even flirted
with

communism as he confronted the unwillingness of
government
officials in the United States to address the problems
of

oppressed Americans

.

Another progressive

representative of the American Catholic hierarchy was

Monsignor William

J.

White,

the Diocese of Brooklyn.

the Director of Charities for

After the Triangle Fire, joining

his voice to that of the Jewish and Protestant clergy.

White warned that in the United States
we have allowed a contradiction to grow up between
our economic and our spiritual ideals; we have put
property rights above life.

The workers have a right to life and it comes before
our right to the ease and luxury that flow to the
community through the production of the wage earners.
But industrial salvation must come from the working
class itself, through its labor unions.

On Sunday April 2nd, these clergymen attended a mass

meeting organized by the Citizens' Committee of Public
Safety, a diverse group of twenty- five prominent citizens
of New York City working in conjunction with the WTUL.

The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Opera House.

Several of those serving on the committee as well as
union, political

,

and religious leaders were invited to

present their views regarding the evils that had caused
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the Triangle Fire and were still
threatening the safety of
the City's factory workers.
The Opera House was filled to
capacity.
Well-to-to West Side residents sat near
the

orchestra section, while those from the East
Side filled
the galleries.
The religious leaders and the learned
academics who addressed the audience urged that
a

permanent citizens' committee be created to advocate

protective legislation and to monitor the enforcement
of
existing laws.
The West Siders in the audience agreed

with their suggestion, but the socialists, the union
members, and the East Siders who were present disrupted
the speeches with shouts and hisses.

They argued that in

the past similar citizens' committees, despite their good

intentions, had failed to produce needed changes.

They

contended that the only way to achieve reform was through
working-class militancy.

They further insisted that

unions be given the authority to make necessary
inspections.^^

Rose Schneiderman, although affiliated

with the WTUL reformers, was a socialist and

a

former

garment worker who had been almost traumatized by the

Triangle Fire.

She made a moving and influential speech

in which she agreed with the East Siders, arguing that "it
is up to the working people to save themselves ... by a

strong working class movement.

"^^

In spite of Schneiderman' s eloquence,

group with only partial agreement, adopted

the assembled
a

resolution

urging the state legislature to create a Bureau of Fire

Prevention and to

a

appointed

a

permanent citizens'

committee to obtain new legislation and
stronger
enforcement.
The resolution was immediately
forwarded to
both the governor and the state legislature.
While state officials were pressed to
act without
further delay, municipal officials, conscious
of public
outrage and anxious to absolve themselves of
blame, made
haphazard and disjointed initial efforts to remedy
their
past deficiencies.
Mindful that the community's attention
was focused on the funerals planned for the fire
victims,

aware that generous contributions were being solicited
for
the destitute families of those killed in the fire,
and

sensitive to public interest in the preliminary hearings

being conducted by the district attorney's office

regarding the feasibility of indicting Max Blanck and
Isaac Harris, members of the City's government, with

little enthusiasm and in no apparent haste, decided to
act.

Alderman discussed the implications of the

Washington Place fire at their weekly meeting just three
days after the fire.

They aid the victims' families and

called on the Charities Committee to make cemetery plots
available for the unidentified dead.

After dealing with

these minor issues, they then passed a resolution

requesting the Law and Legislative Committee to
investigate the advisability of establishing an ordinance
to make fire drills compulsory in factory buildings like

the Asch building.^''
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Landlords all over the City, determined
to escape the
odium being heaped on Max Blanck and
Isaac Harris, acted
more expeditiously than did the city
government and busied
themselves repairing faulty fire escapes
and adding
ladders to those that failed to reach
ground level. ^«
Building and Tenement inspectors suddenly
displayed a

commitment to their duties previously unnoticed.

By March

31st they had hauled sixty-four individuals
charged with

violations of the City Building Code into court.
Forty- four of those violators were factory owners.

Judges

began viewing these cases with a new severity, fining
those at fault $250.00 and court costs for their

transgressions
Local 25 called for the condemnation of lax

inspectors whose lack of concern about violations could be

traced to bribery.^"

Investigations were made and Mayor

Gaynor's administration acknowledged that bribery was
indeed commonplace but emphasized that efforts were

underway to weed out those who had thus betrayed the
public trust.
The New York Society of Architects contacted the city

government, calling for uniform building requirements and

permits to be issued by all five city boroughs.

They

believed that this would help to eliminate many of the
inconsistencies and confusions regarding regulations

stipulated in the Building Code
Low,

.

Former mayor Seth

who recognized that the insurance system was one of

the indirect causes of the fire,
called for new

regulations for the insurance industry.
The Fire Department administrators met
to discuss the
inadequacies that left them unable to deal with
the

Triangle blaze.

Their extension ladders reached no higher

than the sixth floor of the skyscrapers, and
their nets
were inadequate to save those jumping from
great heights.
They were aware that the firemen who responded
to the

alarm on March 25th did not even have axes with them
and
had to break down doors by kicking them in.^^ They
called once more for a strengthening of the City Building
Code and demanded an end to the confusion over inspection

and enforcement of fire protection regulations."^
In the midst of the proposals being suggested to

accomplish reform and the internal investigations being

conducted to determine deficiencies, little attention was
given to a notice placed on the Asch building two days
after the fire, warning those who passed by that the

building was no longer considered safe.

Nor were many

concerned that even while the debris from the fire was
being cleared away from the Washington Place site, a

building permit was obtained to refurbish the structure.
The permit called for the Asch Building to be restored to
its previous condition; no improvements, no changes to

ensure safety would be undertaken

.

''^

A notice was also

placed in trade papers just a few days after the fire by
the Triangle Company advertising for workers for their
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business establishment, newly located
at 5-7-9 University
Place on the top floor of a six-floor
building.
Alerted
to the reestablishment of the company,
officials
from the

Building Department arrived to inspect
the premises and
found that the building was not fireproof,
had no fire

escapes, and lacked adequate exits.

Furthermore,

inside

the factory machines were crammed together
so closely that

workers were unable to stand without disturbing
those
seated behind them. The Triangle partners,
facing
indictment and a public appalled at the holocaust
that had
occurred in their former place of business, assumed
they
could return to business as usual. The authorities

intervened and stopped work at the factory until

violations of the law could be corrected.^''
In the weeks, months,

and years following the

Triangle Fire, the clamor for reform made itself heard
from all sectors of the community.
level,

At the municipal

however, efforts to effect necessary changes were

sporadic, lacked any coordination, and were too often

criticized by those who called for modifications of

existing regulations and statutes rather than passage of
the new and radical changes being suggested.

The ILGWU,

with a membership that was largely socialist but led by
officials whose views were akin to those of Samuel
Gompers, was locked in an internal struggle for power and

was thus unable or unwilling to focus efforts on

formulating clear proposals.

In order to obtain

.

undisputed control of their union, John
Dyche and Abe
Rosenberg fought to centralize authority
in their offi ces
Denouncing the autonomy of local unions which,
they
claimed, crippled the central union and
intensified its
financial woes, they blamed "those warbling for
the class
war."^« as being responsible for the union's
lack of

power.

At their conventions, held every other year,

they

requested authority to decide on when to initiate
strikes
and called for a significant increase in funds sent to
the

General Office by locals so that they, and not the locals,

could dispense strike benefits.

Dyche 's and Rosenberg's

proposals proved unpalatable to the delegates at their
conventions and were consistently voted

down."*^

Even though Dyche and Rosenberg continued to

disparage the idea of organizing women, Local 25 joined

with other organizers from other garment workers' locals
to endorse the unionization of women workers who, after

the Triangle Fire,

showed a growing interest in the ILGWU.

Local 25 lent a modicum of assistance to the WTUL during
the summer and autumn of 1911 in their struggle to educate

workers about the need to unionize and about the laws that

existed to protect them in the workplace.^"

They

assisted members of the WTUL who met with young girls in
street corner meetings and as they left their places of

employment in order to explain what they should do if
their employers were ignoring protective legislation
Rose Schneiderman, Pauline Newman, and other union
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organizers worked tirelessly to strengthen
the union
presence in small shops in the garment
district and to
fight employers' efforts to decrease
wages and to subvert
growing union influence."
In spite of Local 25 's enthusiastic
efforts to

increase their membership, the ILGWU officials
continued
to indicate their uneasiness about the
activities
of the

shirtwaist makers' local.

The officials of Local 25

recognized that many of the ILGWU'

s

criticisms were valid

The financial situation of their organization was
indeed

precarious.

It was usually in debt to the ILGWU and
had

failed to pay assessments levied on it to support strikes
elsewhere.

The seating of Local 25 's delegates at ILGWU

conventions was often questioned and debated because of
their indebtedness."

What is more, the number of those

enrolled in their local had decreased considerably since
their glory days in 1909-1910.

They had tried various

expedients to increase their membership with little
success.

Believing that the most promising way to

rebuild their organization was through the enthusiasm

generated by a general strike, they continually asked the
ILGWU to support them with the sort of financial backing

given other locals.

Without such support, they realized,

they would be unable to risk a strike.

Although the ILGWU had refused to endorse earlier
strike plans made by Local 25 with statements about the

local's depleted treasury,

in 1912 they reluctantly
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endorsed

general strike that would include
not only the
Ladies Waist and Dressmakers' Union
(Local 25) but also
the Cutters' Union, the Wrapper
and Kimono Union, and the
Whitegoods and Underwear Union."
a

The Shirtwaist Manufacturers'
Association,

representing 60% of the businesses in the
trade, was at
that time increasingly concerned with
the escalating
numbers of small competing firms springing
up in its
industry and was reluctant to become involved
in a new
wave of worker protest.
The manufacturers signified their
willingness to negotiate in order to avoid the
anticipated
strike.
A series of conferences was held in order
to

reach some agreement.
the business firms,

In addition to representatives from

those in attendance included delegates

from the locals involved, the ILGWU, and the Federation.

Gompers himself was often present.
The manufacturers argued that their employees

included only one-third of the workers in the trade and
that they would be placed at a distinct disadvantage if

forced to come to terms with the union while employers of
small,

unorganized shops were under no compulsion to meet

the union's demands.

They indicated their readiness to

come to terms if unorganized workers employed by the

competitors could be unionized.

with the manufacturers.

A deal was worked out

Recognizing that employees had

always hastened to seek union affiliation in the heat of a

newly-called walkout, both sides agreed that an
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industry-wide strike would begin on
January 15, 1913.
Workers from the entire industry,
ninety percent of them
women, responded.
As planned, the entire trade was
tied
up.
Within a short time, the strike
produced both

a surge

in union membership and the demise
of some of the poorly

established shops.

At that point the Manufacturers'

Association and the union's executive board
reached a
collective agreement that resembled in most
particulars
the Protocol established in 1910 in the cloak
industry.
It had been structured under the guidance
of Louis

Brandeis, the Boston attorney who had previously
assisted
in settling labor agreements in that city.^^

The Protocol of 1913,

like the cloakmakers' earlier

agreement, established the "preferential shop" and set up
a Board of Grievances and a Board of Arbitration to handle

industry disputes.

Controversies between labor and

management would be submitted to the Board of Grievances,

composed of five representatives from the Manufacturers'

Association and five from the union.

If these mediators

were unable to negotiate a resolution of the problem, it

would be referred to the Board of Arbitration for
settlement.

No strike would be undertaken until disputes

were first considered by both bodies.^"
The Protocol also established a Joint Board of

Sanitary Control that was charged with establishing
standards of acceptable workplace conditions and with

enforcing those standards within the industry.
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In

addition, a union label for garments
was adopted to
certify that they had been manufactured
under conditions
approved by the union. Unique to the
Waistmakers'

Protocol was a stipulation providing
for a Wage-Scale
Board to act as a court of appeals in
wage disputes.
This
board, which included four members from
the Manufacturers'

Association and four from the union/^ did not,
however,
have jurisdiction over piece rates which
were to

be set in

individual shops after negotiations between
employers and
a "price committee" of workers."
The American Federation of Labor assured the
ILGWU of
its endorsement of the Protocol,

and Gompers indicated his

approval by signing the agreement for the Federation."

Initially the Protocol met the optimistic expectations of

both the union and the manufacturers.

It brought a

measure of peace and economic order to the industry,

although work stoppages and other evidence of the endemic

instability in the industry continued during the
Protocol's first year."

The larger manufacturers were,

nevertheless, appreciative of the agreement because it

succeeded in driving small cut-rate competitors out of

business."

At the same time,

they were far from

satisfied with the arbitration procedures, since questions
brought before the Board of Arbitration were usually

decided in favor of the workers.

The employees were far

more satisfied with the decisions rendered by the Board of

Grievances," although the unions, while approving the
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arbitration procedure and satisfied
with the preliminary
benefits of the Protocol agreement,
complained about the
dilatory procedures employed by the
Board of
Grievances

^"^
.

The agreement of 1913 was revised
in 1916 and expired
in 1919.
Between 1913 and 1919, the union label
was

never utilized, and the Wage-Scale Board
soon died off.
Although an attempt was made to substitute another

procedure to negotiate wage agreements, it also
failed.
Gradually, the preferential shop, initially so
important
to the employers,

evolved into the closed shop."

The

Joint Board of Sanitary Control, however, took significant
steps toward improving working conditions in the seven

hundred dress and waist factories, employing approximately
36,868 workers, that fell under its jurisdiction.'"

six

months after initiating a program of inspections, the
Joint Board of Sanitary Control, with the cooperation of
the Manufacturers' Association, was able to report

impressive progress in reducing the danger of fire and

improving sanitation and lighting in dress and waist
factories.'^

Nevertheless, 17.42% of the workers in the

industry were still employed in shops that had resisted
efforts to reform.

Moreover, the movement of some shops

out of the area and the entry of new businesses with

glaring defects into the districts under the Joint Board's
province left the goals of the reformers far from being
realized.

'''^
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The City of New York also initiated
some reforms
after the Washington Square tragedy.
Foremost among these

efforts was the Sullivan-Hoey Act
approved by the City
Board of Aldermen in October 1911. The
Act established a
Bureau of Fire Prevention and, in keeping
with the

requests of Fire Chief Edward Croker, ended
the confusion
about which departments were responsible
for the

investigation of violations and the enforcement
of the
City's fire laws and ordinances.
it stipulated

that it

was the duty of the city's superintendent of
buildings to
put the owners or proprietors of defective structures
on

notice that violations of the City's Building Code had

been noted on their premises."
Urged on by the City's reform element in the years

immediately succeeding the Triangle Fire, the Board of

Aldermen gradually adopted changes to the Municipal
Building Code that provided increased protection for
factory workers.

All newly-constructed buildings housing

factories and workshops had to be fireproof and contain
windows, doors, and trim that could pass a specifically

prescribed fireproof test.^"

For older buildings that

were not fireproof, regulations were imposed mandating,

among other stipulations, fireproof construction of

enclosed stairwells with fire partitions continuous from
the foundation to the roof.''^

Buildings more than

eighty-five feet in height had to have at least one
interior stairway contained in a firetower constructed of
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brick or concrete at least eight
inches thick, with doors
to the firetower from outside
balconies or from fireproof
vestibules
'^^

.

Owners and proprietors of all buildings
where large
numbers of people were employed were
required to install
fire alarms, fire extinguishers, fire
doors, adequate fire
hoses, and other means of preventing and
extinguishing

fires."

Factories were further required to store

combustible fibers and wooden packing boxes in
areas

protected with fire retardant material and in
approved by the fire commissioner.

a

manner

Excelsior, sawdust,

paper, and waste materials had to be removed from
the

premises each day, although the fire commissioner was

empowered to modify or waive regulations if he felt that
individual situations required such modifications.

An

anti-smoking code forbidding all smoking of any kind and
at any time on the premises of a factory building was

reaffirmed by the Alderman.''^
These local measures,
were,

limited in scope though they

convinced many of the citizens that their collective

conscience, uneasy in the wake of the Triangle Fire, had

been appeased.

However, New Yorkers of a more progressive

persuasion remained unsatisfied.

They believed that

meaningful reform could best be mandated at the state
level, and, with this in mind,

they took their reform

campaign to the State House in Albany.
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CHAPTER VII
STATE INDUSTRIAL REFORM
AFTER
THE TRIANGLE FIRE

Those who recognized the urgent need
for industrial
reform after the Triangle Fire realized
that protective
laws would have to be passed at the state
and not just the

municipal level.

Accordingly, the New York City Committee

on Public Safety was formed to bring concern
about reform
to the attention of the governor of New
York State.
The
committee was comprised of twenty- five prominent
citizens,
among them Anne Morgan, Mary Dreier, Rabbi Stephen
Wise

and Amos Pinchot

.

It was chaired

by Henry Morgenthau,^

and Frances Perkins was its secretary.

contacted Governor John

A.

Dix,

The members

who suggested that they

consult with the leaders of the state legislature about
the most effective means of pursuing the passage of

protective laws.
The Committee on Public Safety had initially wanted
to avoid involving the legislature,

since it feared that

the issue might be used as a political football, and had

hoped the governor would appoint a commission of
influential people from across the state that would be

financed by executive funds or solicited public donations.
However, the committee was convinced by Assemblyman Alfred
E.

Smith to forgo its original plan and accept a

legislative commission whose membership would include

mostly senators and assemblymen and that would be financed

^

by legislative appropriations.

Such a body, Smith argued,

would have considerably more power,
and its efforts would
be more likely to lead to statutory
accomplishments
because of the involvement of key
legislators in the

preliminary process.^
Senate Majority Leader Robert

F.

Wagner concurred

with Smith's suggestion, and, with the
New York City
committee's approval, its state representatives
submitted
the Wagner-Smith Resolution to the
legislature.^
In

response, on June 30, 1911, that body, created

factory commission to investigate the conditions
under which manufacturing is carried on in cities
of
the first and second degrees in this state.
a

It was stipulated that two state senators,

three

assemblymen, and four private citizens would serve on
the
commission.

The president of the senate appointed Senator

Wagner to serve as chairman and Senator Charles

M.

Hamilton as a member, and the speaker of the assembly
appointed Al Smith to serve as vice chairman and Edward
Jackson and Cyrus

W.

Phillips as members.

From the

private sector. Governor Dix appointed Simon Brentano,

New York City publisher, Robert
the same city,^ Samuel Gompers,

E.

a

Dowling, a realtor from

and Mary

E.

Dreier,

President of the Women's Trade Union League and the only

woman to serve on the Factory Investigating Commission.
The legislature appropriated the inadequate sum of

$10,000 to cover the initial expenses of the commission.

Senator Wagner and Assemblyman Smith complained to
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D.

Morgenthau about the meager allotment,
and the Chairman of
the Committee on Public Safety
promised to engage a group
of experts who would agree to
assist the commission
without compensation.

The commissioners themselves
served

without pay.^
The charge given the Factory Investigating
Commission
by the legislature was sweeping in nature.
The

commissioners were directed to
recommend such new legislation as might be
found
necessary to remedy defects in existing
legislation
and to provide for conditions at present
unregulated.

They were instructed to investigate and suggest
legislative measures in regard to
hours of labor, safety, ventilation, sanitation,
occupational disease, tenement house manufacture,
wages, defects in existing legislation, and the
extent of the enforcement of existing laws.''
It should be noted that the object of their investigation

would not be just the problems of women workers but of
industrial workers of both genders.^
The appointment of this commission was the first
comprehensive attempt to investigate the waste of the
human life in our modern industrial system, and to
endeavor to devise means to prevent such a
^
sacrifice
.

.

.

The commission was given all the powers held by any

legislative committee.

It was able to compel the

attendance of witnesses and the surrender of requested
books, pamphlets, and other evidence.

It was also

required to submit a preliminary report to the legislature
no later than February 15, 1912.^°
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The commission chose Abram

consul and Bernard
M.

Price,

L.

I.

Elkus to serve as chief

Shientag to assist him.

Dr.

George

an experienced New York City
physician, was

engaged to superintend the work of
inspection, while
several advisors, individuals with
distinguished
credentials, agreed to assist with their
help when called
on H. F. J. Porter, the mechanical
engineer whose

specialty was fire prevention, and Dr. Henry
Moskowitz, a
member of the Ethical Culture Society and a
staff member
at the Madison Street Settlement House,
were two such

experts.

Frances Perkins, Secretary of the New York
City

Committee on Public Safety and also Secretary of the
New
York Consumers' League, was hired as one of the

investigators for the commission.

Most of the work done

by these individuals was done without compensation.
The work of the commission began immediately and with

great energy and commitment.

Public hearings were held in

industrial cities throughout the state.
10th and December 21st,

1911,

Between October

over 3000 pages of testimony

were taken from 222 witnesses in 22 different sessions.

These witnesses were from diverse backgrounds and
occupations.^^

During the eight hearings held in New

York City, several persons who had been connected to the

Triangle Fire and the subsequent investigations testified
about industrial conditions in the factories of the City,

among them Leonora O'Reilly, Rose Schneiderman, Henry
Morgenthau, and ex-Fire Chief Edward Croker, who had

resigned his position a month after
the Washington Square
tragedy to head a fire prevention
company.

Beginning with specific testimony
about the fire at
the Asch Building, the commission
expanded its inquiry to
include deficiencies that existed in all
types of
factories throughout the entire state.

Teams of

inspectors were dispatched to nine New York
cities to
examine conditions in 1,836 factories in a total

of 20

different industries.

Establishments involved in the

manufacture of clothing were inspected but also
businesses
that made paper boxes, artificial flowers, tobacco
products, candy, and other items.

Frances Perkins, who was responsible for arranging

tours of inspection for those affiliated with the
commission, often invited Al Smith and Robert Wagner and

other commissioners to accompany the inspection teams.
The two legislators, at first glance, seemed poor choices
to serve as members of this team of reformers.

Although

they both came from lower-middle-class families and New

York City districts, they had long been associated with

Tammany Hall and its political interests.

Called the

"Tammany Twins," Wagner and Smith were proteges of Charles

Francis Murphy, the enigmatic Tammany chieftain who, more
than anyone, was responsible for reshaping the interests
and direction of the New York City machine during the

progressive era.
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Charlie Murphy had emerged as the
head of Tammany
Hall in 1902, shortly after that
position had been
abdicated by Richard Croker, the last of
the old-time
Tammany sachems. Murphy had assumed the
position at a

precarious time in the history of both the
New York State
Democracy and Tammany Hall itself.
Croker and his

predecessors had blatantly used their formidable
powers to
determine elections, distribute patronage to Tammany
favorites, and enrich themselves.

Few of Tammany's

critics acknowledged or appreciated the organization's
efforts to look after new York City's impoverished

immigrants population and to help them adapt to life in
the United States.

Instead, progressive reformers

attacked the machine's corruption and its arrogance.

They

were loud in their denunciations of Tammany's connections

with the city's vice and gambling interests and held it
responsible for the bribery and corruption of public

officials
When Murphy assumed command of Tammany Hall, the

Wigwam was being battered from all sides.

Many of the

progressive reformers' efforts were coming to fruition.

New laws were restricting Tammany's traditional prowess in
stealing election.

Many of the jobs that had previously

been distributed by the bosses were falling under the

purview of civil service.

Republican critics and members

of the Democratic party who wished to distance themselves

from the odium of Tammany graft were publicizing the
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consequences of corrupt political
leadership.
1903,
New York City voters had turned
out the Tammany incumbent,
Mayor Robert Van Wyck, in favor of
Republican progressive
Seth Low, a mugwump who had attempted,
with little

m

success,

to institute reform measures.

In Albany a

reform-minded Republican, Charles Evans
Hughes, was
winning adherents to the ideal of
progressive reform,
while at the national level a popular
politician who was
critic of political machines had inherited
the executive
office
Murphy,

a

faced with these formidable obstacles to
the

well-being and prosperity of Tammany Hall, recognized
the
need to set a new direction for the organization.

It also

appears probable that he was blessed with something of
a
social conscience."

He pulled the Hall out of the

prostitution business and attempted to limit its
involvements with blackmail and illegal saloons.

He

did not, however, receive much public acclaim for his
efforts.

After the appearance of publisher William

Randolph Hearst in city politics in 1905, Murphy found
himself in an even more vulnerable position.

Hearst,

a

maverick Democrat, had established the Municipal Ownership
League,

an organization that pushed for public ownership

of utilities and public transportation facilities.

He

attacked those individuals who, like Boss Murphy, did not
accept his views.
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Although Murphy never turned down
"honest graft" when
it was available and did his
best to keep control of
patronage, he did continue his efforts
to clean up Tammany
Hall.
He began to support new, younger
men at the Hall
who had not been tarnished by
association with the Croker
regime, and, at the same time, he
directed Tammany

politicians to support passage of progressive
social
legislation, especially legislation that
would benefit the
lower classes.
Up until this point, the Wigwam had been
notoriously

indifferent to the need for any type of social
welfare
legislation.

Before 1910 neither Smith nor Wagner had

ever displayed any concern about factory or sweatshop
conditions, despite the fact that they represented

districts where abuses were common.

Both men were largely

dependent on Murphy for their seats in the legislature and
knew little of the daily trials their constitutents had to
endure.^''

Frances Perkins, accompanying them on factory

investigations throughout the state, made sure that the

Tammany politicians experienced such adventures as
personally crawling through the tiny hole in the wall
that gave egress to a steep iron ladder covered with
ice and ending twelve feet from the ground which was
labeled "fire escape!"
Their education while members of the Factory Investigating
Commission changed their political vision.

Although they

retained their affiliation with Tammany Hall, both became
supporters of social welfare legislation.

201

Historian

Richard Hofstadter has singled out
Smith as "the first
effectual bridge between the humanity
of the reformers and
the humanity of the bosses... a
development
that was to

reach its peak under Franklin
years later, however, Edward

D.
J.

Roosevelt

Many

Flynn, a Democratic

politician from the Bronx during the days
when "Murphy's
boys" were powers to be reckoned with in
Albany,
told

historians "to remember that none of the
progressive

legislation from the State House could have
been passed
unless.
(Charles Murphy) urged it and permitted

it to be

passed

"^°
.

With Tammany's blessing. Smith, Wagner, and their
colleagues collected pertinent facts.

The commission then

evaluated and analyzed the information.

Professor John

R.

Commons, a labor economist at the University of Wisconsin

and a member of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission,

traveled to New York City to assist the commissioners in

collating the mass of material and preparing
the state legislature.^^

a

report for

So overwhelming was their task

that they were compelled to request an extension of the

time initially allowed them, and their preliminary report
was not turned in until March

1,

1912.

In preparing their recommendations,

the members of

the Factory Investigating Commission had to consider the

reaction they would receive not only from the legislators
but from progressive reformers,
labor,

the business community,
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socialists, organized

and the general public.

.

unfortunately, the interests and
needs of these groups
were diverse, and there was
frequently division even
within the groups themselves. Most
progressive reformers
had few reservations about granting
regulatory powers to

government at any level, and they were
especially
interested in the treatment of women
workers who were
forced to labor under exploitative and
dangerous
conditions.
Members of the New York City
Consumers'

League and the National Consumers' League,
staff members
from various area settlement houses, and other
progressive
reform groups all described to the commission
health

hazards endured by women factory workers, and,
influenced
by the arguments that Louis Brandeis and Josephine

Goldmark had presented to the United States Supreme
Court
in 1908 in a successful effort to persuade the
justices to

uphold

a ten

hour law for women,

they urged the commission

to make mandatory protective legislation for women a

reality
Members of the suffrage movement, however, gave only

lukewarm support to the call for protective legislation.
Harriot Stanton Blatch had assumed leadership of the
movement in 1910, beginning a period of concentrated
national effort toward the achievement of suffrage

equality for women.

Though the members of the suffrage

movement were not, of course, opposed to protective labor
legislation for the benefit of women, they simply saw it
as a secondary goal

.

They assumed that once women were
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granted suffrage equality, the needed
statutes would, in
time, be passed in state legislatures
throughout
the

nation
This less-than-enthusiastic support
from the
suffragists, however, helped divide the
energies of the
Women's Trade Union League. That
organization, often torn
by internal differences because of its
diverse membership,
was again locked in disagreement over
the issue of

protective legislation.

The allies who had founded the

League and were its primary source of financial
support
were all upper- and middle-class women who
generally

supported feminist concerns, and most of them shared
the
goals of the suffragists.
Some, however, wanted to

focus

solely on efforts to realize protective legislation as
did
the working-class women destined to become a driving
force
in the organization,

who had little interest in the

suffrage movement but worked enthusiastically for

protective legislation.

Socialists members of the WTUL,

whether allies or working-class women, were also critical
of efforts on behalf of suffrage.

They argued that energy

would be better spent supporting the socialist program to
affect crucial changes in the nation's economic system.
To do otherwise,

they claimed was to act the part of a

"bad doctor who pretends to cure his patient by removing
the symptoms instead of removing the disease itself."^''

They were also critical of the WTUL's continued

affiliation with the American Federation of Labor.
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Fortunately, the WTUL included members
who were able
to work with all factions in the
organization. Rose
Schneiderman was such a person. Although
she was a
socialist when she began her long association
with the
WTUL, she moved nearer to trade unionism
after becoming a

member of the League.

Often angered and disillusioned by

the indifference of Gompers and the AFL
and by the

conservatism of John Dyche during his leadership
of the
ILGWU, after the Triangle Fire she began to
call for

protective legislation to improve working conditions
for
women. 2^

At the same time,

she participated

enthusiastically in the suffrage movement.

She was

respected by both feminist and working women, by the
socialists and the supporters of the AFL.

She and others

like her worked hard to promote the passage of protective

legislation but at the same time called for voting rights
for women.

She argued that women had to have the vote in

order to ensure their continued protection under the law.

Acting as a liaison among the various factions, she
attempted to explain to the allies the position of working

women and why the constant tensions, the deprivations, and
the injustices in their everyday lives required them to

give priority to immediate problems rather than to focus
on long-range remedies,

laudable though they might be.

Under the influence of Schneiderman and Mary Dreier,
the New York WTUL president and a member of the Factory
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Investigating Commission, the WTUL eventually
became one
of the most vocal champions of
protective legislation

for

women.

The League simultaneously increased its
efforts on
behalf of women's suffrage while directing
an increased

amount of the organization's resources and
energies to
lobbying in the state legislature for laws that
would

benefit working women.

At the same time,

the WTUL

moved further away from its original emphasis on
trade

unionism as a solution to the problems faced by exploited
women factory workers.
Nevertheless, progressive reform organizations such
as the WTUL were viewed with suspicion by some working

women, who resented and objected to protective

legislation.

They feared that regulatory laws were

intended either to prevent women from competing with men
for jobs with improved status or to keep women in
low- income positions. Women who were the sole support of

their families argued that they had to work long hours in

taxing positions in order to earn the money necessary to
meet their obligations.

While the progressives

sympathized with the plight of these women, they felt that
these few workers might have to sacrifice their interests
for the benefit of the whole of the female work force then

and in the future.^''

Many individuals who had initially experienced horror
and outrage over the Triangle Fire had, after considering
the effects of reform on their individual interests,
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lost

the original zeal for corrective
actions that had filled
them in the early spring of 1911.
Ideology as well as

financial considerations played a
role in the waning of
concern. Within the WTUL, there was
an exodus of those
members dissatisfied with the
organization's new emphasis
on suffrage and the passage of
protective legislation.
Foremost among them was Helen Marot,
the League's

influential secretary, who resigned as early
as 1913.
Although Marot was distrurbed by the attitudes
of male
union leaders toward women workers, she
nevertheless

felt

that the best interests of women would be
furthered by a
close relationship to the AFL and not by seeking
the

passage of laws to protect them specif ically.

Even

Rose Schneiderman gradually adopted a similar
position on

protective legislation.
men,

"

she wrote later,

"Working women, to be equal with
"must not ask for any kind of

protection against exploitation."^^
Several organization were lukewarm at best in

their support of protective legislation for women.

Although the socialists continued to emphasize the need of
protective legislation for both men and women, this was

viewed as a grave error by officials of the AFL, who were
only reluctantly willing to accept protective legislation
for women. The AFL stood firmly on its traditional belief
that government protection for male workers was little

better than no protection at all. Samuel Gompers continued
to oppose government protection of the eight -hour day and
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minimum wage laws for men and
denounced compulsory health
insurance as "class legislation." He
seldom lost a chance
to say that "social workers wanted
to do something
for

labor whereas labor wanted to get
things done for
itself "
.

Business leaders, who had initially
charged that
the true cause of the Triangle Fire
was the
lack of

effective government regulation, were suddenly
dragging
their feet. Uneasy, perhaps, due to new
conditions in the
garment industry, they were showing increasing
dismay at
the prospect of regulation or of costly employee
benefits.
During the previous two or three decades, the rate
of

growth in the women's garment industry had been
phenomenal. After 1909,

the industry reached a point of

equilibrium where it had adjusted to the demands of the
market and the growth rate began to slow down, especially

after 1914.^^

To make things worse for the New York

business community,

the effects of a recession made

themselves felt in 1914. The manufacturers and their

political allies reacted to these problems by launching

determined opposition to protective legislation. The
Republican leader of the powerful upstate bloc that fought
against labor legislation was Senator Elon Brown, who,

after the Republican take over of the New York State
legislature in 1914, became Majority Leader. Brown called

protective labor legislation "burdensome" and pledged to
prevent the passage of new laws and to repeal those laws
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already on the books.

"The state and its people must
be

relieved of the vast and incalculable
waste of capital and
energy resulting from laws passed in
the name of the

public welfare.

Senator Wagner charged in return that

"there never was a Legislature so
completely owned by the
private interests" as the one controlled
by Brown. Al
Smith, angered at the Republican resolve
to block the

passage of further labor legislation, exploded
in
frustration:

"Tammany Hall is a bed of roses comparedto

the ... Republican Party of New York."^^

The arguments put forth by these adversaries
of the

work of the Factory Investigating Commission were
firmly
rooted in the early national experience. Always suspicious
of governmental power, Americans had replaced mercantilism

with laissez-faire capitalism as the basis of the economic
system.

In the first half century of the national

existence,

those individuals determining governmental

policies decided that the national wealth would be
increased if governmental interference could be minimized.

Nascent business enterprises were freed of controls
imposed on them by Washington and encouraged to develop

within a free-market system. The passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the late-nineteenth century judicial
interpretation of its "due process" clause further

reinforced this anti -regulatory feature of conservative
thought
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Efforts to prevent the national and
state governments
from interfering with property rights
were extended
to

include freedom of contract, which held,

in part,

that

wages and other terms of employment
were private matters
best determined by a free agreement made
between employers
and their workers.
Interference by government in such
arrangements, either through controls or
regulations, was
considered a violation of the right of contract
and was
firmly discouraged by the courts.
It could
not be

abridged unless the judiciary decided that to do
so was

necessary for the maintenance of public order or the

protection of public health, safety or morals. The
earliest protective legislation was upheld by the courts

only when it was decided that the laws were

a

legitimate

exercise of the state's police power in these regards.
In time the courts also curtailed freedom of

contract, when proven incapacities existed on either side
of the agreement.

In those cases,

the court allowed

recourse to outside aid for the less substantial party,
since the latter was not able to negotiate from a position
of equality and was therefore at a disadvantage.^^

Such

individuals were, in fact, recognized to be at the mercy
of their employers when attempting to bargain.

Seldom,

however, was such protection provided for women alone.

Terms of employment and legislation usually applied to

both genders on an equal basis.

After the Brandeis Brief

was submitted to the Supreme Court in 1908, presenting a

convincing body of evidence proving
the fragility of women
and their need for protection
under
the law,

the states

finally began to consider intervention
on women's behalf
without fear of judicial disapproval.
Other nay-sayers in pre-World War

I

American society

viewed protective legislation with dismay
because they
feared that such "class legislation" would
only bring

the

United States another step closer to what
they warned
would be a socialist debacle. Samuel Gompers,
even while
member of the New York State Factory Investigating
Commission, warned of this possibility.

in the years

after 1914, as the United States drew closer to
England

prior to our intervention in the European war, some
saw
another sinister intent on the part of those working
to
achieve protective legislation. Republicans such as

Frederick Davenport, who had left the GOP with Roosevelt
in 1912 but, with Roosevelt, returned after his defeat to

Taft's party, denounced protective legislation as
"Prussian.

"^^

When the progressive reformers responded

to the apprehensions of their critics,

their arguments

were not received with anything resembling enlightened

acceptance by men like Gompers and Davenport.
Most business interests up to the turn of the

twentieth century displayed no interest in protective
legislation for workers of either gender, and they

denounced attempts to promote such legislation on the
grounds that it would work an undue hardship on American

a

.

business. These same monied interests
were equally averse
to feminist demands for suffrage,
fearing that if women
were granted voting rights, they
would use their new power
to ensure the passage of minimum-wage
laws, protective
legislation, or "welfare laws."^^
Not all business interests, however,
regarded

protective legislation for women with the
same jaundiced
eye. Large corporate concerns, such as
those associated
with the Civic Federation, few of which
employed women
workers in any capacity, denounced industrial
firms that

exploited and ill-used their employees. They
quietly
suggested that these abusive firms "clean their own
houses" voluntarily. However, the Civic Federation
never

actually supported the passage of protective
legislation
On the other hand, the National Association of

Manufacturers, after 1903, expended great efforts not only
to prevent the organization of industrial workers but also
to oppose the passage of protective legislation. During

the course of the first decade of the new century,

its

position, although still unconditional, became somewhat

guarded and even covert.

Monitor

,

After the Triangle Fire, The

a business publication,

stated that the call for

labor laws was the result of an "outcropping of hysteria."

They argued that
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Because someone locked a door in
the Trianqle
Shirtwaist Company, someone out of
55 000
the n^h^ravalanche 'or^o^Sal?^^^^

It.llLTlLl^'^.f^''^'

They were nevertheless more restrained
in their
comments, especially in what they said
about their women
and children employees, since they feared
further public
condemnation. However, they claimed that
employers should
not be blamed for fires and accidents in
their places of
business. Such problems were the result of
negligence on
the part of workers, miscalculation, fate,
or
the evil

behavior of a few greedy men. They argued that
the demand
for protective legislation was misdirected at
best and,
more to the point, placed business interests at a
great

disadvantage
Manufacturers received little in the way of

admonition from Samuel Gompers and the officials of the

American Federation of Labor. The union and its leadership
maintained its traditional hostility to government
assistance and instead advocated voluntarism, self-help
and coercion through economic action.

Gompers, an

indifferent and unconcerned member of the Factory

Investigating Commission,^" always warned that government
was not a reliable ally and could, under pressure, turn

against labor and abandon laws previously enacted. He

warned workers that they should not anticipate "at the
hands of government what they could accomplish by their

own initiative and activities."
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He even used Margaret

.

Dreier Robins, President of the
National WTUL, as an
example of someone whose initial
intent was laudable but
who was misled after her involvement
in politics.
Sadly,

he remembered in his autobiography
that when this
happened, Robins' "influence in the

labor movement began

to

wane.-

Only the union, he argued, could be
depended
upon to stand fast in support of its
membership, and only
the benefits won by the union could
be viewed as

permanent

Encouraged by the approval of their supporters,
the
Factory Investigating Commission, in making
its

preliminary report to the state legislature, also
recommended a slate of fifteen bills to be considered
for
passage. Many of the proposals went far beyond the
correction of fire hazards in factories, which was, of
course,

the commission's first charge. The proposals

addressed all types of industrial dangers, bad sanitation,
low wages, long hours, and other threats to the well-being
of workers, both male and female. The commission

recommended first that a Bureau of Fire Prevention be

established to investigate whether exits opened properly,
if fire drills were being utilized,

and whether

fireproofing and automatic sprinkling systems were

installed in factories. Other bills mandated that
workrooms had to be adequately ventilated; there were
restrictions on the kind of work that could be done by

women who sought employment after childbirth; women

.

workers had to be guaranteed rest
periods, and working
children had to have medical examinations
before they
could be legally employed. The hours
that women and
children could work had to be regulated.
People who had
been injured on the job would, in the
future, have to be
compensated.
Al Smith, serving at that time as the
Democratic

Minority Leader in the Assembly, and Robert
Wagner,
President Pro Tem of the Senate, worked
tirelessly

to win

passage of this legislation. They were consistently

oppposed by Republicans from upstate working on
behalf of
farmers and cannery owners. These Republicans
joined
hands with other representatives supporting industrial

interests that were primarily interested in defeating
the
bill mandating employer compensation for injured

workers

'^^
.

The conservatives were successful in defeating seven
of the proposals in 1912.

However, even these reform

bills were passed in the next few years, all of them

supported by progressives in a crusade led by Tammany Hall
Democrats
The progressive reformers, at the pinnacle of their

influence in the state and in the nation, rejoiced at
their accomplishments.

They recognized, however, that the

laws passed in the 1912 session were but a first step in
the fight to realize labor reform. The legislature agreed
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and extended the time allowed the
commission to complete
its work until January 15, 1913.

Several more permanent experts were
appointed to the
commission's staff, including Dr. George
Price and six
field inspectors. Their numbers were later
augmented
periodically with the addition of selected
specialists. As
the commissioners continued their investigations,
they
increased the scope of their activities both

geographically and in terms of the industries into
which
they inquired. During this second phase of their
work,

the

Factory Investigating Commission surveyed conditions
in
1338 factories in forty-five cities of the state. They

continued to explore complaints that might lead to fires,
not only in the factories of New York City but in cities

throughout the state.

They also investigated working

conditions in the same area, taking testimony from
employers and employees about matters such as lighting,
heating, ventilation, sanitary facilities, and the general

construction of factory buidings

.

They extended their

concerns to canneries, looking into conditions in almost

every cannery in the state. In addition,, they

investigated situations in the tobacco, printing, and
chemical industries, and they sent out a crew of eleven

field investigators to report on the manufacturing that
was carried on in tenement houses in New York City and in

fifteen other cities in the state.
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Political factors did not bias the
deliberations of
the Factory Investigating Commission.
Their staff

investigated the conditions in factories
operated by their
progresssive allies and criticized them when
they

uncovered "vile and uncivilized" situations.
Therewere,
however,

instances when Smith and Wagner must have
felt a
certain amount of gleeful satisfaction as they
did their
duty on the commission. Thomas Mott Osborne, a
wealthy

manufacturer of farm machinery from Auburn, in the
central
area of the state, and a Grover Cleveland type of
antimachine Democrat, had founded the Democratic League in
1909. Dedicated to purging the Democracy of "bossism" and

to serving the political ambitions of the eccentric and

disputatious Osborne, the League had on occasion sought
alliances with Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Evans
Hughes. When it suited his purposes, Osborne would even

seek an accommodation with Tammany Hall, which he was

attempting to eliminate as
party.

a force in the

Democratic

During the Factory Investigating Commission's

investigtions

,

Wagner and Smith discovered conditions in

Osborne's Auburn factory to be among the worst in the
state. They righteously publicized their findings.''^

The commissioners drew up about thirty tentative

bills, which they then forwarded to several thousand

interested individuals throughout the state.

Many of

these people filed either suggestions or negative

commentary on the bills, all of which was considered by
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the commissioners.

The proposed legislation was
then

discussed and analyzed in special
hearings held in either
Albany or New York City. Critics of
the
bills made their

views known and were permitted to
cross-examine
investigators and experts.

Interested individuals and

delegates from civic and social organizations
also gave
voice to their concerns and added their
counsel for the
benefit of the commissioners

.

'''^

When the Factory Investigating Commission made
its
report on January 15, 1913, included with the
general

document were a number of additional statements and
special studies related to "dangerous trades."

Descriptions of conditions in factories refining or using

wood alcohol and accounts of physical problems suffered
by
employees in chemical plants were submitted.
Finally,

the recommendations of the commission were

refined and forwarded to the state legislature in the form
of twenty-eight proposed bills. The election of 1912 had

given the Democrats control of both houses of the state
legislature; Smith had assumed the speaker's chair in the

Assembly while Wagner had become President of the Senate.
As a result of the control exercised by the Democrats, who

were in turn controlled by their Tammany leadership,

twenty-five of the Factory Investigating Commission's

proposed bills were passed into law during the tumultuous
1913 session of the state legislature
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The first new statute reorganized
the Department of
Labor and enlarged its jurisdiction.
Everyone familiar
with the Department had long since
recognized its

inadequacies.

The Commissioner of Labor had
testified in
one of the hearings that he had only
eighty- five

inspectors available to visit the

3

0,699 factories known

to the department. They were able to
contact each factory

no more than once every two years. The new
legislation

increased the number of inspectors in the Labor
Department
to 158 and increased its yearly appropriation
almost one

hundred percent. =°

This,

of course,

led to more

strenuous efforts to implement the labor laws. For
example,

in 1909, New York State spent the clearly

inadequate sum of 12.2 cents per wage earner to enforce
the existing laws. After the passage of the new

legislation, the state spent 19.0 cents per worker, a

higher amount than that spent by any other state.

Another bill passed during the 1912 session provided
for punishments to be levied on those who might violate
the labor law,

the industrial code,

or the orders of the

Commissioner of Labor. First offenses carried mild
punishments; offenders had to pay fines of not more than

fifty dollars. Second-time offenders were liable to more
onerous fines and the possibility of a 30 -day
imprisonment, while a third- time offender might be jailed

for as long as sixty days and was required to pay a fine
of $250."
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other laws recommended by the
Factory Investigating
Commission and passed by the state
legislature seemed to
remedy most of the deficiencies
responsible for the great
loss of life in the Triangle Fire.
New factory buildings
more than four stories high had to
be provided with at
least one exterior enclosed fireproof
stairway.
Stairways
had to be wide, well-lit, fireproofed,
and unobstructed.
Doorways had to open outward, and interior
partitions had
to be constructed of fireproof materials.
Fire escapes
had to be safely constructed."

Another newly-passed law stipulated that structures
such as loft buildings that had been erected in
the past
for purposes other than manufacturing could not
be used as

factories unless they conformed to standards that

protected workers against the dangers of fire. Such
buildings had to be inspected, and those that met the
regulations would be granted certificates indicating the
approval of the Bureau of Inspections.^^
The majority of the legislators agreed that children

fourteen and under would henceforth not be permitted to

work in factories, and employers were forbidden to hire

women to do night work. Adequate numbers of sanitary
washrooms had to be provided for workers, and all parts of
factories had to be kept reasonably clean and free from

accumulations of dirt and garbage. Employers were ordered
to protect their employees from accidents caused by

dangerous machinery, and elevators had to be properly
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maintained.

It was also firmly stipulated
that no doors

leading into or out of any floor in
any faotory could be
locked during working hours."
There had always been concern that
the existing laws
had lagged behind the realities created
by a burgeoning
industrialism. A new law expanded the power
of the Labor
Department by allowing it to extend existing
laws when it
became apparent that new industrial problems
had been
created that were not adequately covered by
laws already
on the books. The commission also recommended
that a

five-member Industrial Board be created coordinate
with
the Department of Labor.

This board would supervise the

drafting of industrial codes for various trades, once
again ensuring that legislation would cover current
needs.
In 1915,

on the recommendation of the Factory

Investigating Commission, this Industrial Board was

abolished and a newly-structured Industrial Commission
took control of the New York State Department of Labor.
The five-member Commission was given the authority to

administer not only the labor law, but also the workmen's
compensation law and the state insurance fund. Within the
commission, deputy commissioners were appointed.

One was

given responsibility for overseeing the Bureau of
Inspections, another for superintending the Workmen's

Compensation Bureau, and a third for supervising the

Bureau of Mediation and Arbitration.^''
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It should be noted that both
organized labor and

large numbers of progressive
reformers objected to the
creation of the Industrial Commission.
While it was
understood that the merger of the Labor
Department and the
Workmen's Compensation Bureau would
result in greater
efficiency, prevent overlapping of efforts,
and centralize
the administration of the labor law,
they were reluctant
to relinquish or even endanger procedures
that had been
developed with great effort within the Department
of
Labor.

Even the WTUL's spokeswomen warned that
the new
commission might be a mistake. They warned that
states
that had Industrial Commissions had a tendency to
grant

them too much discretion in granting exemptions to

existing regulations."

Nevertheless, the Industrial

Commission worked well and served to prevent violence in
labor confrontations. In 1919 Frances Perkins was

appointed to the State Industrial Commission, where she
acted as a true advocate for women in her efforts to
enforce obedience to labor laws.^°
Under the 1915 reorganization, a new ten-member
Industrial Council was also established. It contained five

repesentatives of the state's employers and five
representatives of its workers. This body would serve in
an advisory capacity to the commission, advising on "all
rules, regulations, amendments, or repeals submitted to

them for consideration and advice before enactment."

While members of the Industrial Commission received
222

.

.

generous salaries for their services,
members of the
Industrial Council served in their
positions without
compensation
The Industrial Commission approached
its tasks with
great energy. It published a monthly
bulletin reviewing
the results of its inspections, and it
drew up a Safety
Manual for the use of its inspectors and f
ormanuf acturers
in the state. It also established a
"block system of

inspection" for use in New York City whereby
all the

industrial firms contained in a city block would
be

inspected as a single unit. It was anticipated that
under
this system, no factory, no matter how insignificant,

would be overlooked
Although the passage of this needed legislation
convinced many that the work of the Factory Investigating
Commission was drawing to

a close,

others felt that much

still remained to be done. A disastrous fire in a clothing

factory in Binghamton in July of 1913" persuaded many
that the state legislature had been correct in extending
the term of office of the Factory Investigating Commission
to 1914 " and then again to 1915."

An important piece of legislation, recommended by the

Factory Insvest igating Commission in its final period and

passed into law by the legislature, created

a

Building

Department with jurisdiction throughout the City of New
York.

The commissioner who headed this Department had the

right to authorize his subordinates to enter, examine, and
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inspect buildings within the city
in order to ensure the
safety of their construction and the
proper adherence to
the state's laws and ordinances.
The Commissioner of
Buildings had the right to order repairs
made to dangerous
structures, to mandate the removal of
dangerous buildings,
or to condemn buildings that did not
meet with
the

standards authorized by the State of New York.
important,

Equally

it established a system of penalties
for those

employees of the department who inadequately
performed the
duties of their position or those who were found
guilty of

accepting bribes. This law eliminated much of the
confusion that had existed in regard to the jurisdiction
of agencies and departments over inspections and

enforcements throughout the City of New York."

Much of the work done by the Factory Investigating
Commission during the remainder of its existence dealt
with the inadequate wages paid workers in New York State.
The commission authorized a comprehensive investigation of
the wage problem that was instigated by the reports made

by various progressive groups regarding the very low wages

paid to workers in many industries."

Employers'

associations denied these charges, claiming that they were

exaggerated and biased toward the employees and because
they were based on defective investigations that had

examined only a single side of the case. The
commissioners, therefore, decided to gather further facts

and statistics to resolve the controversy in
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a

fair and

impartial way. if, during the course
of this examination,
they concluded that inadequacies and
injustices did indeed
exist, they agreed to suggest ways
in which the problems
might be corrected.
The commission investigated wages in
the Empire State
during the course of the next year and
reached the obvi ous
conclusion that wages were inadequate. A
single worker
residing in New York City, they discovered,
required a

weekly wage of nine dollars to survive."

At that time,

one-half of area industrial workers investigated,
both men
and women, earned wages of less than eight dollars
a week,

and one-eighth of them,

less that five dollars a week.'°

Recognizing the consequences of the situation they
had surveyed, the Factory Investigating Commission devised
a

minimum wage plan. It proposed the formation of wage

boards that would set minimum industrial wages for women
and children.

Samuel Gompers opposed the idea of a

minimum wage for both men and women.

He feared that

setting a minimum wage for women and children would

eventually result in a similar regulation for men.
Protesting that such legislation would be little better
than slavery for union men, he argued that workers who

received adequate wages might see their pay reduced with
such a law on the books.

Weaker unions disagreed with

Gompers and supported the idea of a minimum wage

.

'^^

Progressive labor leaders and the Tammany leaders of the

Factory Investigating Commission stood firmly against the
225

Federation's president, especially in
regard to wage
protection for women and children. Al
Smith argued that
Gompers had to realize that men were
not dependent on a
minimum wage since they were protected
by
unions, but

women and children were largely unorganized
and had to be
protected from exploitation.- Senator
Wagner insisted
the something had to be done to assist
women
and

children."

Facing such determined opposition,
Gompers

reluctantly decided not to contest the Factory
Investigating Commission's recommendation for a
minimum
wage for women, and the 1914 AFL Convention even
endorsed
the resolution.

The type of a minimum wage that the Factory

Investigating Commission wished to see enacted into law in

New York State had already become law in nine other states
prior to 1915.''

They,

in turn,

had been influenced by

similar laws in England and in other European countries.
It seemed as if efforts in New York State were simply part

of a national trend, but, unfortunately, before the

proposed bill came up for consideration by the state
legislature, the reform momentum generated by the Triangle
Fire had dissipated.

Conservative Republicans had

regained control of the state legislature in 1914, and the
bill met a resounding defeat despite Wagner and Smith's

attempts to promote its passage.''^
The New York State legislature failed to extend the

Factory Investigating Commission's term of office in 1915.

.

The Republicans in the legislature
and their allies in the
business community, concerned about
the sharp recession
that was under way in New York State,
were convinced that
further reform efforts by the commission
would endanger

their economic interests.- A lawyer
attached to the Real
Estate Board of New York publically
complained:
You can no longer distinguish the real
estate owner
by the smile of prosperity because his
now a burden, a liability instead of a property is
comfort and
source of income. To own a factory building
in New
York IS now a calamity."

Other businessmen bemoaned the fact that the new
labor

legislation meant "the wiping out of industry in
this
state
While the upstate Republicans and their farm,
cannery, and industrial allies were pleased to see the

expiration of the commission, there was little in the way
of concern about its termination from any quarter.

It was

agreed that the work of that body had been largely
completed, and the progressives took pride in its

accomplishments.

During its brief existence, a

short three and a half years, and at a cost to the state
of only $110,000,^^ it had instigated what its eulogists

claimed was a "revolution in the field of labor and
industry." Frances Perkins maintained that the

accomplishments of the New York State Factory
Investigating Commission signaled a "turning point in

American attitudes and policies toward social
responsibility.

"^°

A consequence of the public fury in
227

the wake of the Triangle Fire
and progressive

determination to humanize the deplorable
effects of the
industrial impulse, the Factory
Investigating Commission,
with the thirty-six laws for which
it was responsible,

rewrote New York State's labor and
factory codes,
producing the most advanced and comprehensive
standards in
the nation.
They would serve as a model for the
rest of

the states until the New Deal, when,
under the influence
of many of the same individuals who had
worked so

assiduously for the passage of the industrial
code in New
York State, the national government would enact
similar
standards for the entire country.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE FAILURE OF THE ENFORCEMENT
OF
PROGRESSIVE LABOR LEGISLATION

Between the years 1911 and 1917 resistance
to the
progressive reformers' attempts to obtain
passage of
protective legislation and failure to enforce
the new laws
and codes as they came into effect were
both widespread.
Indifference, competing interests, bureaucratic

inefficiency, and divisions within reform
organizations
over the issues involved in protective legislation
all

played a part.

As time passed after the Triangle Fire,

many of those who had initially advocated protective
laws
lost interest due to the fact that they had little
close

connection with the workers affected by the regulations.
Those who might have been expected to support protective
laws,

such as the Tammany administration, often did not

because of conflicting interests.

Charlie Murphy, who

controlled the Tammany organization at that time, was the
leader of the state Democratic party and the primary
influence on the Democratic majority in the state legislature until 1914.

Following the example of his

predecessors at the Hall, he was covertly affiliated with
powerful real estate businesses in New York City and on

occasion used his influence to further their interests at
the state level.

^

In the first years of the twentieth

century, before Murphy changed the direction of Tammany's
efforts,

the Hall had worked either to defeat labor bills

that threatened the Wigwam's
business associates or to
emasculate the proposed statutes with
burdensome
amendments.^ With or without the Hall's
intervention,

realty lobbyists in New York City were
so powerful that
exemptions had legally been granted to
buildings four
stories and under.
In some instances, six-story
structures, even if they were old and
hazardous, were not
required to have fireproof ed and enclosed
stairways.^

When labor legislation was passed either
at the state
or the city level, the Tammany administrations
neglected
to enforce the laws.

At the same time,

in an effort to

secure the allegiance of labor interests, the Wigwam

pledged to help procure legislative guarantees for
industrial workers, but it seldom delivered on its

promises because of its obligations to its unacknowledged
associates in the business community.^

Immediately after the Triangle Fire, the forces

working for the passage of labor legislation hoped that
the public outrage generated by the fire would produce

enough sympathy for the sorry condition of women workers
to ensure passage of a fifty-four hour bill for women.

Reformers joined with the state AFL, which had been

assured of Tammany's support, in an effort to push the
bill through the legislature.

Boss Murphy, however,

failed to produce the promised votes, and the bill never
got out of committee.^

Al Smith confided to Frances

Perkins, who had lobbied hard for the passage of the
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fifty-four hour bill, that Murphy's
friendly relationship
with the proprietors of Huyler's
Candy Factory had
produced the stalemate.''
Still, while business influence on
Tammany cannot be
disputed, it was far from absolute.
Politicians

associated with the Democratic bosses were
always known to
break ranks when it suited them.
There
were also

instances when the sachems ignored the interests
of their
business associates. This was especially the
case after

Charlie Murphy took over the leadership of the
Hall.

For

instance, when an amended fifty-four hour bill
finally did

pass in 1912, Big Tim Sullivan, a Tammany ward
boss from

New York City, and his cousin Christy Sullivan, both
state
senators, were prevailed upon to cast votes in favor
of
the measure,

votes that carried the day for those who had

worked so assiduously for its passage.''
later,

A few years

Frances Perkins, working to win support for the New

York State Factory Investigating Commission's
recommendations, solicited assistance from Charles Murphy
himself, and,

in spite of his commitments to the City's

businessmen, the Tammany boss ordered his people in the

legislature to support the factory bills in question.^
Nevertheless, the power of Tammany Hall was

recognized and often feared.

It used its dominance not

only to defeat its enemies but to keep its own associates
in line.

In 1912,

a Democrat,

William Sulzer, was elected

governor with Tammany's blessing.
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Prior to his election.

Sulzer had served for seventeen
years as a pro-labor
member of the state assembly. The
progressives and
organized labor rallied behind the new
governor in support
of an AFL-sponsored compensation
bill.
They assumed that
Murphy and his Tammany proteges also
appproved the bill.
The insurance companies lobbyists,
however, promoted a
self-serving bill of their own that Murphy
supported and
that was finally passed.
Governor Sulzer vetoed
it,

and,

indignant at his independent action, Tammany
engineered
Sulzer' s impeachment,^ much to the chagrin
of the state

If workingmen and women could never be
sure about

where they stood with the Democratic party, they
had
little doubt about the opposition party.

Republican

support of issues pursued by organized labor for workers
was practically nonexistent.

The G.O.P.'s poor voting

record on labor bills earned most of them high-ranking
positions on the blacklists regularly compiled by the
Federation.

The state Republicans had long since

abandoned political power and patronage in New York City
to Tammany Hall and its supporters and contented

themselves with controlling seats from upstate districts,
where businessmen and employers were their traditional
supporters.

These Republican politicians were loyal to

their constitutents and consistently fought bills that
favored labor's interests.
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The Republicans gained control
of the state
legislature and the governor's office
in 1914 largely as a
result of public displeasure at the
impeachment of

Governor Sulzer.

After 1915, this conservative
upstate
faction began to work with great
determination to

reve rse

gains made by the supporters of protective
legislation and
to weaken what they believed to be
the growing power of
organized labor.
Led by State Senator Elon Brown,
their
attack was directed at the entire slate of
reforms

previously enacted.

Organized labor usually joined with

progressive reformers to prevent the wholesale
undermining
of earlier efforts.
Florence Kelly, the dynamic Secretary
of the National Consumers' League,

recognized that

progressive accomplishments were threatened by the upstate
law makers.

She complained, "This is such a dreadful

Legislature that it is no use asking anything of them but
that they stop sinning a little.

"^^

The recession in 1914 disrupted the prosperity that

business had enjoyed for several years, causing corporate
interests to encourage their representatives in the

legislature to fight the reforms that they believed were
at least partially responsible for the downturn in the

economy.

Labor and the progressives, they argued, should

discontinue their attacks against management, recently
shorn of its former iniquities and made timid by the

assaults of the reformers.

Instead,
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they should join

.

hands with their former adversaries
and work to realize
class cooperation, which, in turn,
would restore
prosperity for all."
The reactionary spirit that
dominated the state

government after the elections in 1915
led to the
introduction of anti-labor "ripper bills"
in the

legislature.

One of these bills attempted to
transfer

responsibility for the enforcement of the new
Industrial
Code in New York City from the State
Department of Labor
to the five borough governments where,
traditionally,

such

enforcement would be less rigorous.

The mayor of New York

City,

recognizing the deleterious effects that could
be
expected from such a move, vetoed this proposal,
as was

his right under the Home Rule provision of the state

constitution
Also,

aware that the canning industry had already

been granted exemptions by the Industrial Commission"
allowing it to extend the working hours of women employees
beyond the legal limit when seasonal demands required

it,

the conservatives suggested that further exemptions might
be in order.

They introduced three bills in 1915 that

would have extended the hours that women could work to
seventy- two per week, allowed women to work on Sundays,
and allowed employers to require women to work until

midnight."

These bills almost became laws, but they

failed to pass due to an intraparty squabble over

leadership and patronage between Governor Charles Whitman
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and Senator Elon Brown and his
supporters.

Whitman was a

moderate Republican who had been able to
build support in
New York City while serving as the
City's district
attorney.

He was willing to work with organized
labor and

the social progressives in order to
preserve that support,
but to do so, he had to do battle on
numerous occasions

with Brown and his conservative allies.^''
The governor, Tammany, and the urban
progressives

finally prevailed over the Republican conservatives
and
business allies before Whitman left office in 1918.

But

the subsequent legislative disputes served to
weaken the

government's commitment to vigorous enforcement and, at
the same time,

strengthened the conservatives' hostility

toward labor legislation.
In 1915,

one of these controversial ripper bills

caused the state AFL to desert the reform forces.

Allying

themselves with the Industrial Commission, the State
Manufacturers' Association, and the conservative

Republican faction in the legislature, AFL leaders agreed
to a new and more extensive compromise labor program that

contained a provision permitting women to work extended
hours in canneries when seasonal demands required it

Political considerations, including the need to blunt

criticism directed at labor's delegates on the Industrial
Commission, dictated this move.

It earned the state

Federation the outraged criticism of the WTUL,^^ other

242

.

progressive organizations/^ and several
New York City
unions, ^° even though the proposal was
eventually vetoed
by Governor Whitman.
On November

6,

1915,

in the same year that the

Factory Investigating Commission brought
its work to an
end, another gruesome fire took place
in a factory in the
Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. The three-story
structure housed several business concerns,
among them
candy-making business and a shirt -making establishment

a

The fire broke out in the elevator shaft and
spread

quickly to the adjacent stairway, blocking that means
of
egress for the two hundred workers on the premises.

There

was an emergency exit, but it was locked.
a

There was also

single fire escape, but it was made of flimsy metal

which,

soon after the fire began, became a grill, roasting

those who tried to escape by that route.

and collapsed.

It soon

buckled

The building was not fireproof, and,

since sprinklers had never been installed, the fire

quickly engulfed the structure.

The workers,

unprepared by fire drills for such an emergency, panicked
and jumped from the flaming building.

were injured.

Thirty-six workers

Twelve men and women were killed.

The

youngest was a girl of fifteen,

Although news of the European war, encroaching more
insistently on American consciousness each day, dominated
the City newspapers, details of this new fire absorbed New

Yorkers for a while, briefly reminding everyone of the
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devastating grief that preoccupied them
four and a half
years earlier at the time of the
Triangle Shirtwaist Fire.
New Yorkers were unable to understand
how
the latest

tragedy had occurred, given the tireless
efforts over the
past sevevral years of the New York
Committee on Public
Safety,

the Factory Investigating Commission,
the State

Department of Labor, the short-lived Industrial
Board, the
newly-structured Industrial Commission, and the New
York
State Legislature.
The public demanded an immediate
investigation.
In less than two weeks,

the results of the

investigation were made public.
shocking.

The information was

The owners of the Brooklyn factory had been

notified after a visit by an inspector from the Industrial
Commission three months prior to the fire that conditions
in their building were not in compliance with the law.

The warning had been ignored.

The public was even more

incensed to learn of the confusion and poor administrative

practices existing in the offices of the New York State
Industrial Commission

.

The commission's

sporadically-kept records indicated that a total of 3,711
directives to fireproof defective stairways had been
issued to owners of area factories but that only 246 of
these orders had been complied with.

Similar situations

existed regarding other irregularities in factories.
Furthermore, many of the commission's inspectors

apparently failed to keep records regarding their
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investigations, and no system was in
place^^ to record
follow-up inspections that would ensure
that attempts to
correct problems had been taken.
The commissioners neither denied the
charges laid at
their doorstep nor excused themselves on
the grounds that
the commission had only recently come
into existence.

They admitted that they were in

a

sorry state.

They

claimed that a follow-up system had been created
within
the Department of Labor as early as 1911,
but that it had
lapsed by 1913. However, they did attempt to
exonerate
themselves by arguing that they had too few inspectors.
Indeed,

they stated that they needed at least three times

as many as were then on staff in order to properly

investigate the hundreds of other factories operating

under conditions as dangerous as those in the Brooklyn
factory

^'^
.

Much of the blame for the commission's problems was

placed on John Lynch, the Commissioner of Labor, and John
Mitchell, Chairman of the Compensation Commission, both

members of the Industrial Commission.

They were both

labor men, Mitchell having formerly served as vice

president of the AFL and Lynch as the president of the
International Typographical Union.

The state AFL had been

the primary force behind their being appointed to the

commission, and now that they were under attack because of
the fire. Federation leaders felt duty-bound to support
them.

They feared that without such support, their two

.

representatives might be dismissed in
disgrace and
replaced by hostile conservatives
There is also evidence that police
magistrates and
the courts failed in their duty to
uphold the labor laws.
When inspectors noted unacceptable
conditions in
factories,

they issued only warnings to violators,
except
in child labor cases, those involving
working hours for
women, the one-day-of f -of -rest - in-seven act,
and the law
prohibiting locked doors. Cases involving the latter

violations were immediately referred for prosecution.
Lesser offenders were admonished on several occasions
and
not referred for prosecution until it became obvious
that

they did not intend to comply with the law.
however,

Too often,

sentences were suspended and fines were remitted.

At other times,

the fines were ludicrously low."

it has

been estimated that at least 50-70% of the violations
brought before the courts during the period in question
went unpunished.

^°

As late as igle, Bernard Shientag,

former Assistant to the Chief Counsel of the Factory

Investigating Commission and at that time Chief Counsel of
the New York State Industrial Commission,
in that year,

complained that

sentences were suspended in New York City

courts in fifty-eight percent of cases where violators of
the labor law had been convicted.

Seventy- five percent

were suspended elsewhere in the state.
Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, the owners of the

Triangle Shirtwaist Company, continued their business

.

enterprises after the 1911 fire with
no apparent qualms of
conscience and little in the way of
efforts to mend their
ways.
They consistently violated the laws
and got away
with it.
By August 20, 1913, the Triangle
Company had
transferred its operation to a Fifth Avenue
address.

that day. Max Blanck,

On

listed in the city directory as the

president of the company, was charged with
locking one of
the doors to his establishment while 150
of his employees
were at work.
He claimed that the lock in
use was

extremely easy to manipulate and that, in case of
fire, it
would not endanger the lives of his workers; they
could
easily open the door. He was brought to court, and
the

judge, although he fined Blanck twenty dollars,
apologized
to him for the imposition

On December
again.

1,

1913, Max Blanck was summoned to court

This time he was charged with "allowing" one of

his young employees to work on Sunday, by that time a

violation of the law.

Again, his punishent was the

minimum fine allowed: twenty dollars.
Later in the same month, members of the Bureau of
Fire Prevention were invited by Blanck to visit the

Triangle Company in order to inspect a new lock that he
was considering for use in his factory.

The visitors were

not impressed by the lock, and they were exceedingly

distressed at the littered interior of the Triangle
Company.

Once again, scraps had accumulated throughout

the workshop,

rubbish was piled six feet high in one
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corner,

and wicker work baskets,

metal containers, were in use.

rather than the mandated
On this occasion, Blanck

was not even hauled into court but
was issued a "stern"

warning

^'^
.

Blanck'

s

defiance of the law was certainly obvious,

as was his contempt for the social
progressives whose

reform efforts were aimed at business concerns
such as
his.

In mid- July of 1914 Blanck was summoned
before the

Superior Court, County of New York, to answer
charges
brought by the National Consumers' League and others
that
for the past year fradulent imitations of the National
Consumers' League labels had been used in the shirtwaists

manufactured by his company.

The League granted companies

that could prove they were improving working conditions
for their employees the right to affix League labels to
the garments they produced.

Sixty-one companies were

then using their labels, seven of them producing

shirtwaists
Blanck and Harris sold their shirtwaists to companies
in the Northeast,

among them Forbes and Wallace in

Springfield, Massachusetts and George Bean in Boston.

These stores purchased Triangle's shirtwaists, believing
that the label on the garments was that of the National

Consumers' League.

An employee of the Triangle Company

initially reported her employers to the League, but the
League's attorneys could not obtain an affidavit, since
the employee,

fearful that Blanck and Harris would
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blacklist her, refused to assist
further.
The League,
however, brought charges against
the Triangle partners,
acting as agents for George Bean, who
wanted $50,000 in
damages but who, as a resident of
Massachusetts, could not
sue directly in a New York Court.
The plaintiffs were
represented by Bertha Rembaugh, an attorney
involved
in

the prosecution against Blanck and
Harris in 1911.

Triangle partners' attorney was Max

D.

The

Steuer, who had so

skillfully managed their defense after the fire."

Although The Triangle Company had neither met
the
criteria necessary to obtain the right to use the

labels

nor even applied to obtain the privilege, the
defendants

denied the charges made against them.

Blanck'

s

statement

before the court as he claimed his innocence contained
a

myriad of misleading statements as well as blatant
untruths, not only about the charges in question but about
the history and reputation of his business concern.

The

Triangle Company, during the summer of 1914, was operating
in a ninth-floor loft building at 79 Fifth Avenue.

Blanck

claimed that it was "a model of cleanliness and sanitary
conditions

"^^
.

It had been

organized for him by the

Singer Sewing Machine Company with the intent of

establishing an environment that would produce the
"greatest comfort" for the employees of the company."
He complained,

however,

that the reputation of his

business had been unfairly damaged by the terrible fire at
the company's former location on Washington Square and
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stated that it was difficult to overcome
this prejudice
against him and his concern.
Therefore, he was obliged to
affix the labels to his shirtwaists
in order to assure his
customers that his employees were well
- treated,
but he did
not do so in imitation of the National
Consumers'
League.

In fact,

he denied even knowing of the
existence of the

League and suggested that perhaps the League,
in promoting
the use of its labels, was doing so in
imitation
of him.

He argued that,

in using the labels,

he and Isaac Harris,

then the factory supervisor, were merely
assuring the
public that his factory, which did a business of
nine

million dollars a year, was and always had been an
outstanding establishment in which to work.

He further

maintained that his acquittal after the 1911 fire proved
that the authorities recognized "that the Triangle Waist

Company was a model of its kind, second to none in the
entire country.
It is unlikely that any of the Triangle Company's

employees during the sixteen years of the company's

previous existence would have recognized the glowing

description of their workplace as set forth by the
company's owner.

During several preceding years, while

herculean efforts were being made to effect reform in the
garment industry, the Triangle onwers had remained

oblivious to the demands of their workers, indignant
reformers, and determined legislators.

They continued to

operate with impunity as they had since the company was
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established in the first decade of
the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, ignoring their sorry
record, once again,

in

the summer of 1914,

the authorities refused to
take

forceful action to require the Triangle
Company's owners
to recognize their obligations
not only to their employees
but to society.
Judge J.
Giegerich merely agreed that
the defendants' label was an unfair
imitation of the label
used by the National Consumers' League and
issued an

injunction ordering Blanck to discontinue using
the label.
He also ordered him to pay court costs
in the amount of
ten dollars.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company's lack of
concern for
the welfare of its employees was shared by other
business

concerns in New York City.

In 1916,

a study was done for

the Russell Sage Foundation regarding the health
problems
of all factory workers in the city.

The investigators

reported that tuberculosis, rheumatism, influenza, heart
disease, asthma, and diseases of the digestive and

circulatory systems were rampant in the ranks of
industrial workers of both genders.

They concluded that

the long hours, poor wages, and dangerous working

conditions, combined with wretched living conditions,

caused the illnesses that were so widespread in this
segment of the city's population.

They further stated

that conditions in factories were so hazardous that they

were responsible for accidents and injuries that

contributed to the health problems of workers."*^
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Even if

only a few years had passed since
the passage of the state
labor laws and the refurbishing of
the New York City
Building Code, it would seem that these
investigators
should have made note of some successes
in ameliorating
the deplorable conditions in factories.
Some evidence of
beneficial change could have been cited to
indicate that
the new regulations and statutes put in
place by the
combined efforts of the progressive reformers
and the
Tammany-led politicians were having positive
results.

Since this was not the case, it can only be
assumed that
lax enforcement of the legislation was commonplace
and
that improvements had been minimal.
The WTUL recognized the problem but found itself

isolated politically and struggling with internal
divisions.

Former alliances with other organizations that

had shared its goals, even in a halfhearted way, had
broken down.

World War

I,

Even before the United States' entry into
the WTUL lost all hope of winning over Samuel

Gompers and the AFL unions.
as Rose Schneiderman,

Women labor organizers such

angry and resentful, resigned their

positions with the ILGWU, a union that was usually at
least nominally concerned about the problems of working
women, because they believed that the unions were failing
to aggressively safeguard women working in factories.'*^
It was not enough to just pass protective legislation.

The women reformers demanded effective enforcement and
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could not understand the union's
passive attitude about
the dangers that still existed in
factories.
Other WTUL members, while giving up
on the AFL and
its conservative approach to the
"woman problem,
began
consider the benefits for women that might
result from
forming alliances with those urging the
formation

tc

of

industrial unions/^

They were, however, rebuffed by the

more radical industrial unionists such as
members of the
IWW, who expressed intense suspicion of
the leisure-class

women who led the WTUL and the suffrage
organizations.

They were all, warned the Wobbly organization,
part of a
"ruling class conspiracy" determined to prevent the

class

struggle, which the IWW recognized as inevitable."^

An

alliance with such an intransigent organization would be
impossible for the WTUL to even contemplate."^
Nor were other socialist groups growing more tolerant
of the WTUL's membership and agenda, despite the fact that

there were many socialist members in the WTUL.

Socialists

did continue to work actively to support the idea of

protective legislation and were, on occasion, known to
criticize Samuel Gompers for his lack of enthusiasm for
such laws, but their interest in protective laws continued
to take a back seat to their dedication to their own

agenda and their hostile view of capitalism.

The

socialist members of the WTUL, therefore, became more

ambivalent as time passed.

They were uncertain as to

whether they should advocate unionism or protective
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legislation, class consciousness or the
unity of interests
between worker and employer, safeguards
solely for women
workers or defenses to protect the entire
workforce,

regardless of gender.

Leonora O'Reilly, a long-time WTUL

member and a confirmed socialist, disturbed
by the
perplexity in which she found herself, resigned

her

membership in the WTUL in 1915.

Communicating her

frustration to her friend Mary Dreier, she wrote:
Trade unions are necessary.
They must be worked for
season and out. Women must be organized better
than men are organized. The powers that be in
the
labor movement in New York State do not and will not
recognize an outside body's right to help with the
work.
Worse than that, they attribute their own
shortcomings to the outside body's
disinterestedness

m

''^

.

O'Reilly found new battles to fight and obstacles to
overcome working in the suffrage movement.
Socialists were also distracted by the war being

waged in Europe.

The energies of socialists, whether

moderates or radicals, were primarily directed to

America's entrance into the hostilities and to ending the
conflagration that was destroying the European working
class.

The injustices with which American workers were

forced to cope in factories and workshops were fast

assuming a secondary importance for American socialists.
While many socialists and progressive reformers were

struggling with these questions, more and more members of
the WTUL continued to argue that their organization should

take steps to disentangle itself from the concerns of
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organized labor and turn to other
programs that might
prove to be more productive. Their
primary interests
became the passage of further labor
legislation,
the

education of women in regard to existing
laws, and the
suffrage movement.
In addition, they discussed efforts
tc
set up permanent law enforcement committees
in all union
shops.
Women workers, aware of infractions that
might
endanger them, would be instructed to report
the dangers
to the members of the committees who would,

in turn,

report them to the State Department of Labor or to
the

York City Fire Commissioner.

Nev^

They also encouraged the

WTUL to investigate ways in which they could deal with
judicial indifference or even the nullification of

protective laws.

It was

proposed that the WTUL might

promote the institution of the recall to use as a weapon
to unseat judges who lacked sympathy for women workers.

Recommendations that the League work to gain acceptance of
a minimum wage,

to set up employment agencies,

or to seek

the passage of banking laws to protect workers' savings

were a few of the proposals that were analyzed and debated
at the organization's annual conventions in the years

before 1917.
Businessmen and their oganizations had been divided
over whether to join hands with progressive reformers and
exert some measure of control over inevitable legislation,

which was the policy of the National Civic Federation, or
whether to stand firm and militantly battle labor and
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reform efforts, as the National
Association of
Manufacturers insisted.
Instead of pursuing either of
these options, they had cooperated
with labor in setting
up Protocols in many of the garment
industries in
mid- January 1913.

They were hailed by Gompers and
many of

the unions as well as by businessmen
and reformers as

harbingers of

a

new era in industrial cooperation.

The Protocols had, during the six short
years of

their existence, proved beneficial to all
parties
concerned.

The supporters of the Protocols had solid

reasons to celebrate the new "Industrial Democracy"
that
the agreements had initiated.
In addition to the

president off the Federation, other giants in the labor

movement approved of the Protocols.

Among them was Sidney

Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers'
Union, a new organization set up in 1915 in opposition to

the conservative, AFL-approved United Garment Workers,
and,

in a later era, one of Franklin Roosevelt's trusted

and powerful advisors.

Under the Protocols, unions

bargained with management over wages, hours, health,
safety, and social welfare arrangements.

Grievances that

could not be settled through conciliation and mediation
were settled by arbitration.

The process worked

relatively well for a brief period.

During the first

eleven months of 1913, after the adoption of the Protocol
in the "Ladies Trade" industries, only 2.1 percent of the

workers' grievences proved impossible to settle through
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conciliation and mediation.

These few problems were

directed for settlement by means of
arbitration
Using the process established in their

.

^«

Protocols,

unions were able to assist manufacturers
in keeping the
cost of operation as low as possible.
Businesses, in
return, were willing to grant previously
denied workers'

benefits to their employees.

Labor leaders also

championed the Protocols because they tended
to eliminate
many of the employers' earlier self-serving
actions that

had too often left employees in a powerless
state.

Businessmen came to realize that the Protocols helped
to
increase their profits and to prevent the unwelcome
entrance of competition into the garment industry.
These benefits helped to stifle the Manufacturers'

Associations' earlier criticisms in regard to unwelcome

cooperation with labor.
The Protocols were, however,

short-lived.

As the

National Association of Manufacturers had forewarned,
attempts by either labor or interested third parties to
involve themselves in decisions that, they believed, must
of necessity be controlled by employers, would not,

long run, be acceptable to business."

in the

At the same time,

workers, although they noted efforts to enforce some

regulations and to clean up the shops and were pleased to
see their wages increased as a result of the Protocol

process, grew restive and dissatisfied with the

agreements.

The Protocols had actually forced the unions
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to exert a tight control over
their rank-and-file

membership.

This resulted in considerable
strain between
the leaders and members of unions
such as the ILGWU.
The
workers mainly complained that the
Protocols forced them
to relinquish their right to strike,
even when they

believed that their best interests were
not being served
by the 1913 agreements with their employers.
The employees were also angered when large
numbers of
manufacturers began to withdraw from the Dress
and Waist
Manufacturers' Association, which represented
the

employers'
to 1916,
to 204."

interests in the Protocol process.

From 1913

membership in the Association declined from 300
The unassociated manufacturers would then

distribute their work to subcontractors in outside shops
whose workers were unorganized, thus avoiding the higher
wages agreed to under the Protocols.

As a result,

injustices were allowed to continue.

In 1916,

grave

a

fifteen-year-old married Italian girl from the City's
garment district testified to a Congressional

Investigating Commission that she did home work for
garment manufacturers, earning sixty cents a day."

Evenmore irritating to the workers was the growing
tendency of the employers, troubled by an economic
depression, to dismiss union help and replace them with

non-union workers, an obvious violation of Branders'
preferential shop as mandated by the Protocols."
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Employers also had their grievences

They were

.

angered by the growing number of
unauthorized strikes that
had become commonplace in their shops
and factories.
The

problems these work stoppages caused
should have been
settled by other means under the terms
of the Protocols.
They also objected to the "trivial"
problems they were
asked to deal with during the conciliation
and mediation
processes.
Individual workers' problems were submitted
for consideration and settlement rather than
principles
and policies of a more comprehensive nature.

Much to the disgust of the rank-and-file members,

=^

the leaders of the ILGWU continued to advocate
adherence
to their agreements.

A rancorous internal dispute took

place betweeen ILGWU officials and leadership in the local
unions.

John Dyche attempted to placate the

Manufacturers' Association, explaining that the
ant i -employer contention was being generated by

"irresponsible and irreconcilable elements in our

organization" and not by their "responsible leaders."
the same time, Dyche admonished the ILGWU'

s

At

locals about

their part in the dispute, warning them to back off or
face "severe retaliatory measures" from the central

organization
At one point, John Mitchel, Mayor of New York City,

and other prominent citizens appealed to both parties to
save the Protocols and avoid industrial conflict in the

interests of the community.

An effort was made in the
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early spring of 1916 to revise the
Protocols, a task
undertaken by Louis Brandeis, who had
to leave
the

negotiations prior to their completion to
take
the United States Supreme Court,
Robert W.

a

seat on

Bruere,

an

upper-class urban reformer and advisor to
Mayor Mitchel,
Hamilton Holt, editor of the Independent and
,

a six-membei

Council of Conciliation appointed by the Mayor."
However,

the amended agreements failed to satisfy
either

the workers or the employers.

Even though the Dress and

Waist Makers' Protocol machinery remained ostensibly
in
force until the final days of 1918, it was actually

abandoned after the fall of 1916.^8
not survive even that long.

q^^^^^ Protocols did

The failure of the Protocols

eliminated another means by which the progressive labor
reforms might have been enforced, and the abuses that the

reformers had hoped to eliminate permanently remained,
once more leaving the members of the industrial work force
at the mercy of their employers.

Organized labor, divided over the issue of protective
legislation, did little to demand more official attention
to the enforcement of the laws.

Unions were themselves

under seige, internally from the discord in their own
ranks and externally from the manufacturing interests that

were determined to debilitate them^^ and from progressive

reformers who had earlier hoped to enlist the unions in
their crusade.
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Gompers' refusal to alter his
earlier stand cost the
AFL much in the way of unity.
Radical elements in the

garment industry, frustrated by his
views and angry at his
intransigence, were more than willing
to join the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
after the split
from the United Garment Workers.
Gompers viewed the new
union as treasonous and continued his
long-time support of
the UGW.
The Amalgamated Clothing Workers accepted
the

exodus of workers from the AFL union and soon
surpassed it
in size but, in doing so, divided the voice
of organized
labor
In conclusion,

during a brief period after the

Triangle Fire attempts were made to alleviate the
dangers
and injustices suffered by industrial workers, but efforts
to enforce the new laws and building codes consistently

fell short of the ideal.

The new regulations were often

weakened and neglected even before the United States
became an active participant in World War

I.

The various

groups that had marshalled their energies and raised their

voices in the drive to bring about improvements in the

working conditions of industrial laborers found themselves
divided by internal conflicts.

The coalition that had

organized to press for legislative intervention on behalf
of factory workers broke down,

individual agendas taking

precedence over concern about the hazards existing in
industrial workplaces.

The corpus of progressive labor
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legislation proved
Ipcjo hv,-,r.
ije a less
^ to be
than impressive memorial
to the victims of the Triangle
Fire.
-;
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EPILOGUE
The Progressive Era was permeated
with a sense of
unbridled idealism and energized by a
pronounced moral
fervor.
This combination resulted in a growing
awareness
of the injustices that had been generated
by the rapidly
developing industrialism of the first decade
of the

twentieth century and a desire to eliminate those
evils
that seemed to betray the American dream.
A wide public
constituency now demanded that state and municipal
governments undertake expanded welfare and regulatory
activities.

Among the enlarged concerns of government at

both levels was a newborn interest in the protection of
industrial workers, especially those women, mostly
immigrants,

forced by the new economy to labor in

factories and workshops and endangered by the sort of

conditions that caused the Triangle Fire.

Consequently,

commissions were set up, legislation was debated and
passed, and regulations proliferated.
Sadly, however,

this flurry of activity failed to

live up to its initial promise.

Many of the political and

social groups that had demanded government intervention
lost their original fervor.

This was not surprising,

since in some cases even the initial enthusiasm had

shallow roots.

Business interests, happily distracted by

profitable war preparations and no longer concerned about
a

declining economy or the threat of ruinous competition,

saw little need to cooperate further in efforts to extend
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benefits and protections to their labor
force.

Volunteer

associations, embroiled in internal dissensions
and
disheartened by the seeming failure of previous
exertions,
redirected their energies and resources. Even
workers
themselves, too often uneasy with protective
legislation
that placed unwanted limitations on them,
failed to demand
adequate enforcement and attempted to undermine
or evade
the very laws created to safeguard them.
Coalitions that
once prompted cooperation among unlikely allies now

weakened or disintegrated as previous concerns fell by
the
wayside and new considerations became paramount.

Legislation only recently passed was often
disregarded.

Building codes inspired by the need to

prevent tragedies as appalling as the Washington Square
fire were sometimes halfheartedly monitored and enforced.

Strategies like the industrial protocols that promised
some degree of protection for workers were discarded.

The

progressive dynamism that had generated such optimistic
expectations lost its vitality and abated, and

accomplishments realized through the joint efforts of so

many individuals and groups were notsustained
After the United States declared war on Germany in
the spring of 1917,

the position of labor improved,

especially in terms of wages and other short-range
benefits.

At the same time, however, businessmen and

conservative politicians waged a behind- the-scene
campaign, using the exigencies created by the war, to
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negate earlier gains won by labor.

m

New York State, the

legislature approved a bill that actually
permitted the
Industrial Commission to suspend all laws designed
to
protect labor for the duration of the war.^ The
WTUL
leaders were, however, still vigilant, and now
they had a
new source of political clout; women had recently,
through
a

state-wide referendum in New York State, received
the

vote.

The League lobbied Governor Charles Whitman against

the moratorium on regulation and rejoiced when he
vetoed
the bill.

On the other hand, Samuel Gompers and his close

associates in the AFL objected to a directive issued by
the National War Labor Board in 1918 forbidding employers
to interfere with the unionization of their employees.

Gompers looked askance at the measure, since he feared it

would lead to government intervention in collective

bargaining after the conclusion of the war.^

He

continued to fiercely defend his belief in voluntarism,
arguing, even in the face of growing disenchantment with
the concept in union circles,

that government and social

workers should not "carry the ball" for labor.
he said,

"Labor,"

"wanted to get things done for itself.""*

Workers flocked to join unions during the war years.

Although they had to trade away their right to strike,
labor organizations were aided by increasing wages,

government protection of union recognition, improved
hours, and other advances.

Membership in the AFL from
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1917 to 1918 increased by over a million.

=

The Wil son

administration, concerned with a crucial labor
shortage
the face of increasing wartime demands on
American
industry, was willing to maintain a conciliatory

relationship with organized labor.

The administration

encouraged union membership and guaranteed the
benefits
that made such membership attractive.

Unfortunately,

women workers throughout the nation seldom participated
the benefits received by their male counterparts
during

World War

I

.

After the 1918 armistice, organized labor found
itself a victim of the reactionary and repressive

atmosphere that pervaded the nation.

In New York State,

even with Al Smith holding the gubernatorial office, the
upstate, business-controlled legislature, directed by it

ultra-conservative Republican leadership, blocked all
legislative efforts to improve the position of the state
industrial workers.

Not only did legislators refuse to

enact any new, meaningful laws, they did all they could

weaken or repeal existing laws.

The courts, at both the

state and national levels, also joined in efforts to

sabotage labor's earlier achievements.
Employers emerged from the war years determined to
reassert their previous dominance.

Joining together in

powerful associations, they did battle with organized
labor during the early 1920'

s,

and,

encouraged by the

pro-business administrations in Washington, they emerged

victorious.

Despite years of bitter strikes, labor
found
itself struggling not only with employers
but with the
government and the American public, which
had grown
increasingly suspicious of labor.
People in all ranks of
American life had been influenced by the efforts
of

anti-labor elements to connect unions and striking
wcnkers
with un-Americanism and the threat of Bolshevism.'
Union
membership, as a result, declined before 1925 by
1,500,000."

Organized labor and its allies found

themselves forced to retreat durin(7 the "return to
normalcy" decade.

The employers,

emerging victorious from

the struggle, dictated terms to the quiescent labor

organizations.

While conditions in the workplace never

declined to what they had been in 1911, little progress
was made in attaining industrial justice.
The rank-and-file womon workers in the garment

industry failed to sustain their earlier milit.nu'y (iuring
the 1920' s.

This was at least partly due Lo the fact that

Italians were replacing the more assertive Jewish women in
the factories.''

These new workers tended to rely for

protection more on the paternalism of their employers than
on their membership in labor unions.

They often failed to

realize that the employers' benevolence was mot Ivat-oci by
the manufacturers' desire to discourage their employees

from organizing.
The employers' distaste for militant unionism was so

pronounced that many of them preferrtMi federal protective
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legislation rather than a revitalized
union movement.Other voices were also raised, for
opposing
reasons,

in

calls for federal intervention in labor
affairs.

Encouraged, perhaps, by their efforts at
the national
level on behalf of women's suffrage, the
WTUL was foremost
among them.
The League had promoted the idea of

establishing a Women's Labor Bureau in the Federal
Labor
Department and were gratified when, in 1918,
this was

accomplished.^^

They began, as early as February 1918,

to actively agitate for federal rather than
state

legislation mandating an eight-hour day for women workers.

They also called for federal regulations to ensure
one
full day of rest in every seven work days and to
guarantee

that women would be required to work no more than half a

day on Saturdays.
Not only was the WTUL focusing its attention more

often on Washington, D.C. than on the State House in
Albany,

it was identifying more and more closely with the

Democratic party.
existence,

During the early years of its

the League had many socialist members; others

had been supporters of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive

party or moderate Republicans.

After the war, however,

American socialism was rendered impotent as

a

result of

government persecution and its own internecine conflicts.

During the 1920'

s,

the Republican party fell more

completely under the control of conservative elements in
the party.

Inasmuch as the WTUL had been greatly assisted

"

in its reform endeavors in New York
by the state

Democratic party and by Democratic governors
Al Smith and
Franklin Roosevelt, members of the League
subsequently
tended to associate themselves with the
Democratic

party

.

This relationship was rewarded after Franklin
D.

Roosevelt was elected to the presidency in 1932.
Roosevelt, who had become

a

Eleanor

member of the WTUL after World

War I," introduced Rose Schneiderman to her husband
who,
in turn,

frequently called on this dedicated advocate for

working women for counsel on labor problems
Perkins, a former member of the
the Triangle Fire and who had,

WTUL'"^

.

Frances

who had witnessed

like Schneiderman, become

convinced of the need for protection for workers,

came

to Washington to serve in the Roosevelt cabinet as a

spokesperson for labor interests.

These women and their

associates, many of them people like Robert Wagner, all

deeply involved in efforts to protect industrial workers
since the time of the Triangle Fire, helped focus the

attention of the new administration on labor issues.

They

gave the public the impression that the Roosevelt

Administration was far more sympathetic to the needs of
America's working class than it actually was.
The National Industrial Recovery Act in its famous

Section 7a guaranteed labor the right to organize and

bargain collectively.

The National Recovery

Administration further attempted to protect the working
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man and woman by establishing a minimum
wage and
abolishing child labor. After much of the
NRA was

abolished by the Supreme Court, new protective
legislation
was more carefully drafted with the Wagner
Act.
This

important piece of legislation prohibited unfair
labor

practices and further guaranteed labor the right
to
organize, a right earlier granted to workers in

the NIRA's

Section 7a.

At the same time,

the Wagner Act and other

New Deal legislation sounded the death knell for
Samuel
Gompers' voluntarism.

Organized labor would no longer be

able direct its own destiny, independent of employers and
the government.

Henceforth, American workers, even when

unionized, would be dependent for protection on the

federal government
Those allies of working women who came to Washington

during the New Deal period were especially concerned about
the passage of protective legislation for female workers
and,

encouraged by the First Lady and members of the Labor

Department, worked to improve the status of women workers,

especially in regard to hours and wages.

Severe

restrictions were placed on industrial home work and
states were encouraged to continue their efforts to

protect women who found it necessary to do industrial

work
While protection for workers became a reality under
the New Deal,

there were still those,

like Max Blanck and

Isaac Harris, who were willing to place human lives in

jeopardy in their single-minded pursuit of
profits.
November 23, 1960, a letter was printed in

On

the "Letters to

the Editor" section of the New York Times.

It was

written

by Leon Stein, the dedicated editor of the ILGWU

publication Justice, who would in 1962 pen the story
of
the Triangle Fire as a memorial to the 14 6 workers
who
perished.

had

Stein warned New Yorkers that loft buildings in

the city much like the infamous Asch building were
still

being used for manufacturing purposes.

They were, he

claimed, as unsafe then as they had been in 1911.

The

wooden partitions and staircases and the open air shafts
could all cause the spread of fires, and it was just too

costly to install sprinklers in the structures.

The only

solution, he argued, was to demolish these firetraps.

Two years earlier,

in March 1958,

a fire had

out at the Monarch Undergarment Company,

broken

just five blocks

from the site of the Asch Building on Washington Square.

Before it was converted to serve as a factory, it had been
a

warehouse- -one of Stein's loft buildings.

It was

seventy-seven years old, six stories high, and equipped

with a defective fire escape.

The Monarch fire claimed

twenty-four victims.^®

motivated the state

It also

legislature to enact several measures to ensure the safety
of factory workers.

In March of 1961,

however, a bill was

passed by the same state legislature that, if approved by
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the governor, would have dismantled
the safety precautions
legislated just three years earlier.

Perhaps history does repeat itself.
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2835
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$
$
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9,

856 00
.

$25,250 .00
$13, 755 00
.
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Industrial Commission for the Fiscal Years 1914-1915 to
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It was found in Baker, Elizabeth F.,
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